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ABSTRACT
This is essentially a field experimental, psycholo-
gical study of the response of a group of car salesmen to
a change in their incentive payment scheme.
It is suggested that the ethos of the Human
Relations movement has inhibited research for a number of
years and that the concepts of this movement investigated
by Whitehead (1938), Roethlisberger & Dickson ,(1964),
Maslow (1943), Herzberg (1968) and Deci (1971) and
propounded by McGregor (1961), Argyris (1962) and 'Mayo
(1975) are not supported by the evidence while research
does establish that pay can, and does, enhance performance
in the work place.
This hypothesis is investigated in a group of car
salesmen - firstly by establishing a personality profile
suitable to the characteristics of the job (which are
described) and then by changing the payment system of a
small group of salesmen, so that they are able, and can
expect to, optimise their income for a period of six
months by selling more vehicles and by increasing the
amount of the profit in each unit sold.
At the end of the experimental period it was found
that the number of units sold by the experimental group
was significantly higher than performance in a previous
period and greater than the control groups. However, the
profit per unit appears to have decreased. It is also
found that high self-esteem and an internal locus of
control are related to sales performance.
While it is not possible to ascribe causality for
any changes to the experimental manipulation with any
degree of certainty, there are indications that the
opportunity to optimise
	
income did influence the
salesmens performance.
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this research is to establish, in a
manner which would have credibility among, practising
managers in the motor trade, whether pay could influence
behaviour, particularly sales behaviour, by enhancing
performance. 25 years ago Shimmin (1959:22) stated, while
talking about the commonly held view that productivity
will improve in response to a system of pay that links pay
to performance, 'The truth of this assumption has not been
demonstrated scientifically.' This comment still remains
valid.
By its very nature this research falls generally
into the area called 'motivation' research. This has
recently received a great deal of attention as there
appears to be a dichotomy of views, both among managers
and researchers, as to what does motivate performance.
With the current economic climate managers are actively
seeking a solution to this dilemma In particular, the
role of pay in influencing performance continues to be a
matter of debate - some managers believing views put
forward by the Human Relations movement that pay is not a
primary motivator, and can even reduce motivation on an
interesting task (Deci 1971), while others accept the more
traditional view that if you want someone to work harder
then pay must be linked to effort and performance.
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Much of the literature and many sociological
studies (Roy 1952, Lupton 1963, Bowey et al 1982) are
capable of a variety of interpretations so it is left to
the empiricism of the psychologist to attempt to establish
truth and causality. There have been a number of labora-
tory studies within a variety of theoretical perspectives
(Adams 1963, Locke 1968, Pritchard 1973) but few field
experimental studies, one of the few techniques which has
total ecological validity. In the days before the Second
World War, when it was not considered unethical, 	 there
were a number of studies which manipulated pay. Burnett
(1925) set up a small factory in a room of the University
and taking girls who were unemployed gave them a job for
15 weeks paying them firstly on time rate and then
according to a piece-work system. Wyatt et al (1934)
separated a group of girls from the main factory and
changed their pay system from a time rate, to a bonus
system and then to a piece-rate system and, of course, the
Hawthorne Studies moved girls into a separate department
and changed their pay. One doubts whether such experiments
would be ethically acceptable today.
Field experiments since.then tend to manipulate an
additional financial reward rather than the pay system
itself (Pritchard et al 1976, Latham et al 1978, Luthans
et al 1981) so although the influence of a financial
reward can be established, one cannot necessarily draw
similar conclusions about the influence of pay from this
evidence. This research is an attempt to establish in a
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field experiment whether pay influences behaviour and is
therefore, in this respect, unusual.
The subjects are a group of car salesmen. Car
salesmen are a particularly interesting group of people
to study as they seem to contradict much of the current
Human Relations paradigm of work motivation. They seem
to be competitive and gregarious at the same time. They
seem to strive and work hard for additional financial
income while at the same time getting a great kick out of
the intrinsic achievement and satisfaction of selling a
product; demonstrating both extrinsic and intrinsic
motivation at the same time.
Salesmen, generally, have a negative image but the
car salesman can be regarded as the 'Definitive' stereo-
typical salesman. For example, the Observer (October 2nd
1983), reflecting public opinion, describe his role as
'an obstructive force as he tinkers irritatingly with the
customers pre-set ideas trying to sell him extras he does
not want, or guide him up the range to another model he
has no intention of buying.' In the same article the BL
salesman is described as
He possesses a range of ill-fitting light coloured
budget-account suits and his shoes are always a shade
too fast - coloured grey or blue, or over-decorated
with tassels or buttons or too high in the heel.
This research is among such men, although there is
little evidence from the salesmen seen and interviewed
during the course of this research, to justify either
these comments or the popular stereotype.
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Although it is the intention of this research to
examine the literature on pay and to present and test a
theory driven pay system and so to draw empirical
conclusions which should have practical value to managers,
it is not argued that the values and principles put
forward by proponents of Human Relations Movement are
wrong. It is, however, the authors view that the
importance of pay in the motivation of individual
behaviour has been understated and misunderstood because
research and academic attention has been focused on
intrinsic, group and the social aspects of motivation.
For example, McGregor (1966:24) states quite specifically
that, 'Economic rewards are certainly important to the
professional, but there is ample research to demonstrate
that they do not provide the primary incentive to peak
performance.'
Both McGregor (1966) and Argyris (1962) have
propounded the view that pay is not a major incentive or
motivator, and both have been influential in altering
managerial and academic attitudes to the detriment of pay
research.
Because the subjects of the study are salesmen it
is necessary to understand the job and its environment.
Chapter Two, therefore, describes the job of the car
salesman and evaluates his problems and difficulties.
Chapter Three takes a detailed look at the liter-
ature on pay from the perspective of the psychologist.
There is a great deal written about pay. There are
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articles by laymen propounding a particular viewpoint,
articles by economists dealing with the role of pay in the
economic system, articles by Industrial Relations experts
concerned with bargaining, and sociological studies of
various organisations and environments. To keep the
review to manageable proportions this review tends to
look at the empirical evidence of how pay influences
performance in individuals, although where a study is
particularly interesting or relevant it is included.
According to such criteria the governments review of
payment by results systems (National Board for Prices and
Incomes, Report No 65, 1968) has been excluded but
Millwards (1968) has been included. Shimmins (1959)
sociological study which gives such interesting views on
how workers perceive the payment system and suggests
the principle of functional understanding is excluded,
while the empirical study (also part of Shimmins (1959)
research) by Buck (1957) is included.
In some such reviews, motivational theories are
classified into Process and Content Theories (Campbell &
Pritchard 1976), but it is considered that, as this review
examines motivational theories from the perspective of how
they view pay the High Profile and Low Profile classifica-
tion suggested in 3 accurately reflects this perspective.
Chapter Four discusses the generality of pay
research as it applies it to salesmen. Because behaviour
is viewed as a function of, not only the pay system, but
also the unique personality of the individual it is
- 17 -
necessary to establish whether there are any specific
personality characteristics which mediate successful
selling, and see whether these personality traits make
their response to the pay system more definitive.
Chapter Five describes a payment system, based on
the principles of Expectancy Theory, devised by the author
and designed to enhance the performance of car salesmen.
Chapter Six attempts to give the reader an insight
into the world of the motor-trade - the research environ-
ment.
Chapter Seven explains the methodology of the
research and describes some of the problems encountered
during the course of this field study, many of which are
probably endemic to this type of research.
Chapter Eight presents the results from two
studies, by their very nature exploratory, which examine
the perception of and personality of car salesmen.
Finally Chapter Nine presents the results obtained
from experimentally manipulating the payment system of a
group of car salesmen.
This is an unusual study as most modern research
into pay is not experimental. The results of the study
are not conclusive. However, it is argued that the
results do indicate that pay does influence performance
and that research of this nature is important and needs
encouragement and stimulation if psychologists are ever
to understand how pay influences adult behaviour.
CHAPTER 2 
THE JOB OF A CAR SALESMAN
Introduction
Haggling and bargaining have unpleasant
connotations for many Englishmen. The process conjures
up pictures of the Far East where Levantine Merchants
take unwary English tourists for a ride. Yet the use of
bargaining to resolve conflicting desires is precisely
how one can define the process of selling a car. It is a
common, if complex, inter-personal situation.
In the car sales situation bargaining is almost
impossible to avoid. Bonoma (1979) reports a field study
where experimenters called on a number of car dealers and
tried to buy one at full list price. No one succeeded.
As Bonoma (1979:157) reports:
. . . the salesman never fails to take her aside and
say, "perhaps there is something you don't understand
about buying a car." He then ordinarily goes on to
tell her that people bargain for automobiles: they
do not pay list price!
It is the concept of price bargaining which
differentiates selling from the process of serving in a
shop. In a shop the customer originates the transaction;•
there is little or no financial gain for the shop
assistant contingent on the sale, and the standardisation
of the products and prices ensure the absence of any
negotiation. We need, therefore, to define the role of
the industrial and durable goods salesmen whose job is
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far more complex than just serving a customer. In this
case selling is an inter-active bargaining situation
between two unique individuals, initiated and controlled
by the salesman, the central feature of which is the
persuasive communication regarding a commerical
proposition.
What this chapter does, therefore, is examine the
different aspects of the job of a car salesman, particu-
larly those aspects which make selling more difficult and
the salesman less effective. For example, the reputation
of the salesman means that customers approach him with
some suspicion while the fact that most customers have a
car which they wish to offer in part-exchange further
complicates the situation.
The Car Salesman (the Customers' Perspective)
Even though almost everyone nowadays has a personal
experience of buying a car, they approach car salesmen
with a certain amount of trepidation. This, to some
extent, is a consequence of the salesman's reputation but
to a large extent is due to the situation. During the US
Presidential campaign of 1968 the Democrats used a slogan,
under a picture of Nixon stating, 'Would you buy a used
car from this man?' (Figure 2:1) implying the necessity
for an enormous amount of trust in the situation together
with little expectation that such trust was going to be
justified.
From the customers perspective, if salesmen
generally have an unsavoury reputation then the car
FIGURE 2:1 
1968
Poster used by Democratic Party During 1968 
Presidential Campaign 
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salesman is the epitome of all such characters and is
described by Brown (1973:28)
He cut his teeth selling used cars in Livernois, the
used car capital of the world. He wore herring-bone
suits, his shoes were pointed and polished; on his
right hand he wore a two carat diamond ring; he lied
glibbly; he had no conscience, no pity for the
suckers; he was the architype successful car hustler;
the razzle-dazzle near nefarious business suited him
perfectly.
More recently the Director General of the Motor
Agents Association, (Dix 1984) after a survey of 47
salesmen, described them as:
. . . they date from the 50's. Spent and faintly
shifty. They were mostly a mixed bag of wide boys,
has beens and misfits. Sales patter apart, they
remind me of our Arthur Dailey, except that he is
better dressed even though he wears hush-puppies with
a blue suit and trilby.
It is the opinion of the author after many years
in the motor trade that these ideas are mistaken. Car
salesmen are normally young men just doing a job and
trying to make a living; but the nature of the situation
is such that it makes a large amount of trust necessary.
From the customers' perspective the car is either the
largest or second largest purchase of a life-time. The
importance of such a purchase is only exceeded by the
fact that many people have little or no knowledge about
the price, the model range and availability of cars, so
they need to trust salesmen. It is a potentially
difficult situation, so it is easy to understand why the
prospective purchaser approached the situation with a
certain amount of trepidation.
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The Customer (A Salesman's Perspective)
To a car salesman all customers are different and
need to be approached with caution. The fact that they
have a part-exchange (with which there is undoubtedly
something wrong which they do not wish to disclose) is
grounds for suspicion at least. The trade is rife with
horror stories of angelic vicars who, after a price has
been agreed on their part-exchange, then proceed to
remove the tax disc, take out the radio and change the
wheels for ones with older tyres. It is a common
experience for salesmen to be deceived about the year and
the mileage on a customer's part-exchange.
Customers look different, they want different
things, and go about getting them in different ways. In
the motor trade in particular the customer is, in the
jargon of the advertising agencies, pre-sold by the multi-
million pound advertising campaigns of the motor
manufacturers and so come to the car sales showroom with
a whole number of expectations. He expects immediate
delivery in his favourite colour with the options (sun-
roof, radio, etc) that he selects when, often, such a
combination is not available. Compromises over the
specification of new cars are almost always necessary.
A great deal is known from consumer research about
how customers behave and their attitudes. This is not the
place to evaluate this research in any great depth (for
reviews see Engel, Blackwell and Kollat, 1978, Kassarjian
1982), but a number of studies of car purchasers
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demonstrate the complexity and variability of the situation.
It is clear that customers vary considerably in the
amount of information that they seek before buying a car.
If they already own a particular model and have had no
problems then they are likely to buy the same make, even
model, again without evaluating the alternatives available
(Bennett and Mandell, 1969). Further confirmation of
comparatively limited evaluation is provided by research
which established that 75% of potential purchasers visit
only two dealers (or less) and that two-thirds of these
bought the same brand of car again (Newman and Staelin
1972). It would appear that the amount of information
sought and evaluation undertaken is comparatively slight
for such an expensive purchase. It is only if the
prospective purchaser has had problems with his existing
car that he will make a substantial effort to find and
evaluate the alternatives (Kiel and Layton 1981).
One of the most comprehensive studies which
evaluates and classifies car purchasers according to their
information seeking behaviour was undertaken by Furse et al
(1984). An interesting aspect of this study is that the
patterns of information seeking behaviour identified by the
researchers were also used by salesmen to classify
customers, presumably to assist adaptive sales behaviour.
Using a sample of 1031 "principle decision makers" together
with questionnaire and interview data the researchers were
able (by cluster analysis) to classify car purchasers into
six information seeking categories:-
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a) A Low Search Group	 26%
(Spends least time obtaining information,
has owned more cars, highest income)
b) A Purchase-Pal Assisted Group	 19%
(Least experienced, owned fewer cars,
little confidence, less satisfied with
current car)
c) A High Search Group	 5%
(Spends greatest amount of time obtaining
information, low confidence, best educated)
d) A High Self-Search Group 	 12%
(Spends a great deal of time on but does
not involve others in purchase, well
educated, high income, male, considers
many models)
e) A Retail Shopper Group	 5%
(Large number of decision makers involved,
consider a lot of makes)
f) A Moderate Search Group	 32%
(Below average time in search activity,
don't involve others, older males)
An interesting aspect of the study was that the
researchers then asked a group of 47 car salesmen to
classify customers in a similar way. The researchers
identified six categories of purchasers who appeared to
have similar characteristics to those identified from the
consumer information. (See Figure 2:2)
a) The Negotiator
(Takes up a great deal of time, makes several visits,
high income, hard sell)
b) The Inexperienced Shopper
(A first time buyer, unrealistic expectations,
visits many dealerships)
The Lone Shopper
(Makes purchase alone, knows exactly what he wants,
most experienced)
d)	 The Family Shopper
(Family involved, little time at dealership, not hard
bargainer)
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e) The Pain-in-the-Neck
(Hardest bargainer, visits many dealerships,
hardest to please)
f) The Moderate Search Group
(Visits fewer dealerships, easy to please, self-
assured)
As Figure 2:2 shows the customer self-report information
and the categorisation evolved from the salesmen seem to
have a great deal of similarity.
FIGURE 2:2 RELATIONSHIP OF CUSTOMER AND SALES PERSONNEL
CATEGORISATION 
Customer	 Salesmen 
Purchase-Pal Shopper 	 Inexperienced Shopper
Moderate Search Shopper 	  Moderate Search Shopper
Family Shopper
Low Search Shopper 	
Lone Shopper
High Search Shopper
Pain-in-the-Neck Shopper
Self-Reliant Shopper
From this it can be seen that car salesmen, by
intuition, skill and experience, come to similar
conclusions about customers as does the sophisticated
statistical analysis. The researchers comment:-
It is interesting to note that sales personnel who
participated in the study did not tend to readily
offer types of customers based on search strategy.
Rather they appeared to respond to specific character-
istics of customers. Informal discussions with sales
personnel in the early stages of the study suggested
that they tended to use cues such as "pipe-smoker"
"carries a clipboard" and so on as indicators of a
time consuming or difficult sale, while recognising
that people with small children tended to be rather
easy or quick sales.
Customers also vary in their personality character-
istics.
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According to Evans (1959) a car is a very real extension
of the owners desired personality; consequently Ford
owners appear to have a significantly greater need for
exhibition and dominance than Chevrolet owners, who
appear to have a significantly greater need for autonomy
and affiliation than Ford owners. Westfall (1962)
considers that convertable owners are significantly more
active, impulsive and sociable than saloon car owners.
However, neither of these researchers was subsequently
able to predict either brand or model purchasers in a
controlled setting. This line of research is interesting
as it appears intuitively likely that the colour and
style of a car is a reflection of the owners desired
personality. Certainly this is a popular belief. However,
subsequent research in this area appears to have ceased
following criticism by Steiner (1961) and Winick (1961)
who suggest that Evans (1959) sample was biased, his
statistics did not reach acceptable standards and his
psychometric measures were unreliable.
It has also been suggested that the purchase of a
car is (or maybe was) a particularly male domain. Davis
(1970) established clear patterns of decision dominance
between husband and wife in various domestic purchases.
Apparently the husband decides when to buy, how much to
spend, what make and model and where to buy the car.
- 28 -
It is also possible for characteristics to be
identified which determine if a customer is going to buy
the latest model or switch to another make. Wiseman
(1971) measured socio-economic and demographic variables
(particularly information, search pattern and usage
expectations) which discriminated the new season buyer,
while Ito (1967) is able to discriminate between loyal
product buyers and brand switchers, from their attitudes
to the product characteristics.
Bell (1967) in a study of new car buyers found
that low self-confidence buyers asked for the support of
another person to buy a car and so formed a buying team,
identified as a 'purchase pal shopper' by the salesmen in
the Furse et al (1984) study. However, he did not find
that high, specifically car buying self-esteem made
persuadibility harder.
Such research on the interaction between high and
low levels of customer and salesman's self-esteem could
tell us a great deal more about the interaction, and could
provide an explanation for the findings of Cialdini et al
(1979) who discovered that tough initial bargaining will
result in the customer being offered a lower price on a
new car.
Physical appearance is also a factor in the Car
Sale interaction. Wise (1974) in a study of 19 new car
salesmen faced with customers of different races, sex
and dress, found that women and well dressed men were
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treated better in all respects than others.
If customers vary so greatly according to these
clearly identifiable ways of approaching the purchase of
a car, then it is necessary for a successful and competCAt
salesman to develop a method for identifying and class-
ifying customers. Interviews (see Appendix c) and
discussions with salesmen suggest that salesmen do appear
to adopt techniques for dealing with the enormous variety
of complex interpersonal factors that they face. They
appear to categorise people and situations in a variety
of ways.
This process of categorisation is necessary to
ease and facilitate the development of trust during the
social interaction. However, there is a danger that it
may hinder the sale if, as Tajfel (1981:6) suggests the
salesman only seeks information to confirm his original
stereotypical impressions, rather than seek to adapt and
re-classify in the light of additional information
obtained at a later stage of the sales interaction. Furse
et al (1984)provided interesting empirical evidence for
the categorisation of customers by a group of car salesmen
while this research has found (Chapter 7) indications of
the way a group of car salesmen classify customers
according to their friendliness, co-operativeness,
character, temperament and dress. Interviews with
salesmen (Appendix C) reveal their ideosyncratic way of
stereotyping. One particular salesman (No 6 Appendix C)
commented,
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I don't think any two are the same. I think they are
all different. You obviously get your Managing
Directors on one scale and your sort of Family Man.
And the Whiz-Kid, if you like, the ones that want to
buy a sports car. You can put them in those sort of
categories, I suppose. The odd woman, single woman
that's probably in a good job and wants to buy a
motor car. You know, a nurse, or recently we sold a
car to a woman Custom's Officer. You can put them in
those sort of categories - but I think, you know, one
Managing Director is very much like another Managing
Director, - a Family man, one Family man is very much
like another Family man . . .
Such a technique enables the salesman to form a
subjective expectancy of whether his efforts to sell are
likely to succeed.
It would appear from this evidence that car
salesmen have workable stereotypes and are able to
classify people accurately according to ideosyncratic
schemes.
Given that even the best salesman is able to sell
successfully to only 20% of the customers with whom he
has interaction and has, therefore, to face rejection
about 80% of the time, such initial evaluation
strategies appear necessary to protect the salesman's
self-esteem, particularly when faced with a high self-
esteem customer (Bell 1967).
The Part Exchange
Because in todays affluent society most people
already have a car to part-exchange, the 'part-exchange'
asit is know colloquially in the trade, becomes an
important focus of the transaction. Because the salesman
and the customer have to interact to decide the price
for the 'part-exchange', it is impossible for
- 31 -
management to do anything other than trust the salesman's
negotiating and bargaining ability. Some efforts have
been made by some companies to reduce this risk (see the
Pendle System Appendix A) by having an expert, called 'A
Controller' direct and control the activities of four or
five salesmen. There is no evidence that such procedures
work in practice and many apocryphal stories of situations
where they do not work. (See Appendix A)
In the car purchase situation, trust between the
individuals concerned is difficult and there are many
opportunities for conflict. Not only does the customer
approach the car salesman with a certain amount of
suspicion because of the car salesman's reputation, but
car salesmen have many of the same views regarding the
trust-worthiness of their customers. Some of this
apprehension undoubtedly stems from the fact that the
customer is almost always interested in selling his old
car and the salesman is well aware of the tricks and
techniques of selling a used car. Brown (1976:50) found,
in her group of American car salesmen, a certain degree
of distrust of customers. One of these salesmen comments,
You know where we learn most of the dirty tricks?
From our customers. We learn from them. Each one of
them comes in with something a little different to
try and cheat you. They are all experts and they
bring their friends in.
The situation is similar in the British market.
There are a number of, no doubt apocryphal, stories told
by a salesman of being cheated by customers after the
deal has been agreed. During the course of this study
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one salesman commented
Car salesmen, I think, have a reputation for being a
bit sharp and this sort of thing. But I think the
sharpest one is the customer when he comes in.
The situation has a certain amount of logic about
it. A customer will only want another car when there is
a failure with or something wrong with his existing
vehicle. He needs or wants the highest price for his car
and is reluctant to disclose any defects on his
car which may radically effect its price. A common
occurance is for the customer to forget to bring the
registration book with him and, when the new vehicle is
delivered and the old one taken into dealership, the car
turns out to be a year older than was disclosed in the
first instance. This can make a difference of up to
£500 on the value of the car. Customers will also
"clock" vehicles. That is, they will alter the odometer
4-0 Sh0w. oh.	 reduced mileage in order
to increase the part-exchange value of their vehicle.
One can hardly blame the salesman for facing such a
potential interaction with a certain degree of trepidation
and caution.
It is the price of the 'part-exchange' which decides
the bargain. This figure decides which new car the
customer can afford and it influences the profit on the
total transaction. Consequently, it is important that
the salesman gets this figure right both for the customer
and the dealer. A great deal of skill is needed in
evaluating, not only the condition of the vehicle but,
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the market demand for the vehicle. For no apparent
reason some cars and some colours are more desirable than
others and, therefore, lose their value less quickly.
Knowing which cars sell well, what are the common problems
with a particular model, which colours are difficult to
sell and whether there are any local market peculiarities
which may influence the re-sale value of the 'part-
exchange' are all attributes needed to evaluate a cust-
omers 'part-exchange'. They enable the salesman to offer
a price for the customers existing car which is not only
satisfactory to him, but which will enable the dealership
to make a profit. The sale is agreed on the salesman's
evaluation of the 'part-exchange'. It is possible,
because of the method of accounting, for this car to be
sold later for either a profit or a loss without
influencing the commission paid or profit made on the
original transaction. Good salesmen can persuade a
customer to accept a reasonable price - bad salesmen give
the highest price for the part-exchange. The ethos
within the trade is that a good salesman is not the one
who can sell a new car (anyone can do that on price) but
the one who can value the part-exchange and persuade the
customer to accept a reasonable figure.
The 'part-exchange' also serves as a general source
of information to the salesman about the customer. Often
the initial impression that a salesman makes about a
customer is based on the car that he is currently driving.
It reveals a great deal of information about taste, class
and in which car the prospect is likely to be interested.
- - 34 -
The part-exchange becomes the impression formation
process. Brown (1976) found a similar process occuring
in her group of American car salesmen. She comments:-
The Used Car Salesman is not left completely without
clues. The customers car is quite often a valuable
source of information containing miscellaneous sports
gear, childrens toys, vacation stickers, ski sacks and
the like. All give a salesman a clue as to what kind
of car the customer wants and what kind of man he is.
The car itself (the make, age and model) is an
important clue. The salesman knows intuitively, as May
(1969) has shown empirically, that there is a direct
relationship between the experience a customer has had
with a particular make of car and the probability of him
buying that type of car, or class of car, again.
The part-exchange is a potential source of major
problems to the salesman. Not only does the price offered
for it decide the profit on the new vehicle sold and hence
the salesman's income, but the fact of its existence makes
price bargaining an essential feature of the car sales
process. Price bargaining has all the possibilities for
distrust and conflict. If a salesman gets this part of
the deal wrong he can be in trouble, not only with his
sales manager for failing to make a profit, but also with
customers who have a propensity to come in to complain if
they feel that they have been unfairly treated. The role
of the part-exchange in the car selling process is most
important.
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Micro-Environmental Factors 
As if the job of selling is not difficult enough in
itself, the salesman's life is made more difficult by the
environment in which he works. There are three particular
aspects of this environment which make the process of
selling more difficult. These are
a) Management attitude towards salesmen
b) The pay system
c) The utilization of time not spent in face to face
interaction with customers
Management Attitudes 
Unfortunately, even his own bosses do not regard
the car salesmen as being particularly competent.
Consequently, he has a comparatively low status within the
garage. In the course of this research one sales manager,
during an interview commented, ' . . . the salesmen are all
rogues,' while another remarked,
Oh no, they're all nice people, I mean don't get me
wrong, it's just that they tend to leave things when
you are not watching them all the time. The
frustration bit, but you live with it, and forget it.
In a way, this attitude is quite surprising, as
many General Managers and Managing Directors are
ex-salesmen. Perhaps many of these attitudes stem from
information on sales effectiveness supplied by the most
important influence in the life of a dealership, the
manufacturer (Frazier 1983).
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The manufacturers undertake from time to time an
evaluation of salesmen. Comparatively recently, British
Leyland undertook such an exercise and were disappointed
to find that few salesmen, "qualified" (1) the customer, by
asking basic questions concerned with the ability of the
customer to buy the car and even fewer salesmen
presented the product in the way British Leyland expected
them to. The survey concludes,
The fact remains the survey results give great cause
for concern at a time when the market for new cars is
contracting. Each sales opportunity must be
capitalised upon. Salesmen's attitudes were too
passive, they were polite, courteous, and quite
helpful but left far too much initiative to the
customers instead of seizing it for themselves.
Early in 1982, Toyota undertook a similar research
exercise (Marketing and Research Consultants, 1982) with
similar results. They commented,
The overall performance of Toyota dealers (salesmen)
was low, with a limited number of exceptions.
They commented that the salesman's collection of
information about customers was generally poor, the sales
presentation in terms of behavioural actions showed that
less than half of those behaviours reasonably expected
were being done. Less than half the salesmen offered a
test drive, and discounts were readily offered.
(1) Qualifying is the sales process of identifying
customer requirements by asking a series of appro-
priate questions. For example, finding out the cash
available.
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In 1980, the motor trade consultants, R Sewells and
Associates Limited, undertook a review and commented that,
"Salesmanship of this level of mediocracy will drive hard
working dealers into bankruptcy in 1980/1981."
Based on this evidence, the manufacturers conclude
that salesmen in the United Kingdom are incompetent. Yet,
many of these views are just not justified by the evidence
because the technique for evaluating salesmen, called,
The Mystery Shopper Exercise, is methodologically suspect.
For example, in the BL study, the market research depart-
ment used 50 couples who went to 500 BL outlets in the
United Kingdom and pretended they were going to buy a car.
In reality, the wife was a research interviewer who
subsequently observed the salesman's behaviour and
performance and then allocated marks according to a pre-
established pattern. For example, marks would be given
for showroom appearance, the amount of time the couple
had to wait before being introduced, the method of
introduction (that is whether the salesman mentioned his
name, whether the salesman asked the customer's name), the
process known as qualifying the customers needs,
presenting the technical benefits, the method of trade-in,
valuation, closing the deal and an overall rating of
salesman's performance. All the other surveys used a
similar technique.
Essentially what happens is that a manufacturer has
identified these and other fairly precise behavioural
sequences as good salesmanship. For example, the
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manufacturers believe that if a salesman takes a customer
for a test drive, then the probability of a sale is high.
This view is based on market research correlational
studies which have identified that many customers who
purchase cars have been for a test drive. It is equally
possible that the causal relationship is the reverse of
that suspected and that the customer, who has decided to
buy then goes for a test drive, rather than the test drive
influencing the purchasing decision.
The behavioural models put forward by the
manufacturers and subsequently used in training and
evaluating salesmen, have little credibility amongst car
salesmen. Some believe that the model will work but that
it just does not apply to them. Others try hard to follow
the guidelines laid down but adapt it to their individual
style, so that the process becomes unrecognisable.
In reality, selling is an interactive process
between two individuals, so that each must adapt to the
behavioural sequence offered by the other. A pre-
patterned sequence of behaviour is just not an effective
way of influencing another person. It often happens that
the particularly good salesmen fail the mystery shopper
exercise miserably. They do not perform the sequence of
events specified. It is suspected, by this researcher,
that the mystery shopper is evaluated and intuitively
identified as a time waster. The pretend customer (or
mystery shopper) fails the impression formation and
categorization stage of the sales process, so the salesman
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will not exert his maximum effort to sell.
It may well be that salesmen in the United Kingdom
are not particularly good, but it would be a mistake to
conclude from the available evidence of the mystery
shopping exercise that this is the case.
Such views by management influence sales perform-
ance for while those in authority over the salesmen
continue to regard them as the lowest of the low, even
more important continue to regard them as ineffective and
fail to recognise the reality of the actual sales
situation, then there is little prospect of systematically
improving sales performance. Good salesmen discover for
themselves the techniques that work for them, bad salesmen
appear to follow the manufacturers behavioural sequences
and fail.
The Pay System
Many salesmen have a proportion of their income
dependent on their performance. Car salesmen in
particular have a very high proportion of their income
totally dependent on their sales performance. The amount
can vary from a 100% to 70-80% but rarely falls below
this. This will compare with other industrial salesmen
operating on a commission system where the performance
related element rarely exceeds 20-30% (Dunkelds and
Caslin 1979, Tack 1982). Car salesmen then should be
anxious to sell, particularly at the beginning of the
month, because it is not possible for them to live on
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their basic pay. A recent survey established that 90%
car salesmen receive a basic salary of between £1,500 and
£2,500 (Sewells, 1978), yet the average car salesman earns
between £8,000 - £11,000 per annum, with good salesmen
earning considerably more. The principle, that the
purpose of a payment by results system is to link pay
directly with performance so that economic gain or losses
resulting directly from changes in the individual
performance accrued to him, is a more complex idea to
implement in practice in the retail motor trade than it
would appear to be in theory for three reasons:
a) There is a sales conflict between maximising the
number of units sold or maximising the profit on a
sale.
b) The only behaviour rewarded is the unit sale yet
salesmen are required to undertake other tasks such
as administration, customer follow-up, etc.
c) There is a problem in the definition of profit on the
sale of a car. It is often necessary to take another
car in part-exchange and to write down notionally the
part-exchange in order to arrive at a notional profit
on the sale.
There are many minor variations in how car salesmen
are paid, but essentially they receive a modest basic pay
and then a percentage of the retained gross profit on the
sale of a car. Theory then predicts that they will
optimize income and profit (Farley, 1964). The method of
calculation of the retained gross profit varies a little
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from dealer to dealer, but on the whole is a common method
used in the trade, and is caluclated in roughly the same
way.
Salesmen appear to like being paid in this way. In
a recent survey by the author among 27 Ford salesmen
(Table 2:1), 85.1% of the sample liked the system, but
when answering the question, "I work harder because I'm
paid on a commission basis", only 70% tended to agree.
This confirms impressions formed during interviews with
car salesmen when no-one was found to dislike the system,
most like being paid on a commission basis but were not
really convinced that they worked harder or sold more cars
because of the method of reward.
One salesman summed up the situation when after
being asked why he liked being paid on commission he
commented,
I'm a bit torn, because in some respects, I think, it's
probably in your hands as to what you can earn, in
other words, I can determine myself, if you like, as to
how much I earn.
Another confessed, "It's more exciting when you
don't know how much you are going to earn a day."
There are a considerable number of problems with the
pay system as it is currently implemented. In many
dealerships the profit on a deal, and the resultant
commission, is influenced by individual bargains struck
between the salesman and the sales manager. For example,
usually the sales manager has to agree the final and
accepted price of the part-exchange. He will sometimes
suggest to the salesman, "I will be able to increase the
price you allow on this customer's part-exchange if you
al
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will sacrifice a percentage of your commission." Rather
than lose a sale, the salesman will agree.
Factors, other than the salesman's ability to sell,
can have a profound affect on his performance and
influence his expectation that his efforts to sell will
lead to a successful conclusion and so earn an income.
For example, a few years ago the depressed
economic climate reduced the market for cars so that
each salesman sold fewer cars, and even the high rate of
inflation did not compensate for the loss of sales.
More recently, overproduction has lead to discount-
ing and price cutting in a buoyant market. This reduces
the profitability on a car and subsequently reduces the
sales commission. During June, July and August, 1984,
dealers have been selling cars at no profit at all in
order to reduce interest costs on stocks held. Obviously,
special arrangements are made for the salesman's
commission, but it places the commission system under a
considerable strain.
rate of inflation over the last few years has
radically changed the proportion between the salesman's
basic pay and his commission, with little effort being
made to correct any distortions. There is no evidence
that this has influenced sales effort, but it is a
distorting change in the system.
As comments by the Sales Manager in Appendix B
suggest salesmen suffer in that motor trade management
appears to have a fear of paying too much commission to
successful salesmen.
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Management tend to adopt strategies which
reduce the pay of successful salesmen. One large dealer-
ship has a regulator or charge which can be levied as a
cost against the profit of a vehicle before calculating
the retained gross profit on which salesmen are paid. As
mentioned before, bargains between the sales manager and
the salesman on the amount of commission to be paid appear
to be common, and the researcher has come across dealer-
ships where the total wage system has been altered because
of managerial perceptions that the salesmen are earning
too much commission.
Pay and the ability to earn money appear to be of
great concern to the car salesman but he has to be fairly
quick on his feet to keep up with managerial manipulations
of his pay system.
Allocation of Time 
Ironically, and in spite of the fact that the
salesman is only paid on the number of cars that he sells,
comparafiNely little time is spent in face to face
interaction with the customer. When asked, salesman's
estimates vary from half an hour a day to two hours a day
but rarely exceed one-third of the total time available
(see Appendix C).
Nichols (1979)
	
in the course of his sociol-
ogical study of a change in organisational design in a
group of motor companies, undertook two five day diary
studies of a car sales department. The study covered the
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activities of about 20 salesmen located in five different
locations in the North of England (see Table 2:2) and
provides confirmation that salesmen's estimates are
accurate.
From time to time, attempts are made to increase
this face to face interaction on the grounds that if a
salesman spends more time talking to customers he is more
likely to sell more cars. Individuals are appointed to
take routine activities away from salesmen. People are
appointed to handle finance and insurance, to handle the
clerical aspects of the sale, and sometimes as progress
chaser.
TABLE 2:2
RESULTS OF A PRODUCTIVE TIME ANALYSIS IN THE
SALES DEPARTMENT	 (Nichols 1979:197)
Activity Period 1	 Period 2	 % * *
Talking/Selling
-
2.07
	
2.34	 29.3
Prospecting 0.33	 0.40	 7.6
Telephoning 1.56	 0.42	 10.2
Collecting Vehicles 0.45	 0.48	 9.7
Delivery 0.41	 0.46	 9.1
Clerical Work 0.43
	
0.48	 9.6
Organising Adverts/ 0.39	 0.42	 8.5
Display/Cleaning
Vehicle Valuation 0.22	 0.19	 4.3
Internal Meetings 0.30	 0.18	 5.0
Other Activities 0.44
	
0.21	 6.7
TOTAL 8 hrs
	
8 hrs*
*	 These figures total
table
7 hrs 58 mins - error in original
** Not included in original research
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It is unlikely that any attempt made to increase the
amount of face to face interaction with customers will be
successful, because the selling process is a complex and
an emotionally draining inter-personal relationship. This
combined with the fact that the success ratio with even
the best salesmen rarely exceeds 25% (that is cars sold to
customers seen) so the rate of rejection is very high.
Poppleton and Riley (1978) identified this process of
rejection as having profound negative affect on a sales-
man's self-esteem. Consequently, a certain amount of time
must be spent in repairing self-esteem in a variety of
ways. The practical consequences of this are that salesmen
spent time in a number of necessary, but what they regard
as mundane, activities. When asked what they did when not
selling one salesman commented, (Salesman No 4 Appendix C)
Paperwork, chase cars around in service, or if
someone's got a service complaint, looking into it for
them, that sort of thing.
Another stated, (Salesman No 5 Appendix C)
Well, there are all sorts of things that, for instance,
when I take an order there are always things like
chec'"ng the stock. I have to cost out the deal that
I do. Work out the cost of the car, extras, profit
retained. There are workshop instructions to write
out. The file generally to look after. Things like
appraising the part-exchange, making sure all the
details are correct, making sure the fellow brings in
his cover note, making sure its ready on time and
cleaned. I tend to run them round the block myself to
check it out. There are so many things that I have to
do that I couldn't really leave to anyone else. If
I've got a car going out I have to check it myself.
The job of a car salesman allows him a great deal of
latitude and freedom as to how he disposes of his time.
The only real constraint is the availability and timing of
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customers, management relying on the payment system rather
than any process of supervision. Apart from the
constraints set by the availability of customers, there
are few rules and no-one to tell you what to do and when to
do it. When not selling the salesmen follow any one of the
activities listed in Nicols (1979) Study, although
prospecting has a low credibility one salesman told the
researcher,
Call prospecting is very little done now. I used to do
it a tremendous amount, but it got very disspiriting
because you find that, if I walk into a business office
with my card and my briefcase, the secretary/recep-
tionist looks straight away at the rep as you hand the
car	 "Oh, he can't see you now," - eight out of ten
say that. You go because you can't get in. You've
got to make an appointment, so why waste time going
when you can do it by phone just as easily. You can
make more appointments on the phone and talk to more
people.
A survey of the methods used by a group of success-
ful car salesmen (Lehunte and Reed 1982) showed that none
of the 38 salesmen interviewed did any cold canvassing
or prospecting and many had an aversion to it.
Bearing in mind that they are recuperating from
direct face to face interacting, prospecting in this way is
not a salesmans favourite activity!
Much of the salesman's time, which is not spent
directly selling, is directed towards ensuring customer
satisfaction. He is motivated to ensure the delivery of a
vehicle by, if necessary, collecting the precise model
required by the customer from another dealer. There is a
system of swapping within the dealer network, whereby if a
customer demands a certain colour or a certain internal
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trim, this can be obtained from another dealer within the
franchise network.
They will also chase vehicles through the workshop
preparation process, thereby ensuring that it is through
the workshop, and delivered on time.
How Do Salesmen Sell?
So far, we have concentrated on the many problems in
the sales job and in the sales environment, but we need
to look at the actual selling process. Salesmen enjoy
selling. One salesman commented (Sales No 5 Appendix C)
Yes, I enjoy it very much - after my last sort of
office job. I spent the first five years of my life in
a solicitors office. I was bored silly.
Another said,
I've always been interested in selling, so I do like.
it. I do like meeting the people.
So many salesmen appear to like the personal inter-
action and the variety of meeting different people all the
time.
It would appear that successful salesmen follow a
fairly clearly defined selling process (Weitz, 1978).
Firstly, they form an accurate impression of the customer
by collecting information through observation and by asking
direct questions. This information is used in order to
categorize customers and to formulate a set of expectations.
Car salesmen gain cues from the customer often by looking
at the "part-exchange': If this is not available, the
customer's dress, body posture and attitude and verbal
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comments all act as cues to the categorization process. It
would appear that American car salesmen follow a similar
process as Brown (1976:41) comments,
The opinions expressed by the salesmen concerning the
customers fall into five general categories, each with
a resultant and justifiable course of action.
In Brown's (1976) case some of the categories are
used to justify'conning i the customer. For example, a
group of American salesmen categorised a group of customers
as, "Out to get you," which justified a variety of "con"
tactics by the salesmen. However, English salesmen appear
to use the system for adapting to the customer and using
different sales strategies. Poppleton (1981) suggests that
English people often use social class as a basis for
categorization but, because there is little training in the
process, categorization tend to be idiosyncratic. The
salesman quoted earlier (No 6 Appendix C) has an
idiosyncratic categorization system for his customers as,
"Managing Directors", "Odd women", (that is women who are
not housewives but working women) "Whiz Kids," who buy
sports cars and, no doubt, has others.
Weitz (1978, 1981b) suggests that information
evaluated at the Impression Formation stage, assisted by
the system of categorisation, is used to formulate an
effective strategy to influence the customer. This is
confirmed by Lehunte and Reed (1982) who note that
successful salesmen adapt to the customer and make him feel
comfortable. They also suggest, after interviews with
38 salesmen, that a successful salesman establishes trust,
- 50 -
takes control of the interaction, limits the information he
gives and has a good knowledge of customer psychology. One
of the best salesmen in this research (Salesman No 2
Appendix C) adds further confirmation to the idea of the
Categorisation/Adaption model of selling when he says,
So there is a lot of psychology to come into it. To
understand this individual who rings, who comes into
our showroom - to get involved, to get as much
information as possible from this individual so I know
what his requirements are. Because, once I know what
his requirements are I am half-way there, really, to
selling the car.
During any stage of the sales process the salesman
must be persuasive (Soldow and Thomas, 1984), control the
transaction (Busch and Wilson, 1976, Stolte, 1978), and it
helps if the salesman expresses views and interests similar
to those of the consumer (Woodside and Davenport, 1974).
Unlike his popular image the salesman has nothing to gain
from telling lies, although as Lehunte and Reed (1982)
confirm, he may not volunteer information which he
considers would adversely affect the sale. One salesman
(Salesman No 6 Appendix C), after confessing that he could
be devicr%q'said,
I wouldn't tell an out and out lie, of course the law
is so tight now on motor car salesmen on what you can
do and what you can't do.
But when asked about explaining potential faults to
customers he explained,
If I knew there was a fault on a motor car, sometimes
it's better, and I find it easier, if it's a small
thing we've got to do under warranty, it's better to
point it out to the man there and then and he thinks
more of you than letting him find it out for himself.
If it is something that he probably wouldn't mention it
or something I thought we could get away with I
probably wouldn't mention it. I don't know that is a
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difficult one.
Another told this researcher,
I don't think I am devious. I can be devious in asking
someone for a valuation on their part-exchange because
everyone likes to know what they think of their part-
exchange and if I can't get an answer out of them
sometimes I will give them a really terrible price and
that is that. Then they say "You must be joking," and
I will say, "Well what is a 77 car worth?" and they
will say, "It's a 78" and I say, "Oh, I am sorry."
You know, you usually get a reaction then and you can
get round it in various ways.
Although not volunteering information that will
prejudice the sale of the car seems to be part of the ethos
and part of the process of motor car bargaining, all
salesmen deny that they will lie about a vehicle. Many
consider it more instrumental to point out faults on a
car rather than have to deal with them at a later date.
Currently, sales effectiveness is measured by and
sales training geared to a series of sales behaviours.
This must be a most inadequate method as good salesmen
cannot follow a series of sequential steps, but need to
adapt to the contingences of the interaction with each
individual customer. This process of adaption is necessary
for successful selling.
Conclusion
Current models and perspectives of the job of a car
salesman held by management and on which many training
programmes are based are inaccurate and inadequate. They
tend to underestimate the complexity of the selling process
and the many environmental constraints.
- 52 -
Selling within the motor trade is, by definition,
a bargaining process. This is a most complex social
interaction between two unique individuals. It is
initiated by the salesman, and the central feature is the
persuasive communication regarding the purchase of a car.
The salesman's effectiveness is impaired by a
number of external factors amongst which are his stereo-
typical reputation, customer characteristics, the pecu-
liarity of the 'part-exchange', the pay system and
managerial attitudes. Gorley (1976) found in an indus-
trial sales environment a vast gulf between what the
authorities were saying and what actually happened in the
sales situation. Often the salesman was merely trying to
survive an incredibly difficult interaction. Gorley
(1976) labels these the two realities of selling (Table 2:3)
TABLE 2:3
THE TWO REALITIES OF SELLING (GORLEY, 1976:183)
Rhetoric 
The literature of selling
Sales Training Literature
Recruitment Advertising
Recruitment Process
Sales Meetings
In-Company Sales Training
Real Life 
The Salesmen's working Life
within his whole life
Salesmen's encounter with
buyers and others
Driving, carrying his bag,
lunching, waiting, paperwork,
Sales Incentive Competitor 	 making phone calls
Management Propaganda
	
Everyday language
Sales Language
Such a gulf exists in the motor trade today. The
manufacturers train according to a sequential process
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selling while salesmen actually behave in an adaptive way.
Management call for increased sales at increased profits
but perpetuate a myth that all salesmen are ineffective
or rogues. They pay on a profit dependent system and
create an environment where there is no profit on the
sale of a car. Manufacturers and management in the motor
trade need to recognise the reality of selling, understand
the problems and support a programme for enhancing a
salesman's status.
Nevertheless, salesmen manage to survive
manipulate their environment and even 	 enjoy the job
because it provides many of the characteristics of an
enriched job (Hackman and Oldham, 1976). The job has
autonomy in so far as management rely on the pay system
to control and motivate salesmen so there is little
supervision. Many salesmen stress this as an important
aspect of
	
the job, probably the most important
aspect.	 The job has variety in that they meet different
people all the time and can pursue a variety of different
tasks. The task is clearly defined and feedback
is provided immediately at the end of a customer inter-
action in the acceptance or rejection of the sale. The
quality of performance can be evaluated by the amount of
profit and the consequent income on the sale. Car
salesmen are young, enthusiastic men doing a far more
complex job than their masters realise in a most difficult
environment and are managing to succeed and enjoy them-
selves at the same time.
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If this is so then one must wonder what motivates a
salesman to superior performance. It is possible to
understand that some people become car salesmen because of
the type of job - the autonomy and interest. However,
some salesmen sell more than others and managers wonder
why this should be so. The common belief in the motor
trade is that salesmen are motivated by money but that
each sets himself a target income or 'comfort' level;
other garages have recently abandoned the commission system
experimentally to evaluate whether their sales suffer. It
is important for managers to know whether car salesmen are
motivated to increased performance by the commission
system, so that the system may be changed to that which is
the most effective.
CHAPTER 3 
THE ROLE OF PAY IN MOTIVATION
In order to be able to evaluate whether salesmen
are influenced by pay it is first necessary to establish
that pay can, and does, influence behaviour. Consequently
this chapter does not concern itself with the general
issues of motivation most of which have received wide and
sustained attention from both organisational researchers
and practising managers during recent years. For example
Campbell & Pritchard (1976), after classifying motiva-
tional theories into Process Theories and Content
Theories, give, probably, the most comprehensive recent
review of Expectancy Theory. They also critically
evaluate the general status of Drive Theories, Need
Theories and Equity Theories.
Korman (1977), briefly reviews the current state of
a variety of current theories and suggests that they are
of limited usefulness, while Mitchell (1979, 1982c)
reviews Job Attitudes and Leadership with an update of
Campbell & Pritchards (1976) review of Expectancy Theory,
Goal Theory, Equity Theory and Behavioural Theories.
This review is concerned only with the role of pay
in motivation and reviews motivational theories only from
the perspective of how they deal with pay. In this sense
it provides a more recent review in the same vein as that
of Opsahl & Dunnette (1966), although the structure and
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format is different.
Wide spread interest in pay as a motivational tool
began when Frederick Taylor devised a pay system by which,
Each man's wages as far as possible are fixed according
to the skill and energy with which he performs his
work and not according to the position he fills.
(Taylor 1922:637)
That there "is a" link between pay and performance
is one of the principle ideas of Scientific Management.
This theory is based on a view of human nature which
suggests that workers will put forward extra effort on the
job to maximise their personal economic gain. This
continued to be the philosophy behind pay theory and
practice until the late 1920's when the Hawthorne Studies
(Whitehead, 1938, Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1964, Mayo
1975) suggested that the role of pay in work behaviour
and performance had been exagerated and that non-economic
motivation, particularly the influence of the social group,
were of primary importance.
This paradigm, subsequently called the Human
Relations Movement because it focused attention on social
groups and relationships in the work place, has dominated
research in organisational behaviour for the last 50 years,
to such an extent that, until recently, research into the
effects of pay have been neglected and although, there is
a great deal written on the subject, there is little,
hard, empirical evidence of the influence of pay on work
behaviour.
Marriott (1957:123) for example, mentions only two
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field experimental studies, which manipulated financial
reward, apart from the Hawthorne Studies (1964), and this
review could find only four such studies since that date
(Lawler and Hackman, 1969, Pritchard et al, 1976, Latham
et al, 1978, Luthans et al, 1981). The reasons for this
lack of field experimental research are the difficult
practical problems of interfering in the affairs of a
particular organisation together with the moral
justification of the need to affect people's lives so
fundamentally in the interest of a,research hypothesis
which may be wrong. As a consequence, some ingenious
laboratory experiments have been devised which create a
real looking work environment and real looking tasks for
a limited period and so simulate reality under controlled
conditions (Pritchard and Curts, 1973; London and Oldham,
1976; Terborg and Miller, 1978).
This review is focused on pay. However, it is not
considered or argued that the quality of working life,
whether in the factory or any other work place, is not an
important consideration. Indeed, it is possible to argue
morally that the quality of the individuals working life
is intrinsically, philosophically, and ethically a factor
with which managers should be concerned. However, in
spite of major field research (Brown, 1962, Umstot et al,
1976, Walton, 1977, Wall and Lischeron, 1977, Kelly, 1982,
Kemp et al, 1983) it has proved difficult to establish
empirically links between job enlargement, lob enrichment
or job satisfaction and those factors which are considered
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the responsibility of a working manager, specifically the
productive performance of others. Consequently pay
becomes of particular interest as it is believed by many
managers that by manipulating pay, performance will
change.
Hunt (1972) has suggested that the focus of
attention on the Human Relations Movement, could be the
product of a wealthy society and that a change in economic
conditions could easily lead to a change in attitude.
Economic conditions have changed and already managers are
querying motivational theories propounded by the Human
Relations Movement and calling for, "reality centred
management" (Stanton, 1983).
The question remains to be answered, how does one
account for the differences in performance between
individuals? In many car showrooms the best salesmen will
often sell two or three times as many cars as the worst,
while we are told that in manufacturing jobs the best
worker produces three times that of the worst.
Vroom (1960:73) suggests that performance is a
combination of ability and motivation, or,
Performance = f (Ability x Motivation)
While ability does vary, either innately or because
of the degree of learning, motivation can vary in response
to a whole variety of external and internal influences as
it is, 'the degree to which an individual wants and tries
hard to do well at a particular task." (Mitchell 1982c:81)
Some motivational theories and studies conclude
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that pay is not a primary motivator, so motivational
theories viewed from the pay perspective can be clearly
categorised into two groups, (see Table 3:1) those that
suggest that pay has little or no influence in motivating
performance (which can be called Low Profile Theories) and
those which attempt to account for the influence of pay on
behaviour by integrating it into the body of the theory
(which can be called High Profile Theories).
TABLE 3:1 
CLASSIFICATION OF MOTIVATION THEORIES IN RELATION TO PAY
Low Profile
	
High Profile 
Human Relations Movement 	 Scientific Management
Maslows Hierarchy of Needs 	 Equity Theory
Her zbergs Two-Factor Theory	 Expectancy Theory
A Theory of Achievement Motivation Goal Theory
Job Re-Design Theories
Low Profile Theories 
Hawthorne Studies 
The view that the role of pay is overstated as a
goal or purpose behind work behaviour, and hence was not a
primary motivator, stems from a series of studies under-
taken at the Hawthorne Plant of the Western Electric
Company by F Roethlisberger, from Harvard, and William J
Dickson, the Chief of Employee Relations of the company.
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This review of the studies is not intended to be a
detailed critique of the entire research (for reviews see
Viteles, 1954, Landsberger, 1958, Carey, 1967,, Rose, 1975)
but only to highlight a number of internal inconsistencies
regarding the conclusions drawn about pay as a motivator,
and to query the findings using subsequent research and
evaluations.
This series of studies evolved from an investi-
gation, at the Hawthorne Plant, into the effect of various
levels of illumination on productivity. The curious
finding that workers productivity increased or decreased
according to their perception of the level of light rather
that the actual increase or decrease in illumination led
to a more rigorous series of experiments in which the
Harvard Business School were involved.
In the Spring of 1927 five employees from the Relay
Assembly Test Room were segregated from the main department
so that their environment could be more closely controlled
and the effect of a variety of experimental manipulations
observed more precisely. Subsequently the experimenters
altered the pay system (they became part of a group of five
on a piece-work system rather than a group of a hundred),
changed the rest pauses during day, altered the hours
worked and evaluated the effect of fatigue, monotcny,
temperature and humidity on performance.
Roethlisberger & Dickson (1964:128) regretted that
their experiment was complicated by the extra variable of
pay but nevertheless tried to identify the effect of the
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change in the payment system with two further experiments
- The Second Relay Assembly Group and the Mica Splitting
Test Room.
In the Second Relay Assembly Group five experienced
operators were formed into a special group to be paid
separately from the other members of the department. They
were not physically segregated from the department and
remained under the same supervision. The Mica Splitting
Test Room experiment segregated five girls from the rest
of the department in an attempt to replicate the physical
conditions of the First Relay Assembly Test Room but, as
the girls were on an individual piece-work bonus scheme,
no change in the payment system could be made.
From these experiments, at the end of their long
detailed and complex report, Roethlisberger and Dickson
(1964:575) conclude 'None of the results, however, gave
the slightest substantiation of the theory that the
worker is primarily motivated by economic interests.'
It is difficult to understand how these researchers
came to this conclusion from the results of the pay
experiments, and, indeed their comments on the results are
inconsistent with their conclusions. For example, in both
pay experiments, productivity improved; in the First Relay
Assembly Test Room experiment by 30% and in the Second
Relay Assembly Test Group by 12.6%. In the Second Relay
Assembly Test Group when the experimental method of payment
was ended productivity decreased. Essentially what
happened was that the influence of pay on performance was
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made more direct by reducing the size of the working
group. Under these conditions, productivity increased.
The researchers themselves report of the Second Relay
Group, (Roethlisberger and Dickson 1964:130), 'From the
curves it can be seen that the output rate for each
operator was higher during the experimental period than
during the base period.' One would normally conclude,
from such evidence, that the experimental manipulation
had had an effect. In this case that pay had influenced
performance. The researchers say, in the report of the
experiment (Roethlisberger & Dickson 1964:133)
In general, the findings from the Second Relay
Assembly Group tended to substantiate the hypothesis
that the formation of a small group for the purpose of
determining piece-work earnings was an important
factor in the Relay Assembly Test Room Performance.
This comment is totally inconsistant with the later
conclusion that workers are not motivated by economic
factors (Roethlisberger & Dickson 1964:575).
From Whiteheads (1938) more detailed account and
analysis of the Relay Assembly Test Room it is clear that
the girls liked the size of the group because of the link 
between performance and income. While operator 2
(Whitehead 1938:122) began to urge others to increase
their output (and increased her own output) to obtain
increased income (her father had been laid off and her
family was dependent on her income) and explained that
'I need the money' (April 17, 1928), Whitehead (1938:255),
explains this in terms of the group's social structure
commenting,
- 64 -
Thus the advantage of a small payment group was that
it roughly coincided with a natural size of social
group, given the circumstances, and so was a group
which could be led and influenced as a whole.
While this may or may not be true, the influence
of pay on the performance of this small group seems a
more direct, logical and parsimonious explanation of any
increase in productivity.
It seems tortuous to ascribe the reasons for any
increase in productivity as that resulting from the change
in social groupings. Viteles (1954:187) comes to the same
conclusion when he says that the performance data
. . . represents evidence ordinarily interpreted as
indicative of the direct and favourable influence of
financial incentives upon output, and of the operation
of economic motives in the industrial situation.
Roethlisberger & Dickson (1964:88), after the First
Relay Assembly Test Room experiment, comment that,
The girls came to the company, not to enjoy congenial
work surroundings, but to earn as much money as they
possibly could. In the test room, an opportunity had
been given to them to earn wages more directly in
proportion to the effort that they expended. Although
they had been on a group piece-work in the regular
department the wage incentive had been very slight
because the group was so large. In the test room,
however, wage incentive became an important factor.
The girls were given an opportunity to earn more
directly in proportion to effort expended and hence
production rose.
They also report (Roethlisberger & Dickson
.1964:133) that the experiment in the Second Relay
Assembly Group was prematurely terminated because of
friction with other workers in the main department who
wanted similar consideration. One can only assume that
the remaining workers also wanted the opportunity to
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increase earnings by having performance more directly
related to effort. It is difficult to understand how, on
the evidence of interview data with the individuals
concerned and the subsequent increase in productivity the
researchers can suggest that the girls were motivated
• specifically by pay and subsequently conclude that pay was
not a primary motivating factor. In view of such
inconsistency in reporting it is necessary to review the
evidence and draw ones own rather different conclusions.
It is also difficult to understand how such
unjustified conclusions have been so influential in
affecting some academic and managerial opinion for so long,
particularly as there has been criticism of the research
from when
	 it was published. For example, Gilson
(1940) in a scathing review of the Hawthorne research
suggests that the elaborate charts mean very little
because of the effect of many outside influences on the
experimental groups and the small sample size. Certainly
a major influence, the economic climate, is not considered
as an alternative explanation for behaviour in a number of
cases.
Subsequently, ArgyDE(1953) in a short review of the
pay experiments suggested that, although the research was
important, many of its conclusions were not justified by
the evidence. In particular, that it was not possible, as
the researchers suggest, to identify the proportion of pay
increase attributable to the pay incentive system because
of the inadequacy of the control group. He also suggests
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that the results themselves were suspect as two operators
from the original five were replaced during the course of
the experiment. These criticisms must be valid. The
control groups for the pay experiments were the Second
Relay Assembly Test Group (where experimental manipulation
was prematurely terminated) and the Mica Splitting Test
Room, where the task varied so much and the economic
climate intruded so much that comparisons need to be
heavily qualified, and conclusions difficult to justify.
Regarding the Operators Whitehead (1938:117) tells
us that Operators la and 2a were continually unco-operative
(talked too much, mainly) and in January 1928 were
replaced by Operators 1 and 2. While the researchers are
quite open about this and identify the particular times
and production figures, they do not appear to take this
into account in their subsequent discussion and conclusion.
It is also worth remembering that all the general-
isations from this research are based on the work patterns
and attitudes of five (or more properly seven) young
single girls whose average age was 23 years. As Millward
(1968) shows they are hardly typical of the general
working population in social or economic behaviour, as
they depend on their parents economically and socially.
Viteles (1954) also argues that the pay conclusions
drawn from the experiments are misinterpreted by the
researchers and that firm conclusions regarding the value
of incentives or rest pauses cannot be drawn from the
results. He points our that the prospect of, 'the
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dreaded depression', induced fear and anxiety into the
experimental situation, and draws attention to the fact
that the control group in the Mica-Splitting room
experiment were working on mica of a different
specification to the base period necessitating a
speculative conversion formula, and making comparisons
between the groups speculative.
Landsberger (1958) in his comprehensive review of
these studies makes little comment about the pay results.
However, he is critical of some of the methodology and
ommissions from the research. In particular he suggests,
it is open to attack on its interpretation of the role of
economic security, (fear of the depression) but, on the
whole, suggests that the comprehensive evidence available
about the effect of the incentive scheme, from both the
Relay Test Experiments and the Mica Splitting Room, is
confusing.
Many of the conclusions about pay in the research
are drawn from the situation in the Bank Wiring Room
(Roethlisberger & Dickson 1964:409), where the operatives
were on a group wage incentive scheme; the group
consisting of the nine wiremen, three solderers and two
inspectors - a total in the group payment scheme of 14
workmen (Roethlisberger 1977:47). It would appear that
there was a group output norm which had the effect of
reducing production, so the researchers conclude that
the wage incentive scheme was not motivating performance.
Sykes (1965) examined this particular situation in
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considerable detail. He established that it is a common
belief among workers that increased production leads to
increased quotas and reduced piece-rates, and that Western
Electric had a procedure for altering loose times.
Consequently it would be in the workers long term economic
interest to 'control' the rate of production. It is also
clear that the influence of the individual in such a
large group is diminished so that the effect of the bonus
system is reduced because of the size of the group. It is
not possible to conclude from the evidence that the
workers were not influenced by economic motivation as
increased productivity could have resulted in a review of
the piece-work times and a subsequent reduction in pay.
Yetton (1979) in a mathematical study of several
situations where output is 'managed' identifies that,
'Where it is not in the interest of workers to restrict
output they do not,' which would suggest that the workers
in the Bank Wiring Room considered it in their economic
interest to control output.
Carey (1967) undertook a detailed re-examination of
the conclusions drawn from the Hawthorne Studies and the
evidence reported. In his examination of the First Relay
Assembly Test experiment he argues that the researchers
conclusions are unjustified, and that it is impossible to
identify that proportion of change caused by the various
experimental conditions as the rest pauses, incentive
scheme and friendly supervision were all introduced at the
same time. Neither, he suggests, were there any valid
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control groups. However, the researchers themselves were
aware of this and suggest only hypotheses from the early
report and not conclusions.
	 They go on to verify the pay
hypotheses in the Second Relay Group and Mica Splitting
Group experiments which act as controls for the first
experiment. Carey (1967), as this review and Viteles
(1954) do,
	 suggests that the 12.6% increase in
productivity during the Second Relay Assembly Test Group
experiment and the subsequent 16% reduction on the
termination of the experiment, indicates the effect of the
pay system on performance. He is particularly dubious
about the interpretation of the Mica-Spitting Room
experiment, which, even though the payment scheme was not
changed, showed an initial increase and a subsequent
decrease in production. He, like Argyle(1953) identifies
that changes in the task and conditions in the Mica
Splitting Test Room make comparisons difficult. He goes
on to suggest that it is impossible to compare different
types of payment systems, when, of course, provided one
uses ratios to measure any increase or decrease in
performance valid comparisons can be made. However, this
in no way invalidates his main conclusion which is,
The results of these studies far from supporting the
various components of the "human relations approach",
are surprisingly consistent with a rather old world
view about the value of monetary incentives, driving
leadership and discipline. It is only by massive and
relentless reinterpretation that the evidence is made
to yield contrary conclusions. To make these points,
is not to claim that the Hawthorne Studies can provide
serious support for any such old world view. The
limitations of the Hawthorne Studies clearly render
them incapable of yielding serious support for any
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sort of generalisation whatsoever. (Carey 1967:416)
Parsons (1974) in a detailed review of the studies
notes the methodological problems of the control groups
and the change in the experimental operators. He also
suggests that information feedback could have had an
influence on productivity in the experimental groups, as
feedback was available to the girls in the small groups,
but not to those in the large department where individual
productivity was not measured. This is a sensible comment
as the influence of feedback on human performance is well
known (Fitts & Posner 1973:27) and, while it could easily
have influenced performance, the possibility of this as an
explanation for the results is not considered by the
researchers.
Although in the course of their report (Roeth-
lisberger & Dickson 1964) the figures are quoted, and
although Whitehead (1938) presents performance results
of the Relay experiments in some detail, there is little
or no modern statistical analysis of the Hawthorne
Studies. Franke and Kaul (1978) using multiple regression
on a time series analysis, and using the original data
rather than the Roethlisberger and Dickson 964) or
Whitehead (193 account have undertaken such an analysis.
As a result they suggest that managerial discipline .
 (by
which they mean the change in the two operators in the
First Relay experiment) and the economic depression
are the main variables influencing productive behaviour.
According to this analysis the
	 change in the
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pay system is identified as an experimental effect but is
totally over-shadowed by the two main variables.
It is apparent that the Hawthorne experiments did
not establish, empirically, that pay is not a primary
motivating force. This review has highlighted a number
of inconsistencies in the research reports which suggest
that the researchers, at least during the experimental
period, were well aware of the effect of pay on the
workers, so it is difficult to explain their subsequent
conclusions.
Almost from the time it was published the Hawthorne
Research has been criticised for the small samples (Gilson
1940), the change of operators (Argyle1953) and the lack
of controls (Argyle1953, Viteles 1954, Carey 1967, Parsons
1974). Subsequently moresophisticated statistical analysis
(Franke & Kaul 1978) has shown that the change in
operators and the economic climate had a marked influence
on the performance of the experimental groups; yet, in
spite of these influential, unbiased, academic opinions
the paradigm changed and the Human Relations Movement
continued. In view of the insubstantial and inconclusive
nature of its origins one must question the concepts of
the entire movement.
The Effect of Extrinsic Motivation on Intrinsic Motivation 
If as the Hawthorne researchers propounded with
some vigour, pay is not a primary motivator, then
intrinsic and social factors become increasingly important
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as logical alternatives. It would also be of psycho-
logical importance to know the effect of external
motivation (pay), on such intrinsic motivation and social
groupings, which is probably why Deci's (1971) findings,
after two laboratory experiments and a field experiment,
that there was now empirical evidence to support the view
that external rewards reduced the level of intrinsic
motivation, received such wide attention.
It is interesting that this distinction between
extrinsic and intrinsic factors although of recent
interest, is not a new one as Centers and Bugental (1966)
interviewed a cross section (n = 692) of the American
population and asked questions related to job motivation.
They were able to confirm, within the limitations of self-
report measures, that at higher occupational levels
intrinsic job components (by which they meant oppor-
tunities for self expression, interest value in job, and
job satisfaction) were more valued than the extrinsic
factors of the job, mainly Day. Conversely at lower levels
in the occupational hierarchy, extrinsic components were
more valued than intrinsic although pay was the most
valued
	 job factor at all levels except the highest
professional. Neither is it all that easy to define the
difference between intrinsic and extrinsic factors in the
work context. Dyer and Parker (1975) asked a group of
psychologists to classify 21 lob outcomes into extrinsic
and intrinsic factors. They found some confusion over the
meaning of the two words. As a consequence Broedling
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(1977) in a brave attempt at defining the terms, suggests
that they can be used as a trait, a function of the
situation or as a function of the interaction between the
two. However, in line with pay research in this area, we
will define extrinsic motivation as pay or any other
external reward and intrinsic, as internally generated
interest or enjoyment for whatever reasons.
Deci(1971) examined the interaction between
intrinsic and extrinsic reward in the accomplishment of a
task. He undertook two laboratory experiments and one
field experiment. In the first laboratory experiment
24 psychology under-graduates (12 experimental and 12
control) were engaged in working a Soma Puzzle which, Deci
assumed, is intrinsically interesting. The experimental
group were then paid one dollar for each completed
configuration. At the end of the experimental period the
subjects were allowed eight minutes free time. The amount
of time spent working on the puzzle during this free
period was measured and used as a measure of motivation,
although it could be argued this was more a measure of
perseverance than anything else. The second experiment
was identical to the first but instead of being paid $1
for each configuration, verbal reinforcement was used.
At the end of the first experiment it was found
that those who had not been paid, played with the puzzle
longer during the free period than those who had been
paid. However, the group which received verbal rein-
forcement, continued to play with the puzzle longer than
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the control.
A field experiment in which college students were
paid 50c for writing headlines for the college newspaper
(n = 4) found that performance decreased when payment was
removed while it did not decrease in the control group
(n=2). From this evidence Deci (1971) concluded that
payment for a task which is intrinsically motivating will
decrease the level of motivation.
Like the Hawthorne Studies this research has had a
wide and powerful affect on managerial and academic
belief. It is now considered a mistake to link reward to
performance particularly on an interesting task. However,
like the Hawthorne Studies this research has interpre-
tational and methodological problems which suggest that
any interpretation or generalisation from it should be
treated with great caution.
For example, one must question whether the
comparatively trivial task (a Soma Puzzle) is a reasonable
comparison for the work situation and whether it is
possible to accept such a trivial game as intrinsically
interesting. Although Deci did undertake a field
experiment to confirm his results, the numbers involved
(experimental group n = 4, control n = 2), the subjects
(college students), the absence of both control and
experimental subjects during some periods makes the
results very suspect.
A major weakness of this research must be that the
dependent measure was interest in the puzzle after the
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task had been completed and when neither group was being
rewarded. It is difficult to follow the logic behind
this. It is not logically possible to conclude that
intrinsic motivation during the task has decreased if one
measures behaviour after the task.
The magnitude of the payment involved during the
experiment must also limit the generalisability of this
experiment. It is difficult to conceptualise a trans-
ference from the trivial dollar or two earned by students
to the vital imperative of an adult earning a living.
A number of attempts have been made to replicate
this study but only one has shown total support.
Pritchard et al (1977) replicated Deci's study but used a
chess problem as the task and measured the amount of time
spent on chess problems during the free period as the
dependent measure. They confirm Deci's findings that
interest declined in the paid group during the free
period, but noticed that there were no significant
differences in actual performance between the two groups.
This latter finding, would suggest that pay had had little
effect in this experiment; either because of the magnitude
of the amount, a ceiling effect with the task, or perhaps
because of the subjectschessability rather than their
motivation. Like the Deci (1971) research the measure
of motivation is after the task rather than during the
task and generalisations are then made about the task from
measurements taken of some other behaviour.
Calder and Staw (1975a) have made a number of
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methodological criticisms of Deci's (1971) research. They
note that none of the performance data are reported (the
dependent measure being behaviour after performance) which
makes interpretation of the results difficult. They also
note that there is no information about the total amount
of the reward paid, so it is difficult to evaluate whether
differences are due to contingent or non-contingent
factors. Neither is there any information regarding the
timing of the payment or whether the subjects expected a
reward, often a major factor in motivated behaviour. They
suggest that Deci's reporting is, at the least, incomplete
and subsequently conclusions drawn from the research
cannot be justified from the evidence presented. To some
extent Deci et al (1975) accepted	 these comments and
suggested more research in the area was needed to clarify
these points.
Calder and Staw (1975b) subsequently demonstrate in
a laboratory experiment similar to Deci's with 40 under-
graduates working on a different puzzle, that intrinsic
and extrinsic motivation interact but suggest that this
may not always be the case.
Scott (1975) is also critical of the methodology of
Deci's (1971) study. After commenting on the difficulties
of defining intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, he is
critical of the appropriateness of the statistics Deci
(1971) used. He also suggests that there could be
experimenter bias as the experimenter was not blind to the
various conditions. These criticisms must be valid, if a
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little pedantic, for a seasoned experimenter. The most
significant criticism is that the experimental procedures
constitute a powerful conditioning procedure. Although
one can understand that the instructions alter subjects
expectations, it is not clear why this is a conditioning
procedure.	 Reinforcement is not apparent in all
conditions, and the timing of the reward is not mentioned.
Consequently it is difficult to evaluate the validity of
this criticism.
It would appear logical that whether rewards
interact, are additive or detract from each other could
depend on the nature of the task. While money may detract
from the intrinsic satisfaction of a monk in a monastry,
it could enhance the intrinsic satisfaction for car
salesmen. Kruglanski et al (1975a) and Kruglanski et al
(1975b) test this hypothesis in a series of laboratory
experiments on school children. They replicate Deci's
(1971) experiment conceptually, but use tasks defined as
of high and low intrinsic interest, and tasks in which
money is intrinsic to the task. To some extent they are
able to confirm Deci's (1971) results but they also
confirm that when money is intrinsic to the task itself
payment enhances motivation and does not reduce it. This
finding makes a considerable difference to the idea of
generalising Deci's (1971) finding to the commercial world
where one can assume that money is intrinsic to the
task and so contingent reward should enhance intrinsic
motivation not reduce it.
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Farr (1976) also investigates whether the effect of
pay on motivation is dependent on task characteristics with
a conceptual replication of Deci's (1971) study. He varied
the experimental task according to the characteristics
suggested by Hackman and Oldham (1976) to include a boring
task (low intrinsic) and an enriched task (one that has
variety, autonomy, task identity and feedback). His
experimental results refute the Deci (1971) hypothesis that
pay reduces intrinsic motivation as performance in the
contingent-pay interesting task condition improved.
However, it could be argued that as all experimental
subiects (n = 90 psychology undergraduates) were paid and
that payment was intrinsic to the task that Kruglanski et
al (1975, 1975b ) provide a more complete explanation of
the phenomena. Nevertheless, this experiment clearly
demonstrates that motivation for a task which has all the
characteristics of a job enriched task can be enhanced by
pay which is contingent on performance.
Hamner and Foster (1975) are among those researchers
who are critical of Deci's (1971) experimental methodology.
They suggest that the Soma Puzzle is a task which cannot be
used to measure motivation, and comment that the dependent
measure should be performance during the task rather than
behaviour in the free period after the task. Subsequently,
in a conceptual replication of Deci's (1971) experiment
with 98 organisational behaviour undergraduates, the task
was manipulated to be boring or interesting (the inter-
esting task involved a survey of sexual attitudes) a no-
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pay control group was incorporated and performance was
measured. The results of this study fail to support Deci's
(1971) theory regarding the affect of externally mediated
monetary rewards on motivation. On the contrary they tend
to suggest that extrinsic and intrinsic motivation could
be additive in nature. The results of this study tend to
be more convincing because the experimental design is more
rigourous. Using a two by three factorial design (a
boring and interesting task in a pay, contingent pay and
no pay condition) the researchers measured performance
during the task and checked that the manipulations had
been successful. The results show that performance in the
interesting task did not appear to be influenced by pay
while performance in the boring task was affected by
making pay contingent on results. From this it is possible
to argue that, although the contingent pay plan did not
raise the performance of subjects in the interesting
condition it did raise performance in the boring condition
compared to the no pay and non-contingent conditions. This
is a strong indication of a pay effect in the boring
condition and no influence (or decrease in motivation) in
the interesting task, contradicting Deci's (1971)
hypothesis.
Brennon and Glover (1980) replicated the Deci (1971)
study as nearly as possible. They used a Soma Puzzle as
the task, but incorporated a base line measure (an eight
minute wait at the beginning of the experiment) and a
control group (three unstructured eight minute waiting
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periods with access to the puzzle if interested).
Unfortunately, they did not use money as the extrinsic
reward for the 58 psychology undergraduates, but in the
experimental condition offered ten examination points for
an eight minute work period. The points were not
contingent on any performance standard. The results from
this experiment totally refute those of Deci (1971) as
extrinsic reward in the form of examination points did not
reduce the intrinsic interest in the puzzle in the eight
minutes after the experimental period. However, one must
wonder whether, if money were used as the reward, the
results might have been different. It is difficult to
evaluate how students valued the ten examination points,
but it seems likely that students would value money more
than examination points unless they were very borderline.
The effect of an extrinsic reward on intrinsic
motivation does not appear to be as clear cut as Deci
(1971) suggests and it does raise the interesting question
of whether one extrinsic reward has an effect on another
extrinsic reward. This issue was the subject of an
experiment by Porac and Salancik (1981) who, using 39 male
undergraduates, manipulated a boring task (scoring a
computer form) into a money payment condition, a money
plus exam credit condition, and a control condition. Like
Deci (1971) they used as the dependent measure a period of
free activity on the task after the experiment. The
results indicate that one extrinsic reward can reduce the
incentive value of another, but that pay, when not under-
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mined, was an important incentive to performance. To some
extent this latter finding supports Deci's (1971)
hypothesis although one would expect interest in a boring
task to reduce after the specified completion period.
In his research, Deci (1971) has attempted to
establish that theoretically pay should not be contingent
on the performance of an interesting task, as for example
in job enriched work, as motivation will 	 then decrease.
It is not possible to draw this generalisation from the
results with which Deci (1971) presents us. His research
has a number of methodological and interpretational
problems. Other experiments which have conceptually, or
specifically replicated Deci's (1971) suggest that the
nature of the task, the context and the type of reward,
are important variables which affect whether the two types
of reward interact, detract from each other or are
additive. Some experiments totally refute Deci's (1971)
findings. The issue is confused, but apart from showing
that the influence of pay on a task is more complex than
originally thought,this body of research confirms rather
than denies that pay has an important effect in enhancing
performance on a task.
Need Theories 
With the abondonment of the theory of scientific manage-
ment including its basic hypothesis that the individual
will optimize his economic interests, researchers in the
human relations tradition were left to explain motivation
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in individuals differently. A number suggest that
performance on a task is motivated by some kind of
individual internal need and that activity is generated by
a cognitive or biological necessity to satisfy that need.
The basic structure of the need satisfaction model
is quite simple. It posits that people have basic, stable
and comparatively enduring attributes which include biol-
ogical, social and cognitive needs. Much of the research
is based on the Freudian concepts of latent and manifest
needs subsequently refined and defined by Murray (1938).
Murray believed that the total personality could be
defined in terms of individual needs whether they were
physiological or learned. Murray (1938) identified in
enormous detail a number of needs and proposed a system of
interaction between them. It is suggested that jobs have
a number of attributes which may (or more often do not)
fulfill a number of specific and relevant needs. This
paradigm dominated managerial thinking during the 1960's
but recent research is difficult to find. Mitchell
(1979:252) has suggested that this is probably a general
trend in social psychology.
There can be a great number of needs which make up
the total personality and motivation of the individual.
Murray (1938) specified 44 needs, (20 manifest needs, 8
latent needs, 4 internal states and 12 attributes), but
the need models which have dominated organisational and
occupational psychology research are those of Maslow (1943),
McClelland (1961) and Herzberg et al (1967).
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Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs 
Due largely to the efforts of McGregor (1961) the
concepts and the theories of Maslow's (1943) model are
probably the most widely known of all motivational
theories amongst practi$ing managers. Maslow (1943, 1954)
in a deceptively simple theory, suggests that certain needs
are arranged in a hierarchical order and that each need
motivates behaviour until it becomes satisfied, then it
loses its power to motivate.
He specifies these five needs, physiological needs,
safety needs, belongingness needs, self-esteem needs and
self actualisation needs, (as indicated in Figure 3:1),
and suggests that once the lower order needs are satisfied
then people move up hierarchy to the next need in sequence.
Using the principle of Maslow's (1943) needs, McGregor
(1961)	 devises his managerial theory 'Y' which
recommends a managerial style which enables individuals to
fulfill the highest possible level of need. Pay in this
theory merely serves merely to satisfy physiological needs
and has no role in motivating behaviour. As McGregor
(1961:24) states,
Economic rewards are certainly important, to the
professional, but there is ample research to
demonstrate that they do not provide the primary
incentive to peak performance.
On the contrary, pay is implicitly despised and
the implication is that jobs with a high intrinsic
motivational content are somehow better than those with
low intrinsic content. As Maslow (1965) says, one way of
Self-Actualisation Needs
Belongingness and
Love Needs
FIGURE 3:1 
A REPRESENTATION OF MASLOW'S HIERARCHY OF NEEDS 
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showing that money is not important is, 'That there are
now people in our society who cannot be won away to
another job by offering them more money unless it is a
huge increase in money.' A cynic could be forgiven for
suggesting that this is evidence, not for any change in
human attitudes, but that wealth alters the magnitude of
the amount needed to influence behaviour.
The practical principles derived from this philo-
sophy have been implemented by consultants in a variety
of organisations; for example, Taylor (1972) reports
13 case studies, of major organisational changes in
commercial organisations in line with the theory.
Unfortunately, although this is an ethically
attractive theory, it has received little empirical
support in the work context.
Wahba and Bridwell (1976) in a review of the
relevant research, are able to find no studies which can
identify all five specific needs as independent factors
although some identified self-actualisation as an
independent factor. Two studies showed no support for the
theory at all, and could not identify the need categories.
It is hardly surprising that such a precisely
defined sequential theory of such loosely defined, often
unoperationalisable constructs, should like so many of
Freud's theories defy empirical verification. For example
Maslow's (1942:260) definition of self-esteem as inter-
changable with Dominance seems different from the variety
of self-evaluation, phenomenological definitions suggested
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by Tharanou (1979), which is the commonly accepted view
of the concept.
Talking of the complete model, Maslow (1970:xii)
himself, in his preface to Motivation and Personality
(1970) said, 'I have not yet thought of a good way to
put it to the test in the laboratory.'
Alderfer (1969) building on Maslow's concepts, but
recognising the conceptual difficulties, suggests
categorizing needs, but not hierarchally, into Existence
Needs, Relatedness Needs, and Growth Needs (ERG). He then
attempted to identify, by means of a questionnaire, the
existence of these needs in 110 bank employees and compare
them with the specific progression through the need
hierarchy detailed by Maslow (1943; 1954). He could find
no evidence to suggest that satisfaction of one need leads
to the next level. For example, in this study pay
satisfaction (a physiological need) was, 'moderate at
best,' yet there is evidence that belongingness needs are
satisfied. As a result, Alderfer (1969:171) suggests the
classification of needs into Existence, Relatedness and
Growth categories together with all stages being active at
the same time as more practical modification of the Need
Hierarchy Theory.
Lawler and Porter (1963) attempted to establish the
role of pay in the theory (which seems to regard pay as an
unfortunate necessity in any work situation and concludes
that it serves only to fulfil lower order needs). In a
survey of 1913 managers, the researchers establish that
pay does not satisfy only a single need in the individual
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but rather serves to satisfy a variety of needs, including
security and self-esteem needs.
Although there is little recent research, Marsh
(1978) proposes an extension of the theory by including
time, both present and future, as another dimension. It
seems an ingenious idea but he does not make any
suggestion as to how to operationalise the concepts or to
test them empirically.
The evidence suggests that, although popular,
Maslow's (1943) model has very little empirical verific-
ation and, because of the problems of definition of such
concepts as 'self-actualisation' is unlikely to be
developed further. It is also clear that pay not only
serves to satisfy physiological needs but has a much more
complex interaction with many human needs, including, if
the construct exists, self-actualisation.
Herzberg's Two Factor Theory
A different classification of needs is suggested by
Herzberg et al (1967). They classify work needs into
extrinsic and intrinsic, labelling extrinsic need as
'hygiene !
 needs whose role is to act as a 'satisfier' (or
dissatisfier) and intrinsic needs as active motivators.
Herzberg et al (1967) then argue that only the intrinsic
factors lead to job satisfaction, while extrinsic factors
are at best, neutral and at worst can result in dissatis-
faction. This is an important distinction as the theory
clearly suggests that the causes of satisfaction and
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dissatisfaction are separate and different.
As with Maslow's (1943) theory, the ultimate
motivator is self-actualisation, and job satisfaction can
(they suggest hopefully) lead to increased performance on
the job. They comment:-
Motivators fit the need for creativity, the hygiene
factors satisfy the need for fair treatment, and it
is thus that the appropriate incentive must be present
to achieve the desired job attitude and job
performance.
Pay according to this theory is a 'hygiene' factor
which cannot lead to or cause job satisfaction or act as
a motivator. To account for the anomoay of the recognised
success of performance incentive schemes in improving
productivity, Herzberg et al (1967:117) says,
Money thus earned as a direct reward for outstanding
individual performance, is as reinforcement of the
motivators of recognition and achievement.
This comment demonstrates a certain inconsistency
in the theory which can say in one breath that money
cannot motivate, and in the other, suggest that when it
does it is merely reinforcing other motivators.
Although this theory has stimulated much research
most of it is concerned with job attitudes, job enrichment
and job satisfaction. Not surprisingly little of it is
concerned with pay and performance and so is not reviewed
here.
However, shortly after the theory was prepared
several researchers were critical of both the concepts
involved and the methodology of the research. Wall and
Stephenson (1970) undertook a critical evaluation of the
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theory which they suggest is, to some extent, ambiguous.
They give four interpretations of the basic premise that
hygiene factors can cause dissatisfaction while motivators
cause satisfaction and go on to give a fairly compre-
hensive review of a number of supporting and non-
supporting studies. They notice that the studies in
support of the Two Factor Theory use the same methodology
(a critical incident analysis) while those using different
methodology do not support the theory. This would suggest
that the separation of the two factors is an artefact of
the methodology of the research. Their own study demon-
strates that a strong relationship does exist between the
need to respond in a socially acceptable manner and
responses to the Two Factor Theory.
Soliman (1970) attempts to reconcile the theory
with more traditional theories by correlating scores from
the traditional job satisfaction questionnaires with
scores derived from the sam subjects using the critical
incident method favoured by Herzberg et al (1967). There
was no correlation, indicating that the Herzberg et al
(1967) results were an artefact of the methodology.
Both these studies provide strong evidence that the
two factor theory was not accurate in separating job
attributes into satisfiers and dissatisfiers, and it would
therefore be inaccurate to conclude from this research
that pay merely satisfied lower order needs. The role of
pay in motivation is more complex that that.
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McClelland (1961) - A Theory of Achievement Motivation 
One of the problems of both these need theories is
the difficulty of conceptualising, operationalising and
measuring the construct defined as a need. In one
specific area - need for achievement (nAch) - this has
happened.
It would appear that either naturally or through
some form of socialization, some individuals have a desire
to master nature, to be leaders of men, or to succeed and
achieve in our society generally. A number of researchers
based at the University of Michigan and headed by David
McClelland have defined the characteristics of the
achieving person and developed a Theory of Achievement
Motivation (Atkinson and Feather, 1966).
nAchievement, is a trait which spans theoretical
boundaries in that it suggests that an individual
evaluating a specific task forms expectancies, and that
the particular goal should have an attractive valence.
These constructs are similar to those of Expectancy
Theory (Vroom, 1964) and Goal Theory (Locke, 1968). The
achieving individual has a sense of being responsible for
an outcome; an idea like that of the theories of Locus of
Control (Rotter, 1966; Lefcourt, 1973) and attribution
theory (Weiner, 1974). Such individuals have a motive to
achieve success with the complimentary motive to avoid
failure. They prefer intermediate risk situations
(Atkinson, 1964:242). The attributes of the trait are
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well documented and well researched (Atkinson and Feather,
1966; Atkinson, 1964).
In its original formulation it was concluded that
people with high nAchievement were not influenced by money
but by the intrinsic nAchievement: on the other hand
people low in nAchievement are influenced by money and
can be made to work harder for external incentives.
However, the model was refined (Atkinson 1964:241) and it
is now accepted that the strength of the achievement
motive will vary depending on the incentive value of
success. It seems more than possible that those with a
high nAchievement are influenced by the probability of
financial reward. Morgan (1966) demonstrates, in a survey
of a representative sample of the American population
(n = 3000), that those with high nAchievement are more
likely to be supervisors, three times more likely to have
a high status occupation and earned significantly more
income.
Because those possessing this trait prefer moderate
level risks and have a high desire for income (possibly as
a measure of achievement) pay has become an important part
of the theory. These two aspects of the model suggest
that pay should be contingent on task performance in order
to motivate. In its original formulation this is a Low
Profile Theory but it has evolved into a High Profile
Theory.
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Job Satisfaction 
One of the problems with the need theories of both
Maslow (1943) and Her zberg et al (1967) is the difficulty
in defining and operationalising the constructs. While it
is fairly simple to define physiological needs, the
definition of self-esteem is not quite so straight
forward (Maslow 1942, Wells and Marwell 1976:7, Tharenou
1979:317) and the problems of measurement make research in
the area difficult. Self actualization, an important
construct in both these theories as well as being a
phenomenological construct tends to have different
meanings to different individuals, so only the affective
(or emotional) aspects can be measured. Are high levels
of lob satisfaction indicative of self actualization in
the work place? Possibly, but if they are, the facets
which cause satisfaction (and lead to a feeling of self
actualization) need not necessarily be the same for
everyone. Some individuals need responsibilities, others
avoid it, both with equal degrees of satisfaction.
Using the basic concepts of these theories (and
with the ethical and social orientation of the Hawthorne
Studies) a body of research has emerged which concerns
itself with the individuals quality of working life and
the enrichment of jobs. Whether one can view the theory
as a motivational theory is open to debate as the theories
do not suggest that they predict behaviour leading towards
enhancing performance. Indeed, they are not reviewed in
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several motivational reviews (Campbell and Pritchard,
1976; Mitchell, 1979). There is, however, a common
managerial belief that job satisfaction does lead to
improved job performance (or increased motivation). For
example, Jackson and Mindell (1980) comment,
Not only is this relationship between job satisfaction
and work related values important in determining
employee motivation, at a more basic level it becomes
critical because it directly impacts on productivity
and profitability.
There is an enormous amount of research on job
satisfaction (for reviews Locke, 1969; Cameron, 1973;
Locke, 1976; Locke, 1984). The purpose here is purely to
establish that the link between job satisfaction and
performance is, at best, tenuous and, at worst, that job
satisfaction is a consequence of job performance and so it
cannot be regarded as a motivator.
Reviews suggest (Locke, 1969; Cameron, 1973:23;
Locke 1976:1332) that although Herzberg et al (1967) and
Jackson & Mindell (1980) assume that job satisfaction will
lead to enhanced work performance, there is little
evidence to explain that the relationship, even if it
exists, is causal. Locke (1970) argues that as job
satisfaction is an evaluation of the various facets of the
job, the effect must be that job performance influences
job satisfaction and that only in so far as satisfactory
performance will encourage, and dissatisfactory perform-
ance discourage, further effort, the effect is interactive.
This suggests a theoretical orientation that performance
must lead to satisfaction rather than the reverse.
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Further confirmation is supplied by Cherrington,
Reitz and Scott (1971), who in a laboratory study, (n =
90 undergraduates) study this interaction of satisfaction,
performance and payment. They establish that the
relationship between satisfaction and performance is
dependent on the reward contingencies, but as the reward
in the experiment is not contingent on the task, they
do not
	 argue that performance causes satisfaction.
Also, Schwab (1974) after a large scale field study
of nearly 300 workers, concluded that incentive pay
systems can improve productivity, while having a negative
impact on employee job satisfaction. Comparing three
groups, one on piece-work, one on a group incentive and
another on hourly rates, he reported job satisfaction
highest amongst the hourly paid workers, while the piece-
work group had the highest level of motivation and product-
ivity. However, as productivity was not measured object-
ively and only a self report measure of the level of
motivation was used, the results should be treated with
some caution.
A more definitive piece of research was undertaken
by Sheriden and Slocum (1975) who in a longitudinal field
study lasting a year (of 35 managers and 59 machine
operators), attempted to establish the direction of
causality. Their results indicate that changes in job
satisfaction were significantly related to performance in
machine operators, but not in the managers. As the design
measured satisfaction at two points in time, used cross
lagged correlational procedures and, for the machine
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operators, objective measures of performance, the study
provides strong evidence that the direction of causality
is that performance results in satisfaction.
Bagozzi (1978) also attempted to establish the
direction of causality between job satisfaction and
performance, but used statistical causal modelling
techniques rather than a longitudinal research design.
Nevertheless, in a field study of 122 salesmen measuring
task specific self-esteem, general self-esteem, motivation
and verbal intelligence, as well as job satisfaction and
using objective performance measures (sales volume) he was
able to conclude, 'Thus, support exists for the proposition
hypothesising the greater the performance the greater the
job satisfaction.'
This evidence alone would suggest that there is no
reason to think job satisfaction motivates behaviour to
enhance performance. On the contrary, there is some
tentative evidence (as well as a sound theoretical
justification) that performance leads to job satisfaction.
As there is a clearly established link between pay and
performance it seems probable that pay, particularly when •
linked with performance, is a major determinant of job
satisfaction.
Job Re-Design 
In spite of what is becoming a generally accepted
view of job satisfaction, research (based, not only on the
implied assumption that job satisfaction enhances perform-
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ance or has a positive financial benefit (Mirvis and
Lawler, 1977), but with the moral conviction that
individuals deserve a high quality of working life,) into
the effects of job re-design has flourished.
It is clear from the methodological and inter-
pretational criticisms of Herzberg's theory that it is
inadequate to serve as a model for practical application.
Hackman and Oldham (1976) who also consider that
the socio-technical system approach is limited, suggest a
comprehensive model of motivation through job re-design.
The term job re-design and job enrichment seem to be used
inter-changeably in much of the literature but for this
purpose the definition suggested by Wall (1982) will be
used. He suggests,
Job re-design refers to the deliberate attempt, . . .
to organise the work of individuals or groups in such
a way as to provide greater complexity with respect to
one or more of the following characteristics: variety,
autonomy and completeness of task . . .
The characteristics mentioned derive from Hackman
and Oldham (1976) model which suggests that five core job
characteristics lead to three psychological states which
have four personal and work outcomes. (Figure 3:2)
It is significant that although the model claims to
be a motivational model, it does not predict quantity of
production only quality. The model was tested on 658
employees in 62 different jobs and the predicted relation-
ship was established by questionnaire and correlation. Pay
plays no vital part in this theory. It could be
argued that the theory suggests pay should be directly
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linked with performance in order to act as meaningful
feedback, but the feedback utilised in the theory is
normally assumed to be purely knowledge of results.
Umstot et al (1976) in a carefully controlled and
ingenious piece of research which combined the control of
a laboratory experiment with the realism of a field
experiment, compared the affects of goal setting and job
enrichment in a simulated works situation. Using 100
subjects, they varied the task along the characteristics
suggested by Hackman and Oldham (1976) and set goals. The
results provide strong, fairly clear, evidence that job
enrichment improved job satisfaction, but had little
effect on productivity. However, goal setting had a major
impact on productivity.
Kemp et al (1983) report a quasi-experimental
field study of a Greenfield site, where, because of the
particular situation experimental manipulation and control
groups were clearly available. They observed and measured
the effect of autonomous work groups, the assumption being
that groups of workers in autonomous work groups perceive
higher levels of work complexity (ie variety, task
identity, feedback and autonomy). Again, the results
showed clear evidence that job satisfaction was at a
higher level but no effect was found for those factors
which managers are trying to control; motivation,
organisation commit ment or mental health.
Farh and Scott (1983) looked more specifically at
the effects of autonomy on performance. Autonomy (one of
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Hackman and Oldham's (1976) core dimensions) was mani-
pulated in a laboratory experiment (using as subjects 60
undergraduates) by varying it on four levels using a proof
reading task. It was found that high levels of autonomy
had a negative affect on the rate of productivity and no
affect on the quality of the task. Clearly this is against
the predictions of the job enrichment model, although
Hackman and Oldham (1976) do not predict quantity only
quality.
Even where performance improvements have been
reported it could be a mistake to infer causality. Kelly
(1978) suggests that the autonomy granted in work groups
is comparatively limited and that the role of pay in much
of the research reported is understated. In particular he
undertakes a re-analysis of the Ahmadabad Textile Mill
Study (Rice, 1953). Kelly (1978) stresses that simul-
taneously with the re-organisation of work groups to
provide more variety, autonomy and res ponsibility the
basic rates of pay were increased and the workers trans-
ferred to an incentive payment system. The improvement in
productivity was impressive but, on the evidence, it would
be a mistake to ascribe any increase to the changed work
system when pay could also have worked as an incentive.
These are four empirical studies which demonstrate
fairly strongly that although job re-design may be morally
and socially right, it probably has a financial cost and
will not necessarily be the causal factor in any increase
in productivity. If a manager is looking to increase
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production the techniques and methods of job re-design are
not going to be helpful.
In the traditions of the Human Relations Movement,
where pay has a low profile, payment systems suggested by
many of those concerned with job enrichment, are the group
value-added schemes. The argument is that workers should
participate in the results of any increase in production,
but that direct payment on individual results could be
stressful and ineffective. A number of case studies have
been reported in major organisations such as British
5
Aerospace, Distillers Company Limited, GKN Lincoln Electric
Limited (IDS 1979), a white goods manufacturer, a manu-
facturing company (Staples, 1981), and an industrial
electrical components factory (Ghobadian, 1981). And while
it is suggested that co-operation improves no increases in
productivity are reported.
Bearing in mind that there is ample evidence that
group schemes disperse the individual feeling of respon-
sibility (Campbell 1952, Buck 1957, Roethlisberger and
Dickson 1964) and the problem that the mechanics of the
scheme are so complex that even the accountants find the
relationship between production and payment difficult to
follow, this result is hardly surprising.
Conclusion about Low Profile Theories 
The Human Relations Movement has been the ethos of
much managerial, consultancy and academic thinking since
the 1940's. Its concepts have resulted in Glacier Metal
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Company Limited abandoning their piece-work payment
schemes (Brown, 1962); in a number of companies advised by
Linda King Taylor (Taylor, 1972) restructuring their
' organisation, to improve participation, increase autonomy
and reduce the profile of the payment system; in General
Foods, restructuring the jobs of the work force in one of
their plants at Topeka (Walton, 1977); in Volvo, re-
organising the way people work in their plant at Kalmar
(Gyllenhammar, 1979) and many others; yet although these
changes have involved these organisations in a great deal
of cost, there is little empirical evidence that either
the organisation or for that matter the individual worker
has received much benefit. One can not help but sympathise
when Fein (1979:499) comments, 'The simple truth is that
there are no data which show that re-structuring and
enriching jobs will raise the will to work,' or to agree
when he suggests that the vast majortiy of workers seek
fulfillment outside of their work.
High Profile Theories 
Introduction 
When managers are looking for practical techniques
and advice on how to improve productivity, then they need
to look to the more limited if more pragmatic theories of
Goal Setting (Locke, 1968), Equity Theory (Adams, 1963) or
Expectancy Theory (Vroom, 1964). In all of these theories,
pay has a high profile and is integrated as a causal,
motivational factor.
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Need theories make the assumption that man is
motivated by deep internal needs and are concerned with
the content of these needs, his emotions and attitudes,
while other theories are more concerned with trying to
explain the process of motivation and make the assumption
that man is a cognitive being with at least a sense of
subjective rationality. One of the first motivational
theories which assumed that man was a rational and econ-
omic being was propounded by Frederick Taylor and became
known as Scientific Management.
Scientific Management 
The pioneers of the scientific management, in the
early years of this century when industrialists were still
evaluating the recent revolution sought the answer to two
practical problems endemic in industry at that time, how
to increase industrial production and how to increase the
level of worker motivation. Taylor (1922) suggested his
answer, not only from the basis of theoretical concepts
but from his practical experience as a labourer and
manager in a steel workshop. He observed that management
were unable to improve production because of their ignor-
ance of the details of the job. He became aware of the
existence and the rationale behind why workers restrict
output, a feature of the work place much discussed by
the Hawthorne researchers, (Roethlisberger & Dickson 1964).
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The principles of scientific management (for review
see Thompson, 1922; Kelly, 1982) are similar to those
propounded by classical economic theorists. They assume:
1. Man is rational and concerned with maximising his
economic gain.
2. Each individual responds to economic incentives as an
isolated individual.
3. People are motivated in a similar and standard way.
Taylor (1922 Para 44) subsequently developed time
and motion study for analysing individual jobs into
components, hence a system for costing production, and for
use as a basis for rate fixing on a piece-work payment
system. The piece-work pay system is fundamental to the
practise of scientific management because it assumes the
individual will respond and maximise his economic gain,
although workers are considered to be quite capable of
manipulating the system to maximise long term rather than
short term economic gain. Taylor (1922:637) claimed seven
advantages for his system of scientific management:
1. Costs are reduced and wages are higher
2. Because rate fixing is fair, workers will not fiddle
the system
3. Men are treated with greater uniformity and justice
4. It is in both the interests of men and management to
attain maximum quantity and best quality
5. Maximum productivity is achieved rapidly and main-
tained by the system
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6. It selects the best men and selects out lazy men
7. "One of the chief advantages derived from the above
effects of the system, is that it promotes a most
friendly feeling between men and their employers and
so renders labour unions and strikes Onnecessaro'
(Taylor 1922:638)
The final advantage (quoted in full) is particularly
important as evidence to refute the allegation that the
theory is inhuman and insensitive to individual needs.
Taylor believed that by coinciding the objectives of the
individual and the organisation, everyone including
employees would benefit and that his system would promote
harmonious industrial relations.
Taylor (1922) and his theory had been severely
criticised and the concepts totally repudiated by the
Human Relations Movement. Because of industrial trouble
in implementing this theory in a government workshop,
Taylor was called upon to explain and justify the theory
before a congressional committee, and in 1915, the US
Congress passed a law forbidding the use of any timing
device to measure work performance in a government plant.
Those who advocate the Human Relations approach
regard this concept of man as being motivated by money
alone to demean human dignity. These views appear to be
seen from the philosophical perspective that those who
value money are tainted by it and must, somehow, have less
ethical values. After all does not the Bible say,
” . . . the love of money is the root of all evil."
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(Timothy, 6:10) and does not Marx (Frankel 1977:19)
consider,
Money abuses all the Gods of mankind and changes them
into commodities. It has, therefore, deprived the
whole world, both the human world and nature, of their
own proper value. Money is the alienated essence of
man's work and existence. This essence dominates him
and he worships it.
The rejection of money as a motivator by the Human
Relations movement stems from Mayo's (1975) philosophy.
Mayo (1975) rejects economic theory generally and, citing
the Hawthorne studies as evidence, concludes,
It is at least evident that the economists' presuppos-
ition of individual self-preservation as a motive, and
logic as an instrument, is not characteristic of the
industrial facts ordinarily encountered. (Mayo
1975:39).
These ideas are reminiscent of the 'return to
nature' and the 'good old days' concepts propounded by
the Green movement today. Mayo (1975) appears to want
to reject the whole industrial and material society.
It is an exageration to suggest that Taylor saw
man in his totality as being motivated by money. For
example, he regards one of the responsibilities of
management to select people,
. . . with a view to finding out his limitation on
the one hand, but even more important, his possibilities
for development on the other hand; and then as
deliberately and systematically to train and help this
workman, giving him wherever possible, opportunities
for advancement which will finally enable him to do
the highest and most interesting and most profitable
class of work for which his natural abilities fit him.
(Taylor, 1922).
One can see similarities between this view and
Maslow's (1943) concept of self actualization. However,
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Taylors concern was with man in the workplace and in this
context he did regard money as being a primary motivating
factor.
His systems are said to de-humanize, to treat
individuals as work units and to ignore all the other
factors discovered during the course of the Hawthorne
researchs. Scott and Hart (1971) compared his philosophy
with that of the philosopher, Thomas Hobbs, who believed
that the natural state of man was chaos and that man had
a natural propensity for evil. These views and compari-
sons tend to exagerate the philosophy of scientific
management or over simplify or ignore many of its concepts.
A number of researchers have sprung to Taylor's defence.
Fry (1976) argued that Taylor's principles were misunder-
stood, while Locke (1982) after a detailed review of
Taylorism and the criticisms of scientific management
concludes, 'Taylor's views, not only were essentially
correct but have been well accepted by management.'
(Locke 1982:22)
To a large extent this is true. The literature
shows that Taylorism and its principles are very much
alive, being recommended and put to practice by todays
managers. For example, Denzler (1974) is critical of the
procedures of job enrichment, pointing out the inconclu-
sive nature of the evidence from the studies at Ford and,
basing his arguments on a survey among 2,535 sewing
machine operators, suggests a return to the principles
of scientific management.
Shapiro and Wahba (1974) basing their argument on
research among 200 employees in a steel company, conclude
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that the employees appear to be motivated by money to do
what is a basically unsatisfying job, thereby confirming
the view of Scientific Management.
Piamonte (1980) exorts America's Personnel Managers
to link rewards to performance and to ensure that each
employee knows exactly what is expected of him and has the
requisite skill, knowledge and ability to handle the job.
Jenkins and Gupta (1983) in a philosophical analysis
of traditional and innovative incentive systems suggest
that money can still be used to motivate employees and it
would seem probable that Taylor would accept their caveat
that context and the specific job need to be taken into
account.
In spite of the propaganda of McGregor (1961),
Argyris (1962) and Mayo (1975) the professional managers
views are synthesised by Mark Spade (Nigel Balchin,
1950:66) who wrote:
Don't, I implore you run away with the idea that
people will do anything for money. They won't. Only
the other day I heard a very eminent person say with
some surprise, that he had discovered that men won't
work themselves to death even to earn E4 a week. On
the other hand, all the books on incentives agree,
albeit with gentle regret, that if you want a man to
work harder the easiest way to get him to do it is to
offer him more money.
This, then, is the perspective of Scientific
Management but the philosophy of the Human Relations
movement has so clouded the issue that it is worth
examining the evidence in some detail to establish whether
the assumption of economic rationally is justified. Locke
(1983) is among those who think so, as his review of 53
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studies of motivational methodology and research (see
Table 3:2) shows:
TABLE 3:2
Summary of Studies Comparing Four Motivational Techniques
Technique 	 No of	 Median	 % Showing	 Range 
Studies Increase Some Increase 
Money	 10	 + 30%	 100%	 + 3 to 49%
Goal Setting	 17	 + 16%	 100%	 + 2 to 57%
Participation 16	 + 0.5%	 50%	 - 24 to 47%
Job Enrichment 10	 + 8.75%	 90%	 - 1 to 61%
From this table it would appear that money has a major
influence on productivity. This view is supported by a
variety of evidence some of which stems from research in
the 1920's and 1930's. At that time there was a concern
for identifying the effect of monotonous and repetitive
work on both the individual and his subsequent product-
ivity. In the United Kingdom the Industrial Fatigue
Research Board undertook a number of studies investigating
and evaluating, scientifically and systematically the
variables which were the concern of the Hawthorne
Researchers - monotony, rest pauses, illumination and the
general physical conditions of work.
It is difficult to understand why the results of
such research are ignored when the Hawthorne Studies are
widely quoted. Perhaps if the Industrial Fatigue Research
Board had employed a PR executive as good as Elton Mayo
this would not have happened.
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One report from the Board examined the effect of
pay on performance (Burnett, 1925). This experimental
study had three objectives - to observe the effects of
repetitive work on people of different intelligence, to
observe the effect of rest pauses on output and to compare
the effects of time-rate and piece-rate on output. With
this in mind a work room was set up and four girls, with
varying intelligence, were given the task of sewing
coarse thread onto canvas. 	 For eight weeks the girls
were paid a time rate and for six weeks were paid on a
piece-rate basis. The researchers report (Burnett
1925:13), that the immediate effect of adopting the piece-
rate system was an average increase in output of 7.2% at
the end of the first week rising to 18% at the end of the
second week, and an increase of between 7.9% and 10.8%
was maintained.
Although the sample is small and there are no
comparative groups to control for extraneous variables
this seems a strong indication that pay influenced
production.
Some time later (Wyatt et al 1934) undertook a
field experiment which, like the Hawthorne studies,
separated a group of girls from the main factory and
altered their pay from a time rate (eight weeks) to a
bonus rate (fifteen weeks) and then on to a piece-rate
system. Figure 3:3 shows the effect on output of the
different systems. The results are obvious - when the
bonus scheme was introduced productivity increased by 46%
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and increased by a further 30% with the introduction of a
piece-rate.
This is a field experiment, with ten girls working
in a room separate from the main factory. The task was
wrapping, packing and unwrapping sweets and control
groups of workers in the main factory were used,
. . . lest it should be thought that the tendencies
observed in the present experiment were exceptional,'
(Wyatt et al 1934:7). Consequently this establishes
strong evidence that, at least in a repetitive task,
money influences performance and that linking pay to
performance enhances performance.
Since that time empirical field studies which
experimentally manipulate pay, money or a financial
reward have been rare. The Hawthorne Studies
(Whitehead, 1938; Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1964; Mayo,
1975) contain an account of the experimental manipulation
of direct wages, and although the researchers conclude to
the contrary, these researches do provide some evidence
that pay influences behaviour and enhances performance.
Lawler and Hackman (1969) as will be reported
later, designed a field experiment which established that
the effect of participation in the design of an incentive
system can effect attendance. However, they did not look
at the effect of pay on any other aspects of performance.
Pritchard et al (1976) in an experimental study
based on Expectancy Theory manipulated a variety of
incentives in a group of American service trainees. The
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detail of the experiment is reviewed in the Expectancy
Theory section but they did establish that financial
incentives appear to influence performance.
Latham et al (1978) manipulated a financial reward
in a goal setting field experiment, where the financial
manipulation is of secondary consideration to the main
manipulation of participative and assigned goal setting,
and so the experiment is reviewed in detail in that
section. However, the experiment did establish that pay
and goal setting influence productivity separately and
that monetary incentives produce significantly higher
performance than other incentives.
Luthans et al (1981) also obtained significant
performance and behavioural changes in a field experiment
with a group of 82 shop assistants. Manipulating a
variety of rewards which consisted of time-off, cash
instead of time off or a paid vacation the researchers
measured, (as a performance measure), a variety of
behavioural changes, defined as improving customer
satisfaction. These behaviour changes were noted by an
observer to be present in the Experimental Group during
the experimental period, but were not observed in the
control group. Although this study does demonstrate a
link between sales behaviour and financially based
reward it is not possible infer any pay to performance
effects in this research, as pay was not manipulated.
In all experimental field studies where financial
reward has been manipulated behaviour has changed in the
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predicted direction to enhance performance for the sake of
increased money. In the two studies where pay has been
manipulated performance and productivity have increased
substantially and so provide strong, if not recent,
evidence that people generally will change behaviour for
a financial reward.
Unfortunately, none of the recent field studies
manipulated pay directly or looked at the effect of pay
as an incentive on performance. For ethical reasons most
research in the area is investigative and correlational.
For example, Campbell (1952) obtained data sheet
performance and pay among different size work groups in
an industrial organisation. These results, interpreted
after interviews with the work force, suggest that
productivity (and pay) increases as the size of the
groups decrease. They also found that in large groups a
high proportion of the men did not have a know]edge of
their results and its effect on their earnings, and so it
could be expected that output would be lower than in a
small group who could see their results directly. Such
phenomenon could partly account for the effect of pay on
performance found during the Hawthorne studies when the
size of the work group was reduced from 100 to five, and
is suggested as an explanation by those researchers.
Buck (1957) in a similar study obtained data from
a Railway Carriage works. Here the groups of workers
varied from eight to over 40.
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Taking advantage of a naturally occuring change in the
pay system the researchers observed and quantified the
effect of the change on four groups, over some time.
There was a clear indication that the effect of the change
to a piece-work system was more marked in small groups
than in large ones. It would seem logical and intuitively
plausible thatwhen an individual perceived his effort
more clearly linked to improved pay, his subjective
expectancies increase as the size of the group decreases
and so his performance should improve. These two studies
provide some empirical evidence to support this view.
Millward (1968) examined the role of pay in a group
of young women working in a factory. She encovered an
interesting phenomenon. Apparently, until the age of
eighteen, (or until they get engaged) young girls in the
Manchester factory gave their entire pay packet to their
mother. Consequently, their interest in pay and response
to the pay system i$ minimal. When they go 'on board'
(that is become financially self-supporting) the incentive
bonus scheme seems to operate to improve productivity.
This is an area which is much neglected in research and
a great deal more is needed to try and uncover how and why
money has an effect on behaviour, once it is established
that money does have such an effect, particularly as
several studies use young girls as subjects and then
generalise to the working population.
Lawler and Hackman (1969) in one of the very few
field experiments examine the influence of participation.
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in the preparation of an incentive pay plan on subsequent
behaviour. Three autonomous work groups of office cleaners
developed their own pay plan which was designed to reward
good attendance. These plans were then imposed on other
groups whose performance was then compared with the
performance of control groups. In the experimental
condition attendance improved from 88% to 94% of scheduled
hours while no change in attendance was observed in the
imposed plan condition or in the control groups. This
study provides strong evidence that participation in the
development of ones own pay plan (eg menu pay plans) has
a strong motivational force. Scheflen et al (1971)
collected data from the same groups one year after the
original had been installed. Management had dropped the
incentive plan for two of the three participative groups
with the result that attendance in those groups had
dropped to below pre-treatment levels. In the remaining
experimental group attendance continued at 93% indicating
that participation in the development of a pay plan had
a lasting effect. This research provides strong evidence
that pay does effect and influence behaviour.
It is evident that pay does influence behaviour
so it becomes important for companies to identify those
behaviours which it wishes to reward.	 Many companies
do not appear to relate pay to behaviour and so there are
problems. For example, Kerr (1975) gives examples of the
influence of pay schemes on behaviour in two organisations
- one an industrial company and the other an insurance
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firm. By means of a questionnaire and interviews he
established that behaviours which top managers regard as
disfunctional were those that the lower level employees
claimed were being rewarded. It is clear that the firms
studied were not able to identify whichbehaviour they
wanted to reward and subsequently did not reward those
vital unseen and often informal aspects of the business
which make it work effectively. They rewarded, as do so
many companies, attendance and tenure rather than
performance and effectiveness.
Heneman (1973) provides further evidence to support
the view that in many organisations pay is not related to
any performance criteria. He correlated the performance
evaluations of a group of managers with pay levels and pay
changes over the next two years. There was no correlation
between performance and general pay level, however managers
with the best performance tended to get larger increases.
In this company the relationship between pay and perform-
ance, in general, was tenuous.
Further evidence that pay which is contingent on
performance can enhance performance comes from a laboratory
study by Farr (1976). He paid 144 undergraduates for
sorting out computer cards according to two incentive
systems; an individual incentive (piece-work) and a group
incentive. He found that in both the group incentive
condition and individual incentive condition, performance
was significantly better than in the no incentive control
condition.
Much research in the pay area is neither experi-
mental nor empirical. Nevertheless these case studies,
surveys and reviews enhance our knowledge about the
general influence of pay and managers perceptions of the
influence of pay. For example, Lloyd (1976) reviewed
the operation of incentive schemes in 245 organisations in
the United Kingdom. The survey covered managerial
perceptions of the schemes rather than any objective
evaluation, consequently 42% of the incentive schemes are
judged subjectively to be very successful and 53%
partially successful, with little evidence being given to
substantiate these claims. The principcd reason for
operating incentive schemes appears to be to increase
output. The survey also looked at the communication of
incentive schemes to employees and discovered plenty of
room for misunderstanding and mis-information to occur.
The survey concludes (Lloyd 1976:6),
Communication of incentive schemes to employees is
poor. Companies encountered difficulties both in
terms of putting across the underlying principles of
the scheme and simplifying the operating details so
that employees are able to relate their efforts to
their reward.
If communication about incentive schemes is so bad
one wonders whether this is the reason that pay systems
designed to enhance performance sometimes fail.
Thorpe (1980) examined the relationship between pay
and productivity in a large engineering company. He
suggests that pay systems fall into two groups. Those
designed to increase productivity and those designed to
facilitate organisational change. This researcher clearly
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influenced by Maslow and Herzberg (Thorpe 1980:10)
desperately searches for explanations for his findings
when the production dropped from a performance index of
105% under piece-work conditions to 65% under day work.
He explains that on one production line production
increased because of a 'good mix' of workers, as if this
would compensate in some way, and using different
performance criteria suggests that productivity subse-
quently improved.
This case study approach can and does often high-
light a number of real and practical problems with payment
schemes. Such a study is the comprehensive review of the
introduction of incentive schemes into the British Coal
Mining Industry (Clarke, 1980). Bearing in mind the many
disputes with miners such research seems particularly
relevant in establishing a basis of fact, even if these
need interpretation, rather the rhethoric and propaganda
put out by both sides during a dispute.
In 1971, the National Coal Board had a national
uniform day wage pay structure which minimised geograph-
ical differences and differentials between underground
workers and surface workers. In 1972, after a general
review of the pay system, the NUM and the board decided
on the need for an incentive system. After a period of
bargaining most pits were put onto a productivity bonus
incentive scheme by January 1977. On the introduction
of the scheme
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production of coal increased to a record 2.36 tonnes per
week. Although such record levels were not sustained a
general increase of 5% was observed and a reversal of the
steady decline in production. However, the board did not
consider the scheme successful as the level of increased
productivity did not compensate for the sharp increase in
pay. Because of the complexity of the situation the many
factors affecting production (mechanisation, pit closures,
etc) and because only national figures are quoted it is
not possible to establish an unambiguous relationship
between the incentive scheme and productivity.
In a similar vein, and during the period 1977 to
1980, Bowey et al (1982) researched the effects of the
implementation of incentive shcemes in the United
Kingdom. This is a comprehensive, sociological evaluation
of the way incentive and productivity schemes were
implemented during the Government's various wage freezes
when only productivity linked pay agreements were allowed.
This group of researchers clearly hold the view
(Bowey et al 1982:8) that the effect of an incentive
system is contingent on the context and other environmental
factors. They suggest 11 such factors necessary for an
effective system. Their survey covered 63 firms employing
662 people, mostly in manufacturing companies and reviewed
a variety of bonus and piece-work schemes which had a
variety of objectives. Sometimes the objective was not to
increase productivity but to increase the earnings of
employees in times of rapid inflation and a wage policy.
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The researchers did not obtain objective measures of
performance but do report that only 68% of firms reported an
improvement in efficiency and productivity although 85%
reported an increase in employee earnings. Presumably a
fairly substantial number implemented incentive schemes
which increased earnings but which did not improve
productivity. One reason for this could be, as the
researchers report, that many of the schemes were hastily
thrown together to meet a particular and peculiar environ-
mental need.
A similar, if less comprehensive, survey was
undertaken by DeLoitte, Haskins and Sells (Moulder and
Murray, 1980). It confirms the problems of communication
and design reported by Lloyd (1978), in a sample of 16
audit clients. It reports companies where the measure of
productivity was sales, while the majority of employees
receiving the bonus had no influence on sales and accepted
any subsequent payment as a gratuitous distribution. They
are critical of their clients implementing a value-added
scheme where employees do not identify their behaviour
with the value added - a particular problem with this
type of scheme.
A number of studies have found that the link
between pay and work behaviour rewarded is often tenuous
(Heneman 1973, Kerr 1975), and that communication about
the system is ineffective (Lloyd 1976, Bowey et al 1982).
One way to resolve this problem is suggested by Cummings
(1984) and Storich (1984), who suggest that the system of
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pay and reward should be integrated into the organisational
system and culture. Storich (1984) points out that the
reward system sends powerful signals to employees and that
it should be directed at strategic goals. He proposes a
model which would enable organisations to select measure-
ment and compensation systems compatable with organisa-
tional philosophy. Cummings (1984) identifies five stages
in an organisational life cycle and suggests a variety of
compensation components which can be manipulated according
to the stage of growth and organisational imperatives. He
quotes case studies of organisations which have conserv=
ative cultures (with salaries and long promotional time
horizons) taking over an entrepreneural company with
growth, production and performance as imperatives (with
payment by results systems). Clearly the organisational
environment, culture and objectives will be a major factor
in determining a pay system and a mismatch between the
culture and an appropriate system could cause problems.
It is clear from this research that there is some
empirical evidence to suggest that people will enhance
economic gain by changing performance and behaviour in
response to the pay system. The experimental field
studies (Burnett 1925, Wyatt et al 1934) give strong
evidence of this. Few studies suggest, as the Human
Relations movement would have you believe, that pay is not
an important influence. So far, the literature reviewed
has addressed the simple problem of, 'Does pay influence
behaviour and performance,' however, some research, which
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is theory based, attempts to establish how and why pay
affects behaviour and productivity. Such a theory is
Equity Theory.
Equity Theory
Research in this area is concerned almost entirely
with predicting the effect of pay on performance (Patchens
1961, Adams 1963). Equity Theory is a social exchange
theory based on the principles of cognitive dissonance.
Festinger (1954, 1957) suggests that beliefs and attitudes
are changed by considering the relationship between two or
more cognitive elements. Elements (beliefs or attitudes)
are considered to be dissonant if the conclusion derived
from one would preclude believing the other. For example,
'I like smoking' and 'I know that smoking causes lung
cancer', are dissonant. The theory argues that attitudes
are altered in a variety of ways in order that an
individual can maintain a sense of cognitive consistency.
Adams and Rosenbaum (1962), Adams (1963, 1965)
apply these principles to workers perception of wages and
suggest that a sense of inequity exists when a worker
perceives the relationship between his inputs, (effort,
skill or expertise), and the outcome (pay, extrinsic,
intrinsic rewards) are out of balance. When such an
inbalance exists, people take steps to reduce it. Adams
(1963), in a series of three laboratory experiments with
undergraduates working as interviewers, demonstrates
experimentally that when subjects perceive themselves to
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be overpaid they will improve productivity and so improve
the cognitive balance, or when paid by piece-work, will
reduce productivity to maintain consistency.
The theory predicts that people will correct an
inbalance in their perceptions of equity in a variety of
ways. The options open to an individual are to act on
others to change their inputs or outcomes, change ones
own inputs or outcomes, change the comparison other, or to
abandon the exchange relationship.
Consequently, in an inequitable pay situation,
individuals will, if they feel overpaid, increase their
effort (and productivity) to maintain consistency, and if
underpaid will reduce effort. However, with a piece-work
system increased effort will mean increased earnings and
so in the overpayment situation a greater sense of inequity.
In this situation effort (and earnings) will decrease but
quality may improve.
This theory has generated a large amount of experi-
mental activity, most of which deals purely with the
effect of pay on the productivity of the individual (for
reviews see Pritchard, 1969; Mowday, 1979).
The research can be criticised methodologically
because the manipulation of equity involves telling
experimental subjects that they are unqualified for a
particular task. The argument is that this reduces the
subjects self-esteem, rather than produce a feeling of
inequity with a subsequent effect on production caused
by lower self-esteem.
The theory is also unclear about who should be or
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is used as a referent or a comparison other. This
question is generally regarded as important, although it
could be argued that, as a sense of inequity exists, the
accuracy of this perception or the source of this percep-
tion is irrelevant.
However, Goodman (1972) in an interview questionn-
aire study of 217 managers examined seven possible
referent situations. He established that people appear to
use multiple referents; a combination of self, other and
the organisational system. The exception appeared to be
professionally qualified people who, as might be expected,
used more outside referents.
Pritchard (1969) after reviewing 13 studies, (three
of which were those of Adams and his associates) concludes
that the predicted effects of underpayment were supported
by the evidence but that the effects of overpayment were
far from clear, mainly because of the difficulty of
contamination by the self-esteem effect.
Lawler (1968) discusses the four possible inequit-
able payment situations (overpayment, underpayment,
contingent and non-contingent) and suggests that Equity
Theory provides an incomplete explanation of the phenomena.
He concludes that a combination of Equity Theory and
Expectancy Theory can provide a more comprehensive
explanation of human behaviour, and to some extent
Equity Theory has been subsequently incorporated into
Expectancy Theory models (Lawler, 1971).
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Mowday (1979) in his review found only six more
studies than Pritchard (1969). This would indicate that
interest in the pure theory had declined, and its concepts
integrated into other theories.
Pritchard et al (1972) undertook an impressive
field/laboratory experiment designed to test the theory's
predictions of overpayment (without the contaminant of
self-esteem) and underpayment. Using 253 college students
working in a simulated company (the students thought the
company was real) the researchers were able to manipulate
pay and observe quality and quantity affects on a computer
print out sorting task. It is a pity that in such a well
manipulated and well controlled experiment the results
are not more conclusive. Although the results were in the
predicted direction they were not significant, and
Pritchard et al (1972), as does Lawler (1968) suggest that
Equity and Expectancy Theory combined could provide a more
comprehensive explanation of human behaviour in this
context.
Evans and Molinari (1970) in a laboratory study not
reviewed by Mowday (1979) examine the problem of experi-
mentally induced inequity in a condition of job insecurity.
They demonstrate experimentally (N = 32) that Equity
Theory predictions of high quality, low quantity, pro-
duction for overpaid subjects, were confirmed, but for
subjects under conditions of high job insecurity (they were
working for a probationary period to be confirmed on
satisfactory
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performance) both overpaid and underpaid subjects
produced high quantity, low quality work. This would
indicate that the simple predictions of Equity Theory are
inadequate in the explanation of behaviour in more complex
situations.
Finn and Lee (1972) in a questionnaire study, of 170
employees in the Federal Public Health Service were able
to separate the subjects into those who perceived them-
selves to be inequitably paid. This research established
that in an organisational setting perceptions of inequity
derive from performance evaluations, while equity percept-
ions were based on age, tenure and maturity factors.
Further research took advantage of a naturally
occurring wage freeze in an industrial company. (Marks and
Mirvis, 1981), and after establishing that pay increases
below the rate of inflation induced feelings of inequity
(compared internally and externally) and reduced pay
satisfaction, could find no evidence in a work situation
that performance or people leaving the organisation altered
in any way. This would, again, confirm that simple
perceptions of equity can not explain behaviour in a
complex environment.
It is clear that the concept of equity, or as
Jaques (1967) calls it Felt Fair Pay, is an important one.
However, the experimental predictions of the Adams (1963)
theory are just not clearly and empirically verified.
Presumably, for this reason, interest in the theory has
declined. Lawler (1968), however, has suggested that
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Equity Theory and Expectancy Theory are not inconsistent
with each other and others (Lawler, 1973; Campbell and
Pritchard, 1976) have suggested that equity considerations
could be (and subsequently have been) subsumed under the
more comprehensive and general Expectancy Theories of
motivation.
Although the early promise of Equity Theory as an
explanation for behaviour in response to pay has not been
fulfilled, it continues to be necessary to try and
establish an explanation for motivated behaviour. Other
theories have been more successful in predicting behaviour
although the link with pay sometimes becomes less clear.
One such theory is Goal Theory (Locke, 1968).
Goal Theor3 
Implicit in the many definitions of motivation are
two general factors. Firstly, that there is some force
which makes people behave in a particular way and secondly
that there is some purpose or goal to their behaviour.
Locke (1968) in a clear and explicit formulation
suggests that it is the goal itself or 'what the indivi-
dual is trying to do' that determines performance on a
task. From this theory and the research it has been
established that specific goals result in better perform-
ance than general or no goals; that difficult goals result
in a higher level of performance than easy goals and that
goals formulated by and accepted by the individual, result
in a greater level of achievement than assigned goals.
- 128 -
To summarize the theory, it is stated that the most
immediate determinent of successful task performance is the
individual goal or intention; that external incentives
affect action through their effect on these goals and that
satisfaction (or otherwise) is the result of an evaluation
of actual achievement against goals planned. It is worth
noting that many of these concepts are also fundamental to
the theory of Scientific Management.
The theory has stimulated a great deal of research
which attempts to establish and confirm the precise effect
of goal difficulty, specificity or other factors on
performance (fOr reviews see Latham and Yuki, 1975; Locke
et al, 1981). The theory in its original formulation
(Locke, 1968:174) suggests that money can act to encourage
workers to accept tasks they would not otherwise accept
and to ensure goal acceptance. Locke et al (1968) reports
five experimental studies to test this hypothesis using as
subjects local undergraduates. The five experiments
tested piece-work, hourly incentives and variable
incentives on a variety of simple tasks. None of the
studies found any effect for pay on performance, except
through goal acceptance.
Pritchard and Curts (1973) point out that these
results contrast with predictions and research from other
theories, and suggest that the magnitude of the amounts
paid could have affected the experiment. Using 81
undergraduates in a conceptual replication of the Locke et
al (1968) study, Pritchard and Curts (1973) manipulate a
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variety of levels of pay (50 cents to $3). They found
that performance in the high pay condition was signifi-
cantly higher than in the other conditions and that
different levels of incentive did produce different levels
of performance. It is clear from this experiment that the
effects of goal setting and the effects of the financial
incentives are separate.
London and Oldham (1976) examine the particular
type of incentive system on performance, together with the
interaction between levels of goal difficulty. In a
laboratory experiment using 180 undergraduates with a two
by three factorial design, they were able to identify an
independent effect for pay in the piece-rate incentive
condition over the fixed rate condition. However,
interestingly enough there was no difference in performance
between the no pay (but goal) condition and the piece-rate
condition which would suggest that goal setting can result
in a better performance where pay in not involved.
Terborg and Miller (1978) argue that when testing
for the effects of goal or pay on performance, one should
examine the motivational processes more closely by
measuring or monitoring observable behaviour. Using 60
undergraduates in a laboratory experiment, these
researchers manipulated pay and goal conditions and
photographed behaviour. They too discovered that the
method of payment and goal setting independently effected
motivation and performance, but were able to assess that
payment effected quantity performance and effort whereas
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goal setting effected quantity, quality of performance
and direction of behaviour. Both effort and direction of
behaviour were operationalised ingeniously from an
analysis of the filmed behaviour.
Latham et al (1978) explored the affect of financial
and other extrinsic rewards as well as participative goal
setting in a field experimental study where the subjects
were 76 engineers/scientists. They manipulated the method
of goal setting as well as three types of reward to give
a two by three factorial design. Although goal accept-
ance did not appear to be affected by anticipated monetary
reward, job performance was improved by expected financial
reward, establishing in a real life setting that financial
incentives have a separate effect on task performance,
from goal setting.
Mowen et al (1981) were concerned that goal
performance depended not only on goal difficulty but also,
where it applied, on the type of incentive system. If
high goals were set with a bonus system the expectancy of
achieving the goal might be low and subsequent performance
low; whereas a high goal with a piece-rate system should
lead to high performance as total effort is rewarded.
Using 124 undergraduates in an arithmetic task the
researchers manipulated three levels of goal difficulty
(low, medium and high) and two incentive systems (bonus
on achievement of goal and piece-rate). With a piece-rate
system, performance was highest in the difficult goal
condition whereas with bonus system, performance was
lowest in the
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difficult goal conditions. This difference was significant.
The lessons for incentive scheme designs are clear - piece-
work systems which reward all effort should result in
higher performance, and that goals which are too difficult
will be rejected regardless of the incentive. It is
theoretically interesting that goals and incentives inter-
act (at least in some conditions) and that goal setting can
enhance performance motivated by a performance contingent
piece-work type incentive.
Examining the interaction of the goal and payment
system in greater depth Campbell (1984) manipulated a no-
pay system, a non-contingent hourly pay system and a
contingent pay system with easy and difficult goals. An
interesting facet of this laboratory experiment using 56
undergraduates as subjects was that it attempted to make
the task more representative of a complex managerial task
by using a computer simulated business game. The results
show significant differences in performance between
conditions with the contingent pay showing the best
performance.
It is clear from most of the studies of pay in the
goal setting context that pay and goal setting influence
performance separately. 	 The two studies by Mowen et al
(1981) and Campbell (1984) suggest that they can interact
and that goal setting can enhance the effect of a perform-
ance contingent pay system provided that all effort is
rewarded (such as in a piece-work or commission system).
Locke (1981) refuses to accept that money has an
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independent effect but has altered his original formul-
ation to take account of some of the recent evidence. He
now suggests that,
• . . money may arouse the willingness to expend more
effort to attain a given objective than not offering
money. In terms of Expectancy Theory monetary rewards
endowed goal success with a higher valence.
While such a comment may explain the results of
Mowen et al (1981) and Campbell (1984), it does not
provide an explanation of the influence of money on
performance when there is no specific goal. However, the
concepts of goal theory, because they are fundamental to
any definition of motivation have, to a greater or lesser
degree, had an influence on all other motivational
theories (Locke, 1977).
In spite of Locke's (1981) reformulation, the
research in the areas is fairly clear. Goal setting does
have an effect on task performance but money also has
independently an effect on performance which may (or may
not) enhance goal setting.
It would appear that those who accept the
principles of Scientific Management have their views
confirmed and that experimentally and practically money
does have an influence on performance. However, neither
Equity Theory research nor Goal Theory research provide a
satisfactory explanation for the influence of pay in a
complex situation. A theory which attempts a more
comprehensive explanation is Expectancy Theory.
Expectancy Theory 
A problem with many of motivational theories
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mentioned so far is that they focus on one particular
cause, and assume that everyone, to a greater or lesser
degree, is influenced by that particular need or that
peculiar, simple process. As a consequence the power to
predict a variety of behaviour is constrained by the
limitations of the concept. Goal theory does not account
for irrational or emotional behaviour as it lacks order
or purpose, while need theories by definition are limited
to behaviour satisfying that particular need and can not
fully account for continuing behaviour after the
particular need has been satisfied. A more general
theory (or more properly body of theories) which have
formed the basis for models for research in a variety of
psychological areas is Expectancy Theory.
Expectancy theory is based on ideas put forward by
Lewin (1951) who proposed a cognitive model of behaviour.
The basic structure of this is the psychological field, a
concept similar to the totality of conscious perception.
He suggests that behaviour is instigated by a psycho-•
biological force (similar to a vector) which has magnitude
and direction. He calls this a 'valence'. This idea,
together with the concept of 'expectation', deriving from
the work of Tolman (1948), (who suggests that choices and
alternatives are decided according to the individuals
expectations of the anticipated consequence) formed the
basis of Expectancy Theory.
Stated simply Expectancy Theory suggests that
behaviour is the function of the strength of the desire
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for a behavioural outcome (valence) together with the
estimated subjective probability expectation of
achieving that outcome. As a general theory it has
formed the basic model for research in a variety of
areas. Rotter (Phares 1976, Lefcourt 1982) formulated
his Locus of Control theory
and integrates its concepts
Atkinson (1964) regards his
motivation as an Expectancy
in Expectancy Theory terms
in Social Learning Theory.
theory of achievement
Theory which Fishbein and
Ajzen (1975) are clearly influenced by	 in
their formulation of a theory of beliefs and attitudes,
although they suggest the consequence is an intention to
behave and point out the problems of intention leading to
actual behaviour. Decision theorists call it the
subjective expected utility model (Edwards, 1961) and
research in development of the decision theory model
continues. The original formulation of Expectancy Theory
in the area of organisational psychology was put forward
by Vroom (1964).
Vroom (1964) is very precise in his formulation of
the theory. He defines valence as the 'affective
orientations towards particular outcomes,' from which it
follows that a motive is an outcome towards which a
person has a positive valence. People acquire valence for
a particular action in relation to the ends which that
action serves or the 'instrumentality' of the action
towards achieving a particular outcome. Consequently,
Vroom (1964:17) can state,
- 135 -
The valence of an outcome to a person is a mono-
tonically increasing function of the algebraic sum of
the products of the valences of all other outcomes
and his conception of its instrumentality for the
attainment of these other outcomes.
He defines expectancy as '. . . a momentary belief
concerning the likelyhood that a particular act will be
followed by a particular outcome' and suggests that the
strength of expectancies can vary from zero to negative
or positive certainty. There appears to be little
difference between expectancy as defined by Vroom
(1964:15) and the concept of subjective probability.
Combining valence and expectancy Vroom (1964:18)
suggests that the '. . . force on an individual to act,'
this is the same as the motivation to act)'is a mono-
tonically increasing function of the algebraic sum of all
products of the valence of all outcomes and the strength
of his expectancy that the act will be followed by the
attainment of these outcomes.'
These two separate propositions stated by Vroom
(1964) are, of course, highly related to each other and
have subsequently been combined into a single model
(Evans, 1970; Lawler, 1971).
In an attempt to operationalise the concepts Vroom
(1964:27) suggests a number of situational and behaviour-
able variables which may affect or be affected by the
valence or expectancy of the individual (seeFigure 3:4)
In the field of leadership research Evans (1970)
has proposed a model of behaviour more specifically
relevant for research in this area. By combining the
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concepts of expectancy (that is belief that effort will
lead to performance) and instrumentality (that is the
belief that performance will lead to a particular out-
come), Evans (1970:279) defines the totality of the
concept as, the 'Path-Goal Instrumentality'. Evans
(1970:281), by including goal attainment and Path
frequency proposes a motivation model of supervisory or
leadership behaviour. The model predicts worker
satisfaction rather than Performance, but in an empirical
study of utility workers and nurses some support for the
model is presented.
House (1971) has used the Evans (1970) model to
examine leadership behaviour, so research in this area,
using this model is following a direction of its own
away from the main body of motivational theory. Fulk and
Wendler (1982) are still using the Evans (1970) model to
investigate leader behaviour, while, in areas where the
effort and performance link is comparatively clearly
defined and the performance outcome a separate issue
models which maintain the distinction are the bases of
research, (Lawler 1971, Walker, Churchill & Ford 1977).
Even in the main body of motivational research the
theory has been reformulated and extended by other
researchers. Galbraith and Cummings (1967) stress that,
while in Vroom's (1964) theory, outcomes are dependent on
the role occupants action or effort leading to actual
performance (or what they call first-level outcomes and
what Vroom (1964) calls instrumentalities) and the
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subsequent valence for the rewards of performance (2nd
level outcomes), in some cases, performance valence may
not depend on the value of performance to outcome
probability, (P-)0) but may have some intrinsic value
which is relevant to maintaining individual self
identity. They argue that in the work role, variation
in valence will reflect individual intrinsic differences
and the extrinsic rewards, which can be money, supervisor
relationship or the affect of the norms of the work
group. Galbraith and Cummings (1967:246) attempt to
operationalise these concept and measure them in a group
of 32 workers in a heavy equipment manufacturer, using a
questionnaire (which on pretests had high internal
reliability). They were able to conclude that instru-
mentality and valence do interact to determine
motivation, particularly for 'supervisors support' and
'pay', thus supporting Vroom's (1964) theory.
Graen (1969), in an experimental study of 169
women finds some support for his extension to the theory
although this is limited to the predictions of job
satisfaction rather than performance, even though he
experimentally manipulated pay. This extension of the
model attempts to predict job satisfaction by incor-
porating into the model, work role variables and suggest-
ing that these variables (accomplishment, achievement
feedback, recognition, responsibility, human relations,
working conditions and salary) predict the outcome of
'job satisfaction'. Having established that instrument-
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ality relationships are responsive to the contingencies
of the job situation Graen (1969:20) suggest some exten-
sion to the theory in the form of boundary conditions.
He suggests that the reward, however defined, must be
contingent on performance and that communications about
performance and outcomes must be concrete before
predictions can be made. Graen (1969:62) also argues
that performance can be predicted by incorporating role
system expectations, attitudes and beliefs in the model
and that job satisfaction can be predicted from superior
performance which is contingent on job role attributes.
The concepts from the Graen (1969) study must be viewed
with some caution as a grand edifice has been established
on experimental results which use 15-18 year old girls
(hardly typical of the working population as Millward,
(1968) demonstrates) and which predicts job satisfaction
rather than performance. It is a pity that money (which
was manipulated in the study) was not made contingent on
performance making sure of a money effect (there is no
evidence that this particular manipulation worked) and
that the task was not more interesting. Nevertheless,
this study is an important one which put Expectancy
Theory into the front of occupational research.
Perhaps the most comprehensive reformulation of
the Expectancy Theory model of work motivation is that
developed by Lawler (1971:108). After reviewing the
predictions from Drive Theory, Equity Theory and Need
Theories and examining the conceptual and methodological
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problems put forward by Galbraith and Cummings (1967) and
Graen (1969) together with the concepts of Vroom (1964),
Lawler (1971) attempts to integrate these concepts into
a comprehensive model of work behaviour. This model is
particularly suitable for research in the pay area as it
predicts performance rather than job satisfaction.
As Figure 3:5 shows the model includes perceptions
of Equity Locus of Control, Self Esteem and includes
both intrinsic and extrinsic needs in its formulation.
There has been a great deal of research testing
the Expectancy Theory model (for reviews see Mitchell
1974, House et al 1974, Connolly 1976, Feather 1982),
predicting practical work behaviour (Churchill et al
1977) and to test predictions about pay and performance.
Here only the pay or extrinsic reward studies are
reviewed.
Expectancy Theory predicts that provided pay has a
high valence for an individual (irrespective of why) and
if his expectancy of obtaining pay by superior perform-
ance is strong (say by linking pay to performance
deliberately, that is a piece-work or a PBR system)
performance will be enhanced.
Arvey (1972) in a laboratory experiment (n = 180
college undergraduates) manipulated ability and reward
expectancies during an arithmetic task. The reward did
not appear to influence performance in any way but as
the reward was a 25% or 75% chance of gaining two
experimental psychology points this result is probably
an artefact of the perceived value of the points.
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However, the experiment did show that the beliefs
individuals have about whether their effort can result in
successful performance is linearly related to actual
performance.
Camman and Lawler (1973) in a detailed and
comprehensive field study reviewed the incentive system
in a shipping company. They found (with a group bonus
system) that in one group the incentive system appeared
to be based on rewards that were valued by the workers
and the perception of the link between effort and perform-
ance was clear, while in other groups men did not under-
stand the relationship between their Own behaviour and
their rewards. Using Expectancy Theory, they derive a
simple mathematical model which predicted rates of pay
and suggest that the incentive system seemed to be working
effectively in the first group. However, it is not clear
whether, as there were groups of ten men interviewed,
this was also the size of the work group. The size of the
work group is likely to be an important factor in deter-
mining whether such an incentive scheme is effective
(Campbell, 1952; Buck, 1957).
Pritchard and Sanders (1973) examined the valence
and instrumentality concepts put forward by Vroom (1964)
and established by means of a survey of 146 post office
employees that 'getting a pay rise' was the most valued
work outcome. Support for the concepts of the theory
and their relationship with each other was established,
but as the research uses self report measure of effort
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and subjective measures of performance its results should
be treated with some caution.
Jorgenson et al (1973) test the hypothesis that
high expectancies result in different behaviour from low
expectancies. In a realistic simulated work experiment
using 256 college undergraduates the researchers
manipulate pay by having subjects work for three days in
high performance reward contingency (an incentive scheme)
and three days in a low contingency condition (hourly
paid). The change from one condition to another had the
predicted effect on performance, in that performance was
higher in the high performance reward contingency
regardless of the order worked. Pritchard (1973)
reviewing this experiment expresses some disappointment
at the results, but his concern is mainly over the effects
of performance on job satisfaction, a link not clearly
established.
Pritchard et al (1976) in one of the few field
experiments using financial rewards, manipulates three
types of extrinsic incentive system among a group of
airforce trainees (n = 1301 observations). Initial
research established a series of incentives valued by the
servicemen (ie three day pass for the weekend, wearing
any uniform for a week). These incentives were then
manipulated to effect performance, using the subjective
measure of supervisor evaluation as well as objective
performance measures, such as exam results and general
grades. The mechanics of the system were that the student
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could earn points for performance and then use these
points to acquire a particular incentive.
In addition to the two incentive conditions (one
attempting to reward effort) a third incentive of a
financial nature was offered on top of the points system
for performance or effort. Unfortunately, for such a
comprehensive experiment, the results were inconclusive.
The first two incentive schemes had little effect on
performance but when financial incentives were used,
performance improved. The researchers conclude, 'the
answer seems fairly straight-forward, only when fairly
strong incentives were used, in this case financial
incentives, did the programme have any impact on
performance,' (Pritchard et al 1976:492). This is an
important field study which overcame many of the problems
inherent in such a real situation. Perhaps the results
were marred by having such unclear measures of perform-
ance and effort rather than any weakness in the field
situation. It is important that such research be carried
out in real life situation using objective performance
measures where these are available.
Klein (1973) experimentally examines predictions
about pay deriving from both Equity Theory and Expectancy
Theory. As a matter of interest although the hypotheses
from each theory are different, and they predict job
satisfaction rather than performance, they are not
incompatible. Using a large sample (n = 1200) of blue
collar workers in an industrial company, Klein administered
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a questionnaire measuring worker reinforcement (two
questions), expectancy (two questions) and equity (three
questions) and tries to ascertain if it is possible to
predict job satisfaction (4 questions). The results
suggest that both the equity of, and expectancies about,
pay predict job satisfaction but that perceptions of
equity have a stronger influence on satisfaction.
Dachler and Mobley (1973) attempt to operationalise
the concepts of the theory and subsequently to examine,
(by administering a comprehensive questionnaire measuring
expectancies, goals, utilities, a variety of outcomes,
performance and measures of productivity), the concepts of
the theory in two work settings. Although they did not
directly measure the effect of pay on performance, it was
an interesting artifact of this research that while in
Plant 2 the results were inconclusive, in Plant 1 which
had a piece-rate system, some support for the theory was
provided. This supports the suggestion put forward by
Graen (1969) who argued that a boundary condition of the
model must be a performance contingent system of pay.
Koppleman (1977) investigates the reward practices
of a company towards 399 engineers. Using subjective
measures of effort and motivation with objective measures
of reward, and re-testing four years later,
He	 found that the relationship between supervisor
evaluation in 1969 and current reward was low in one
particular company (0.37). This indicates little
relationship between pay and subsequent performance or
- 146 -
effort in that company. His explanation for this is that
responsive reward systems tend to encourage those with
low motivation to leave the organisation. Unfortunately,
there is no comparison with any objective measure of
performance, so it is not possible to identify if the
more responsive reward system was organisationally
successful.
Summary
The literature presents two views of the role of
pay in influencing production. These have been classified
as Low Profile Theories and High Profile Theories.
The Low Profile Theories find inspiration in the
conclusion, drawn from the Hawthorne Studies, that pay is
not a primary motivator of performance. However, there is
little empirical evidence to support the alternative
explanations put forward. Evidence to support Maslows
(1943) theory is not forthcoming and derived alternatives
(Alderfer 1969) have received little support. Although
it has stimulated a great deal of research the theory of
Hertzberg et al (1967) appears to be an artifact of its
peculiar methodology (Wall & Stephenson, 1970; Soliman,
1970) while the idea that payment for an intrinsically
interesting task decreases motivation (Deci, 1971) has
been qualified so greatly (Kruglanski et al, 1975a; Pomac
& Salancik, 1981) that it now has little crecUbility
The Low Profile Theories do not appear to have any role in
helping managers influence performance.
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However, the High Profile Theories seem to provide
general support for the concept that pay can influence
behaviour and enhance performance but do not provide a
comprehensive or satisfactory explanation of why this is
so. These theories seem to suggest that linking payment
to performance does enhance performance depending on the
context, the task and probably the type of personality.
In order to establish whether car salesmen are motivated
by pay it becomes necessary to establish the type of
personality as Chapter Two has already established the
context and the task.
CHAPTER 4 
SALES PERSONALITY AND PAY
One of the things that comes across when talking
to salesmen particularly car salesmen is that they have an
enthusiasm for and enjoy the job. They are well aware of,
and openly discuss, the many problems influencing their
effectiveness. They continue more or less successfully to
survive and prosper. It seems likely, and many popular
writers believe, that it takes a particular type of
personality to succeed at the job. A man who employs a
lot of salesmen Harry Turner (1981) considers that a good
salesman is 'A bit emotional, they have inflated opinions
of themselves and when all is said and done these qual-
ities are quite frankly un-British.' Reiser (1962)
suggests that at one time the salesman had the 'Willy
Lomas, dubious value' image but that he is changing
rapidly, while Thompson (1972) describes in some detail
the image, and consequent personality, that the salesman
has in the public mind as 'pushy, aggressive, insensitive,
brash and bombastic.' These very words reflect the bias
as, by using synonyms, one could rewrite this particular
description as, 'assertive, aggressive, determined, open
and cheerful,' all qualities generally admired. It is
vaguely ironic that the one personality trait most often
associated with salesmen generally, extraverlfion, is not
widely researched.
It is true that Howells (1968) measured extra-
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version using content analysis of interview data and
established a significant link between extraversion and
performance in some sales situations; however as he uses
a subjective evaluation for establishing personality and
self-report measures of performance the results are not
objective. In the other two studies using the concept
(Turnbull 1976, Poppleton and Riley 1978) the results
were not significant. Poppleton and Riley (1978) conclude
that 'the most successful salesman and the least success-
ful salesman are not differentiated by scores on the
extraversion or anxiety scale.' Perhaps the idea of
extraversion in the mind of the general public is some-
what different from the psychological construct.
It is clear, however, that there is in the public
mind a general stereotype of the sales personality. The
literature has concerned itself with trying to identify
those personality traits apparent in successful salesmen
rather than in relating them to motivation. So this
chapter will firstly review attempts to establish the
existence of personality traits in successful salesmen
and then link personality to motivation and pay.
Sales Personality
According to several models of sales behaviour
(Ford, Walker and Churchill 1977, Bagozzi 1978, Ryans and
Weinberg 1981, Poppleton 1981) performance is viewed, at
least in part, as the function of the enduring personal
characteristics of the salesman.
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Research, attempting to identify which particular
salient personality characteristic leads to successful
performance, is often undertaken by selecting a trait,
measuring it, and correlating the result with a measure
of performance.
This methodology has its limitations. In order
to establish causality one needs to establish more
than	 a simple relationship; consequently, identifying
a characteristic in a group of salesmen tells us little
about its role, except within some body of theory and
much research in this area is not theory based.
There are also problems in selecting and identi-
fying which performance measure is relevant. Much of the
research in this area uses self-report measures or vague
company appraisals when objective data (in the form of
sales figures) are available.
Finally, having identified a	 characteristic
which is correlated with sales performance or behaviour,
it is difficult to evaluate whether the level of the
trait is high or low. 	 Comparative data are not often
reported. However, such research is a necessary first
exploratory step towards the knowledge of a sales
personality and may suggest hypotheses for subsequent
experimental verification.
Among early researchers is Witkins (1956) who gave
the Strong Interest Blank to a group of 300 salesmen and
was able to discriminate between speciality salesmen,
route salesmen and sales engineers. Unfortunately, the
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raw personality data is not presented in his report, only
comparisons with other jobs, so the data is difficult to
interpret. The fact that this group of salesmen can be
differentiated on the 'office workers' or 'Production
Manager' scale in not particularly informative.
In a similar vein, Dunnette and Kirchner (1960)
devised a Sales Job Description Checklist (SJDC), which
was administered to 120 salesmen of the Minnesota Mining
and Manufacturing Co, together with a series of person-
ality tests. Correlations revealed differences between
Industrial and Retail salesmen but as the results are
reported in the form of comparisons with other occupations
they are awkward to evaluate. 	 Industrial salesmen score
higher on the scientific and technical occupation scales
(ie Mathematician, Engineer, etc), while Retail Salesmen
show greater interest in business and persuasive activi-
ties (ie Purchasing Agent, Real Estate Salesmen, Life
Insurance Salesmen).
These researchers, also, tell us that an Industrial
Salesman places heavy emphasis on ingenuity inventiveness
and the exercise of his wits while the retail salesman
places emphasis on planning, hard work and the persuading
of others. It should be noted that the definitions of
industrial and retail salesmen are not the usual defini-
tions used in the literature where an Industrial Salesman
is one who is out on the road, covering a large territory
and selling to large industrial companies, while a retail
salesman sells to the general public. In the 3M's study
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the Retail Salesman is one who sells to retail stores, or
the traditional commercial traveller.
Harrell (1960) compared the sales records and
performance reviews of 21 oil company dealer salesmen with
six personality measures used by the company to select
salesmen. He found that the differences between high
performing and lower performing salesmen could be
significantly identified by mental ability, stability,
dominance, self confidence and aggressiveness. However,
as the salesmen were all employed and performing to
presumably acceptable standards these characteristics may
not differentiate between salesmen and non-salesmen during
the selection process.
Miner (1967) gave a group of 65 oil company sales-
men a whole variety of personality tests (a two day inter-
view and testing schedule) and correlated the results
with performance measures. They identified the success-
ful salesmen as having high dependence, sociophilia, self-
confidence and happiness while the less successful have
low aggression sociophilia, strong superego, overconform-
ity and deviance. This is strong evidence of intuitively
salient characteristics in successful salesmen.
Zdep and Weaver (1967) .using a sample of the
subjects handwriting, select intuitively a group of 13
personality traits which they consider should
discriminate successful life insurance salesmen. They
asked 63 salesmen to write a prepared passage and two
graphologists analysed the writing for personality traits
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The researchers themselves warn of the problems of
construct validity and, unfortunately, for this originally
conceived research, none of the results were significant.
In a rather more usual study Baehr and Williams
(1968) used personal background data to identify a variety
of traits such as achievement, (from school and college
achievement) drive, (from supervisory situation) and from
some unreported source - Financial Responsibility. These
were correlated with subjective and objective performance
measures in a group of 210 salesmen. The results suggest
that successful salesmen were significantly more
financially responsible, more stable and had earlier
family responsibility than the less successful.
Bray & Campbell (1968) selected from a group of 78
men, 57 as being suitable as salesmen according to
intelligence (school record), a critical thinking •test,
an abstract reasoning test and a general knowledge test.
The performance of the entire sample was monitored by a
review team (performance standards being a series of
behaviours expected to lead to sales success such as
preparation, prospecting, closing, etc) and 47% met
review standards. Only two of the men judged as unaccept-
able passed the review. This study is interesting in that
it enables researchers to follow the performance of those
selected as 'unacceptable'. Normally, they would not
have been appointed and comparisons could not have been
made. However, the performance or review measures are
suspect, good salesmen as has been shown in Chapter Two
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tend to use ideosyncratic techniques rather than trainer
decided behavioural patterns so the results would be more
meaningful if objective sales performance figures had
been used.
Howells (1968) in one of the few English studies
of this nature, used interview analysis (rather than
questionnaire) to identify personality characteristics
leading to success in 542 salesmen in five different
industries. He evolves a model of the sales interaction
which, he suggests, is dependent on the type of product
and the market. He finds that the personality character-
istics Ego Involvement and extraversion, extraversion
alone and ego involvement alone lead to successful selling
depending on the context. These results should be treated
with some caution, as the analysis of interview data to
establish personality characteristics is, to some extent,
subjective and the performance measures used were a
company rating of salesmen on a five point rating scale
(it is not stated who in the company did the rating). It
seems probable that this is, therefore, a correlation of
two subjective measures presented as being objective.
Pruden and Peterson (1971) measured self-other
orientation (the components of which include the indivi-
duals perception of power relationships, social interests,
marginality, identification intensity and openness) in a
group of 91 building material salesmen. This was correl-
ated with self measures of performance. There was little
relationship between job satisfaction and performance but
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the study did provide some evidence that as the salesmans
perceived power over the customer increases so does sales
performance. The fact that a self-rating of performance
was used reduces the validity of this research particu-
larly as more objective measures were available.
According to the researchers developments in
personality theory and the availability of new personality
measures inspired them (Lamont and Lundstrom, 1977) to
review the question of identifying personality character-
istics leading to success in a group of 143 industrial
building materials salesmen. From the literature and
exploratory research the personality traits of dominance,
endurance, empathy, and ego strength were selected
together with such demographic characteristics as age,
height, weight, education and hobbies. Correlations of
these measures with both subjective (manager rating) and
objective measures of performance (sales volume) revealed
that although a combination of demographic factors
correlated with performance, of the personality factors,
only endurance and social recognition were significant.
Height was also significantly related to performance,
perhaps associated with dominance in some way.
Turnbull (1976) selected self-esteem, extraversion.
and machievellianism (Christie and Geis 1970) as the
characteristics most likely to mediate sales success.
Unfortunately, none of the personality characteristics
were significantly related to sales performance although
the number of calls made and hours spent working were.
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However, as the sample was a group of 210 college students
selling books to their associates on a part time basis,
generalisations from this sample to other samples should
be treated with caution.
Poppleton and Riley (1978) tackled the problem in
a very thorough way. They obtained a detailed job
description (both from salesmen and sales managers) and
then interviewed six successful salesmen and six
unsuccessful (lower performing salesmen) to establish
'on the job' characteristics, and from the individuals
themselves the personality traits that mediate success.
An important influence in the job of this group of life
insurance salesmen was the fear of rejection, and the
research discusses how it was handled by various
individuals. This would suggest that high levels of
self esteem are very necessary to perform well in this
job and, although it is a factor identified in this
study	 its' importance is not stressed. This is also
one of the few studies which suggest that salesmen have
a level of economic motivation. From their analysis the
researchers have developed a selection scale which is as
yet untested. Presumably, as the personality character-
istics were obtained from interviews with a group of
salesmen performing to acceptable standards the scale may
discriminate between acceptable salesmen and successful
salesmen but will not necessarily identify differences
which distinguish salesmen from non salesmen.
Perhaps the most comprehensive body of research
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into the sales personality is that by Mayer and Greenberg
(Mayer and Greenberg 1964, Greenberg and Greenberg 1976,
Mayer and Greenbtrg 1980). These researchers identify
empathy (the ability to feel as the other person does)
and ego strength (which they define as a mixture of self-
esteem and dominance) as the critical factors in the
successful salesman. They correlate these traits with
performance in a group of automobile salesmen (n = 195)
a group of insurance salesmen (n = 181) and a group of
mutual funds salesmen (n = 114) to give at total sample
of 490. Their results demonstrate that salesmen high in
empathy and ego strength appear in the top two quartiles for
performance after periods of six and eighteen months.
The selection test was marketed commercially and in
studies to evaluate its success the researchers (Green-
berg and Greenberg 1976, Greenberg and Mayer 1980)
selected a random 5% sample from the 350,000 evaluations
completed, giving a sample of 17,000 individuals in
twelve industries. An analysis of these data, apart from
re-stating that those selected appeared in the top two
quartiles, revealed that performance did not appear to
vary with age, women were as good as men sales persons
and there were no performance differences between black
and white salesmen.
Unfortunately, although the articles present
conclusions from an impressively large sample the method-
ology is not presented (the test performance measures,
sampling methods and statistical analysis) so it is
Marketing Week August 14, 1981
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difficult to evaluate. The test appears to have been
commercially successful.
Ingram (1980), Ingram and Bellinger 0.984), correlated
valence for a variety of rewards in a group of 241 sales
people together with a number of demographic variables
and self esteem. These variables and the hypothesis for
the research were suggested by the model proposed by
Churchill, Ford and Walker (1979). This is a peculiar
model mixing the concepts from Expectancy Theory with
Maslows (1964) hierarchy of needs. The model has stim-
ulated some research but predicts job satisfaction and
not performance, so results tend to be inconclusive. In
this research (which did not concern itself with
performance except indirectly through reward valence) age,
job tenure, income levels, specific self-esteem, pay plan,
promotion are all related to a reward valence. The
valence for pay appears to be inversely related to income
level, as one might expect, and commission salesmen have
a significantly higher valence for increased personal
growth than their salary based counterpart. This last
finding is particularly interesting as it suggests that
salesmen see income as contributing towards, or as an
indication of, personal growth and self-actualisation, as
well as a manifestation of materialism.
Williamson (1980) correlated need for achievement
with job outcome variables and job performance, using both
supervisor evaluation of performance as well as objective
measures (dollar sales). Few of the relationships between
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job outcomes and goals were significant but Need for
Achievement had a moderate correlation with performance
(r = 0.33 p4.0.002).
Saxe and Weitz (1982) suggest that some salesmen
are more customer oriented than others (using the con-
cepts developed by Blake and Mouton (1968, 1971) of
'concern for others') and have developed a 'customer-
orientation scale.' They tested several groups of
salesmen to standardise the scale. The scale has a high
reliability (alpha 0.86 for the first sample) and some
convergent and discriminant validity. Correlations with
performance datokobtained were moderate,	 An
interesting aspect of this study is that two groups of
automobile salesmen were tested and scored comparatively
low on the scale. It is not clear, however, whether this
'other orientation' is a particular sales trait or whether
it is present in the general population. The evidence
suggests that it may discriminate good salesmen from
extremely good salesmen and it seems likely that it could
discriminate between salesmen (or potential salesmen) and
others before they acquire sales behaviour. However,
specific research would be necessary to establish this.
Teas (1981) in a comprehensive piece of research
using concepts drawn from Expectancy Theory, expands the
model of sales behaviour proposed by Walker, Churchill
and Ford (1977) to include Locus of Control and self-
esteem as well as a number of environmental variables
suggested by Hackman and Oldhams (1974) model of an
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enriched environment. Unfortunately, none of the varia2
bles are related to performance, but an indirect relation-
ship can be deduced from findings that job specific self-
esteem and internal locus of control orientation are both
related to the sales persons expectancy and instrumental-
ity perceptions.
Bagozzi (1980) using Causal Modelling examines
the causes of performance in salesmen. He identifies
self-esteem as an important variable from the literature,
and correlated measures of self-esteem (together with a
number of job variables) with objective measures of
sales performance (dollar sales volume) in a group of
salesmen (n = 122). He established a fairly high
correlation fr=0.5), which suggests that, mathematically
at least, self-esteem is a cause of successful sales
performance.
Summary of Personality Traits in Literature
Of the 22 studies reviewed only 13 establish a significant
link between the personality variable and the sales
behaviour (see Table 4:1). Although it is quite difficult
to distil from such a mixed body of research whether
there are any personality variables which consistently
influence sales performance, analysis suggests that self-
esteem (in its' various guises) appears to have a consis-
tent influence as does Dominance, but there are few other
relevant useful results. It is possible, by interpreting
responsibility, social recognition and endurance as
TABLE 4:1 
SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PERSONALITY TRAITS AND
SALES BEHAVIOUR IN SUCCESSFUL SALESMEN
Researcher
	 Trait
Dunnette & Krichner (1960)
	 Dominance
Harrell (1969)
	 Mental Ability
Stability
Dominance
Self-Confidence
Aggressiveness
Miner (1967)	 Dependence
Sociophilia
Self-Confidence
Happiness
Baehr & Williams	 Financial Responsibility
Early Family Responsibility
Stability
Howells (1968)	 Ego Involvement
Extraversion
Pruden & Peterson (1971)
	 Power
Marginality
Lamont & Lindstron (1977)
	 Endurance
Social Recognition
Dominance & Height
Greenberg & Meyer (1980)
	 Ego Strength
Empathy
Bagozzi (1980)
	 Self-Esteem
Teas (1981)
	 Self-Esteem
Williamson (1980)
	 Need for achievement
Saxe & Weitz (1982)
	 After Orientation
Ingram & Bellinger (1983)
	 Self-Esteem
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achievement oriented concepts, to make a case for Need
for Achievement. This would suggest that successful
sales performance is achieved by salesmen who have high
levels of self-esteem, dominance and need for achievement.
As far as car salesmen specifically are concerned
a number of studies attempt to link personality variables
to performance.
Tobolski and Kerr (1951) correlated Empathy with
a ratio measure of sales performance and discovered a
significant relationship (r = 0.44) between performance
and empathy in 11 new car salesmen but not with 17 used car
salesmen. It is suspected (because of the authors
knowledge in this field) that the ratio of performance
used distorted the results, as the opportunities to sell
new cars and used cars varies enormously. As the
performance data are not reported it is not possible to
test this hypothesis.
Kennedy (1958) has developed a selection test but,
presumably for reasons of commercial secrecy, does not
identify the constructs which make up the test. However,
he does supply the quite useful piece of knowledge that
new car salesmen, used car salesmen and prestige car
salesmen are identified by similar characteristics, even
thought he does not tell us what these are.
More recently Oda (1983) correlated a number of
personality measures with performance in a group of 41 car
salesmen. Six were related to performance - aggressive-
ness, self confidence, leadership, empathy, vigourousness
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and independence. This supports research in the general
area of sales personality, suggesting that self-esteem
(aggressiveness and self-confidence), dominance (leader-
ship and vigourousness) and nAchievement (leadership are
related to successful performance.
However, performance is only part of the job of a
salesman. Perhaps by examining the characteristics of
the job of a car salesman it will be possible to confirm
and logically deduce the value of the traits already
mentioned link them with pay attitudes and possibly
identify other traits which may contribute towards the
salesmans survival.
Personality Traits and the Job of a Car Salesman
Earlier it was possible to identify the principle
factors influencing of the job of a car salesman as:-
Bargaining
Reputation
'Customer Characteristics
Part-Exchange
Context:- Management
Pay System
It should be possible to examine the influence of a
variety of personality characteristics on performance in
the work context, using these particular facets of the
job.
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Self-Esteem
It appears intuitively likely that self-esteem is
important in all aspects of the sales situation. Self-
esteem is generally defined as
. • . the evaluation which the individual makes and
maintains with regard to self. It expresses an
attitude of approval or disapproval, and indicated
the extent to which the individual believes the self
to be capable, significant, successful and worthy.
(Tharenou 1979:317).
From this definition it follows that in order to bargain
well, a salesman should feel confident of his abilities;
in order to overcome the stigma •of his reputation a
salesman should feel a personal sense of self-worth; in
order to overcome the constant rejection a strong sense of
self-concept mast be important; and in order to accept a
system that pays on results a salesman must be confident
of his ability to sell consistently. Bell (1967) examined
the effect of customer self-esteem on the price paid for
a car but did not recognise that selling is an interaction
and so establish the effect of different levels of the
salesmens self-esteem on the price paid. Korman (1970)
proposes that performance will improve as either chronic
or situational self-esteem increases and that people with
high self-esteem will be highly motivated, succeed at a
task because they like it, and will be motivated to
perform when the incentive or reward is contingent on
performance. Korman (1970:33) quotes the research by
Adams and Rosenbaum (1962) and Andrews (1967) where
individuals on a piece-rate system, who thought they were
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getting more than they deserved, reduced their perform-
ance. These two studies, he suggests, are consistent
with the view that when income is calculated on a contin-
gency basis people earn in relation to their perceived
self-concept. This finding would suggest that those with
high levels of self-esteem will prefer performance
related pay as they are confident of their ability to
earn. Although Dipboye (1977) is critical of Korman's
(1970, 1974) theory, he is critical of the explanation
and does not suggest that performance is not enhanced by
increased self-esteem. It is also a consistent finding
from the sales research that successful selling is
correlated with high self-esteem (Miner 1967, Howells
1968, Greenberg and Meyer 1980, Bagozzi 1980, Teas 1981,
Ingram and Bellinger 1983) so, from Kormans (1970) theory
we can deduce that salesmen will perform better when pay
is contingent on performance.
Additional empirical evidence will be presented in
Chapter Seven.	 However,	 Hechler and Weiner (1974) who
in a laboratory experiment using 80 undergraduates,
manipulated pay (high and low) with high and low levels
of chronic self-esteem subjects and related this to
performance on a word manipulation task, found that
subjects in the high pay group produced more than those
in the low pay group. While self-esteem did not appear
to effect quantity, quality was clearly influenced,
indicating that high self-esteem subjects produce
quantity and quality on a work task. Burke (1979) in a
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laboratory experiment with 90 male undergraduates did
establish a link between self-esteem and performance
and goes onto establish that success was attributed more
to effort and ability than was failure.
Clearly self-esteem is an important facet in all
aspects of the sales task and individuals high in self-
esteem appear to value money as a measure of success.
Dominance 
It would seem logical that in order to influence
another individual one should have some form of overt or
covert power or dominance over him. In the sales context
Busch and Wilson (1976) suggest that expert and referent
power (the degree to which salesmen are regarded as an
expert or perceived as similar) are major factors in the
sales situation. In a laboratory experiment 187 under-
graduates were presented with a sales message which
varied on various levels of expertise and referent power.
The results confirm that high levels of expertise and
referent similarity did influence the undergraduates
declared intention to buy, but as the subjects did not
actually buy and the link between intention and behaviour
is suspect (Fisbein and Ajzen 1975), the results are not
definitive. However, Busch et al (1977) developed this
theory into a model of sales interaction and suggest
investigating the various potential sources of power in
the sales situation.
The concept of dominance as an intrinsic need
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stems from Murrays (1938) research. Murray (1938)
affirms that the human personality consists of needs or
or forces, either internally or externally mediated and
either physiological or psychogenic in nature. A need
interacts with other needs and presses in a dynamic way
to result in a particular 	 behaviour. The
Need for Dominance, as its' name suggests, is 'the need
to influence or direct the behaviour of others by
suggestion, persuasion or command. To convince others of
the correctness of one opinion,' (Murray 1938:152). The
definition could almost describe the sales situation and
significant relationships have been found between Need
for Dominance, and sales behaviour by Dunnette and
Kirchner (1960) Howell (1960), Pruden and Peterson (1971)
and Lamant and Lundstrom (1977).
Maslow (1942) has researched the trait of
dominance extensively, equating it with self-esteem. He
is able to identify high dominance personalities and low
dominance personalities who have easily identifiable
behaviour patterns. In particular, Maslow (1942) found
large differences in sexual behaviour between the two
groups.
Desmond Morris (1979) suggests that, 'in any
organised group of mammals, no matter how co-operative,
there is always a struggle for social dominance.' This
synthesises the anthropologists view, which would suggest
that the trait is innate. However, whether innate or
learned it would appear that people with high nDominance
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behave differently from those with low nDominance and
that these behavioural differences could facilitate car
selling performance.
Achievement
Another of Murray's (1939) needs, but one which
has attracted a large body of research is the need for
Achievement (McClelland 1961, Weiner 1974, Atkinson and
Feather 1966, Feather 1982). Murray (1938:164) defined
need for achievement as
• • . to accomplish something difficult, to master,
manipulate or organise physical objects, human beings
or ideas as rapidly and independently as possible.
To overcome obstacles and to attain a high standard
to improve oneself and excel , to rival and surpass
others.
Although self-esteem is a general personality
concept, need for Achievement is a fairly narrow specific
trait but one which, as Atkinson (1964:20) reminds us,
provides an explanation for 'the direction, magnitude and
persistence of behaviour in a limited but very important
domain of human activity.'
Individuals with high need for achievement are
more interested in the accomplishment of moderately
difficult tasks and show a preference for moderate risk.
As explained in Chapter Three, people with high
nAchievement need to form some subjective judgements of
the situation to evaluate risk. Consequently, they form
expectancies, so the theory has a certain amount in
common with Expectancy Theory (Vroom, 1964).
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McClelland (1961:235) also establishes that those
with high nAchievement value money as a measure of
success commenting that the knowledge of achievement in
business is normally related to money. Litwin and
Stringer (1968) after reviewing the research conclude
that those with high need for achievement enjoy activity
and become good salesmen.
Morgan (1964) examined the economic achievement of
those with high nAchievement in a National cross-section
of the American population (n = 3000). It was discovered
that those with high nAchievement were more likely to
have high status occupations, supervise others and earn
significantly more money than those with low nAchievement.
It is clear that in order to live with a payment
system under which income depends totally on successful
sales activity an individual must have a high nAchievement
yet only one study (Williamson 1980) found a significant
relationship between nAchievement and sales performance.
However, the evidence from other sources (Atkinson 1964,
Weiner 1974, Feather 1982) is so strong that one finds it
difficult not to include this trait as an important
factor in any study of sales performance.
Autonomy
Many car salesmen suggest that one of the most
important facets of the job is the minimum supervision
and the freedom to structure your time as you wish. One
salesman commented, 'Oh yes, you get a certain amount of
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freedom being a car salesman. You are virtually self-
employed.' Another volunteered,
Well, your hours. There are no set hours as such.
If we get here five minutes too late there is no
clocking on or clocking off. When you are on
showroom duty you should be on the showroom floor
for about 9.00 but they don't bother you if you
are a few minutes late.
Yet another says,
Well, it's a little bit like being your own boss, and
being free yourself and being allowed to have your
highs and lows. It's the ideal situation.
This theme of valuing freedom is a common well-
liked facet of the job from which it would follow that
car salesmen have a high nAutonomy in order to stay in
the job. There is little research in this area from
the sales perspective but Hackman and Oldham (1976)
regard autonomy as a critical factor for job satisfaction
although there is no reason to suppose that it should
influence sales performance, Farh and Scott (1983)
finding that, although autonomy may influence job
satisfaction it has little effect on quality or quantity
of performance. However, recently, Oda (1983) did find a
significant link between independence (a synonym for
autonomy) and performance in a group of 41 car salesmen.
Affiliation 
In any job where you work with others and interact
with people it would be necessary to enjoy co-operating
with them and to like them. In many sales jobs, much
time is spent alone driving between appointments, but the
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car salesman is normally part of a team of from 2 - 15
salesmen so it becomes necessary to find strategies for
co-operation. For example a common rule is the 'touch
first rule'. Customers do not always buy a car on the
first visit and will sometimes come to the showroom when
the salesman dealing with them is not there. A common
rule evolved in many showrooms is that the customer
(and commission from the sale) belongs to the salesman
who spoke to the customer first, irrespective of any
subsequent selling or administration done by other
salesmen at a later date. Such co-operation demands
that salesmen have a nAffiliation defined by Murray
(1938:174) as 'to draw near and enjoyably co-operate or
reciprocate with allied others to adhere and remain loyal
to a friend,' in order to belong to the 'group'. James
(1950:293) was among the early writers who suggested that
individuals have 'social selves', which enable men to live
/
and work together in harmoneous groups. Harr e and Secord
(1979:92) define a, 'social individual as one who shows
a fairly consistent set of inner and outer responses to
his fellows and to the social situation' but do not agree
that this behaviour is innate, while Tajfel (1981:229)
identifies a whole series of behaviours which enable
individuals to belong to and work with a group of others.
It is not suggested that high levels of the
nAffiliation are likely to influence sales performance
but it seems probable that salesmen need to have an
affable disposition and an acceptability of group norms
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to work together in the same place. Perhaps, in
salesmen who travel to the customer, it is not so
relevant or important.
Social Manipulative (Machievellianism)
If the car salesman is, as his popular stereotype
would suggest a 'cynical sweet talker' then an appro-
priate construct for assessing these characteristics has
been developed by Christie and Geis (1970). Their concept of
'Machievellianism' was developed to investigate how
powerful men manipulate others. Without reference to
the academic literature Christie and some colleagues
tried to determine the fundamental characteristics of
people who were successful in controlling others. They
reviewed the political literature of the past, including
Machievelli's 'The Prince' as well as such esoteric works
as, 'The Book of the Lord Shang' and the 'Arthastra.'
From this they suggest that manipulative people have four
characteristics
1. A relative lack of affect in interpersonal relation-
ships
2. A lack of concern for conventional morality
3. A lack of gross psychopathology (they appeared
normal)
4. Low ideological commit ment
From this philosophical base and using many of the
pragmatic constructs of the Prince, Christie and Geis
(1970) developed a personality scale.
Marketing Week August 14, 1981
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The concepts attached to the scale would appear to
be particularly well suited to the role of a car salesman.
Thompson (1972) suggests that salesmen like money and are
aggressive while Mach research (Christie and Geis
1970:161) demonstrates that high Machs consistently
outmanoeuvre others for financial reward, and show a lack
of emotion in the interpersonal relationships involved.
Brown (1973:57) describing the behaviour of a
group of American car salesmen suggests that, 'Some
aspects of the con are present in his behaviour and he is
more than willing to admit this; although he sees nothing
dishonest, peculiar or immoral about it.'
She also suggests that car salesmen view the
sales bargaining process as, 'two con men trying to
outcon one another - with the best man winning.'
Geis (Christie and Geis 1970:130) show experiment-
ally that high Machs outmanoeuvre others in an ingeneous-
ly designed 'con-game' and lack concern for any
conventional morality.
Gorley (1978:11) describes salesmen as opportunis-
tic, incapable of deep loyality, unable to distinguish
right from wrong and emotionally unstable, while Christie
and Geis (1970:3) describe the high Mach personality as
lacking in concern for conventional morality and using
guile, deceit and opportunism in interpersonal relation-
ships.
All of these attributes which demonstrate skill in
interpersonal manipulation will appear, at face value, to
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be of value to the car salesman in the selling situation
and certainly fit the popular image of the car salesman.
However, attempts to correlate Machievellianism with
performance in the sales situation have not been
successful (Turnbull 1976).
Locus of Control 
If the salesman is to bargain well, value the
part-exchange, adapt to customer characteristics, do a
good deal and get paid he must feel that he can control
events around him and the sales situation in particular.
Research in this area (Phares, 1976) indicates that
individuals in their search for meaning tend to look for
the cause of events and will ascribe causality in a
variety of ways. Peoplewho consider events under some
sort of internal personal control tend to be more
effective in achievement related behaviour CWeiner
1974:125, Lefcourt 1982:81), and there is some evidence
(Nystrom 1983) that internals who believe pay received is
contingent on ones actions earn more than externals. Teas
(1981) found a significant relationship between Locus of
Control and sales behaviour but other researchers mentioned
here have ignored the construct, although it is widely
researched in other areas of psychology.
Conclusion
It would appear that the literature on sales
personality is not very extensive, what there is follows
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few theoretical concepts and is inconclusive. However,
it is possible to establish empirical links between sales
effectiveness and high levels of self-esteem and
dominance. The literature also suggests	 that Need
for Achievement could be a contributing factor and one
study establishes this empirical link.
The characteristics of the job would also suggest
that salesmen have a high need for autonomy, a need for
affiliation, the ability to be socially manipulative and
to feel that they have some personal control over events.
Of these personality characteristics research
indicates that self-esteem is probably related to the
desire for money, need for achievement in the business
sense is normally measured in financial terms and
machievellion types tend to manipulate any money
situation towards themselves. If salesmen have high
levels of these traits then money could easily act as a
prime motivator and linking pay directly to performance
should appeal to such a personality.
Sales Personality and Pay
Salesmen probably need to maintain a higher level
of motivation than many people in many jobs. They need
to face a constant series of rejection as a matter of
course, they interact with people constantly - a highly
stressful process and they span the boundary between the
organisation and its customer - a situation shown to be
particularly difficult and stressful.
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However, salesmen have a great deal of autonomy,
the job has enormous variety, the task is interesting and
varied and performance feedback is direct and immediate.
The job already has all the characteristics of an
enriched job (Hackman & Oldham 1974, Becker, Morgan and
Pritchard 1982) suggesting that the techniques of job
re-design would have little chance of being effective in
enhancing sales performance, if indeed, they are capable
of so doing. That leaves pay as a potential motivator.
Some writers in the field of sales incentives
(Bullus 1983:4) regard the idea that money motivates sales
performance as dated and untrue and, clearly influenced by
Maslow (1954) suggest motivating salesmen through self-
esteem and self-actualisation. Indeed in one research
study Smallbone (1971), after correlating performance
indices (not objective performance measures), with salary
only, high incentive and low incentive payment schemes in
159 companies fails to find any link to suggest that
money was making a significant contribution to high
performance. This study suggests that successful sales
individuals have a high need for Achievement and are
therefore intrinsically motivated.
Both writers (they are not researchers or serious
academics) are in the minority - most writers and
researchers in the sales area are convinced that money
will enhance sales performance and Pecotich (1979) finds
that pay is the single most important source of
anticipated satisfaction in a group of 40 sales people.
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Evidence for this belief is shown by the fact that
in the United Kingdom 53% of marketing companies have
some form of incentive scheme in which commission
represents up to 40% of a salesmans income (Philpott
1976). For the car salesman over 90% of companies use a
commission system with the incentive element varying from
100% to 60% (Sewell 1978).
Perhaps a definitive view (if not, certainly a
much quoted view in the pay sales literature) is put
forward by Tosdal (1953:61) who believed, 'Financial
incentives appear to be particularly effective with
salesmen, but they are by no means the only incentives
to which salesmen respond.'
In a well argued, logical article Tosdal (1953)
suggests that salesmen have a variety of intrinsic needs
(status, achievement, competency) which need to be taken
into account from the managerial perspective. He then
suggests setting particular objectives for the payment
plan which take account of salesmen's needs as well as
company objectives. He states that the incentive element
of the pay plan should depend on the particular and
peculiar sales task. He reviews his study of 1254 sales
forces and concludes that a combination of basic salary
and commission is probably the most effective way of paying
salesmen and achieving the company objectives. Although
this article is not empirical, (the study representing
the authors experience rather than a research exercise)
it contains a great deal 'of intuitive good sense on which
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many sales payment schemes have subsequently been
founded.
Smythe (1968) surveyed the sales payment practices
of 444 manufacturing companies employing 16,263 salesmen
and establishes that the incentive element of pay is
increasing and currently ranges from 4% to 82% (with an
average of 26%) of basic salary.
He identifies that the commission element depended
on the amount of selling skill needed, and the character-
istics of the product and the company. Unfortunately,
the article draws conclusions without presenting the
performance data so the degree of relationship between
pay and performance is unclear. One can only hope that
the author draws logical inferences from the data,
although as this is a pragmatic article by a practitioner
the results are unlikely to be interpreted with
scientific rigour.
A more scientific attempt to try and establish
how salesmen respond to financial incentives was
undertaken by Darmon (1974). Taking advantage of a
naturally occuring change in the payment plan among two
groups of salesmen (n = 14 n = 11) the researcher
examines performance data over a period of four years
(two years before and two years after). The salesmen
were already on a commission incentive scheme, so when
they changed to another pay plan it was difficult to
identify any increase or decrease in pay which was
related to performance, but using mathematical models
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Darmon (1974:420) was able to predict probable perform-
ance under the old system and compare it with the new
system. He identifies two groups of salesmen - a group
in which the probability of an increase in income
appeared to cause an increase in performance and another
group who chose to work less (increase leisure) and so
sold less but still maintained or increased their
income. He does not comment on whether there are any
personality characteristic differences between the two
groups. He does, however, speculate that each salesman
has either consciously or subconsciously, an income level
he wishes to reach and maintain and, given a payment
system or change in the system will adjust his activity
to achieve this income. Interestingly enough, the
phenomena of the salesman who will maintain a specified
level of income is enshrined in motor trade folk-law,
with the barrier of the car salesmens 'comfort level' as
a well known problem to any change of the pay system.
This study provides additional evidence that pay and
financial incentives do influence behaviour, particularly
during a change in the pay system but it does not enable
us to conclude that a change in pay will influence or
improve performance.
Oliver (1977) uses an Expectancy Theory model to
try and evaluate the value of pay to a group of insurance
salesmen. As, in his subjects, pay is directly linked to
performance a high valence for pay should lead to
improved performance. Using a
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questionnaire and correlation technique in a sample of
99 male insurance agents this research found that the
valence for money decreased with age and that agents with
the highest valence for pay perceived a greater likely-
hood of receiving it - indicating thajt. there is a type
of personality motivated by money.
If one assumes that individuals will maximise
their economic gain (as do economists and Taylor 1922)
then Farley (1964) suggests a comprehensive model for
creating a sales compensation plan. Assuming that the
quantity of the product a salesman sells is an increasing
function of the time he spends trying to sell that
product Farley (1964:40) proposes a mathematical model
which should optimise, not only the income of the
salesman, but the profits of the firm. Davis and Farley
(1971) extend the model by integrating targets or quotas
into the model, so the company could centrally control
the amount of the product it wishes to sell, while
Tapiero and Farley (1975) integrate 'time' into the model,
so that if different products take different amounts of
time (or effort) to sell the model will still mathe-
matically maximise earnings for the salesman and maximise
profits for the company. Weinberg (1975) integrates
another variable into the model by suggesting that profit
and income will be maximised only where the salesman is
controlling the price in a price bargaining situation.
He identifies, as an example of such a situation, the
automobile salesman who can give discounts and make
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allowances on part exchange. It was not until 17 years
after its original formulation that Farley's (1964)
mathematical model and, its extensions were investigated
empirically.
Dalrymple et al (1981:Stephenson et al 1979) using
a questionnaire and performance data from a sample of
medical supply firms (n = 108) examined the effect on
performance of three different payment systems - a
commission system on a fixed gross margin (Farley 1964),
a variable margin scheme and a salary plus commission and
bonus scheme. Their survey showed that, while the model
predicts that companies using gross margin schemes
should have the highest level of profitability, such is
not the case. The results suggest that gross margin
schemes produce high income for the salesmen but not
necessarily high productivity for the company. The
results also suggest that while delegating price
authority to the salesman may increase volume and
salesman's earnings it does not increase the profitability
of the companies concerned.
Even controlling for the influence of company
size on the system the researchers conclude that there
is little support for the theory of jointly optimal
commission schemes. They note that there is a high
correlation between sales and gross margins indicating
that salesman tend to think in terms of turnover rather
than profit and let the gross margin take care of itself.
Another writer who attempts to evaluate the worth
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of several types of sales compensation scheme is
Steinbrink (1978). He surveys the pay practise of 380
selling companies, discovering that most use a salary
plus commission system (a combination plan) and a few a
salary or commission plan. He suggests a number of
practical and motivational advantages for each scheme,
but unfortuantely does not link earnings (which he clearly
identifies over a period) to performance.
Gorick (1978), however, proposes a scheme and
provides case study evidence which suggests that linking
a bonus to the accuracy of the sales forecast, improves
not only sales results but the accuracy of the forecast.
He describes a system in IBM where the bonus was linked
to the company objective, the salesmans forecast and
the actual results. This case study is interesting in
that it identifies not only one criterimfor payment (eg
Gross Margin) but two, and rewards on the interaction
between the two. Such a system was suggested by Stata
and Maidique (1980) who argue that there is no reason to
limit pay reward to only one factor of performance (say
profit or sales), but suggest that one can devise a
method or a matrix which will reward two (or even more)
facets of performance. The advantage of such a scheme is
that is enables a number of different performance facets
to interact and contribute towards pay without any undue
concentration on one single factor, such as Farley (1964)
suggests.
The idea that performance is a combination of a
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number of factors is the theme of a suggestion put
forward by Darmon (1982). He argues that the compensation
plan should link the various facets of performance. It
should also link both the salesmens objectives and the
firms objectives, and he proposes a seven step process
of consultation and participation, for devising a payment
plan.
Impltmenting this suggestion in a group of 144
salesmen he was able (by cluster analysis) to identify
four types of salesmen according to their attitude to
thepay system - Incentive averters, Commission-oriented,
incentive oriented and only-some-bonus-incentive
salesmen. This again suggests that some personality
types respond to money. This research demonstrates
empirically that although individuals respond to the
incentive system in various ways salesmen do appear to
respond to money and can be broadly categorised according-
l y , although the level of reaction to pay and motivation
must clearly depend on the particular sales personality.
Conclusions 
It would appear that pay does influence the type
of people who become salesmen and that they respond well
to a system which rewards their individual effort and
affords them the opportunity to optimise their income.
However, although there is a profound belief,among managers
in the motor trade, that money will motivate salesmen,
there is also a conviction that the present system is not
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working too well. Some of the reasons for this were
spelled out in Chapter Two. One must therefore seek a
way of designing a more effective payment system for car
salesmen.
CHAPTER 5 
THE SALES PAYMENT SYSTEM
Sales Compensation 
Salesmen have been paid on a variety of incentive
based schemes for a long time and a body of pragmatic,
non-theory based ideas have evolved based on experience.
For example Tosdal (1953) is widely regarded as one of
the authorities on sales payment systems. 	 His
recommendations are based on a study of 1,254 sales
forces and, although prescriptive, his paper is well
argued.	 He suggests that individual payment schemes are
better than group payment schemes, and that salesmen are
not totally motivated by money.	 He considers that
intrinsic needs, such as the need for recognition, need
for status, the need to excel and the need to have the
opportunity to do good work, are important motivators,
and stresses the necessity to set clear compensation
objectives before designing a payment system.
	
His
suggestions are:
1) The plan should be devised to give an adequate
income for acceptable work; so that it provides
some form of security.
2) It should provide an incentive for additional
effort, as well as being understandable.
3) The plan should be flexible enough to operate
satisfactorily during periods of fluctuations in
business conditions.
- 191 -
4) The plan should be cost effective in that it
should increase sales at costs which are
competitive or better.
5) The plan should be perceived to be fair.
It is difficult to find a flaw in such a practical
and sensible set of objectives, although they are derived
from practical experience rather than empirical evidence.
Smythe (1968) reviewed the payment practices and
results of 444 companies, which included 16,264 salesmen.
From this survey, and his experiences with sales
commission systems, he concludes that a basic salary
plus commission system is probably the most effective
form of incentive. 	 He suggests that the proportion of
income dependent on performance should vary according to
the types of product sold.
	 The greater the necessity
for social skills in the bargaining process the higher
the proportion of incentive payment.	 This system should,
according to Smythe (1968) motivate the salesman to
'Plan ahead, use time effectively, comply with
management requirements and result in lower costs,
increased profits and higher personal income.'
Gonik (1978) another pragmatist, suggests a pay
system which, 'Rewards sales people not only for actual
results but also for their effort and ability to
forecast accurately.'
This plan calls for a system of commission payable
on a matrix which is set according to the salesman
ability to forecast accurately.
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Apparently, the system was devised for IBM and works
effectively in that organisation.	 It operates
according to the principal that you should reward what
you actually want achieved.	 In the Gonik (1978) system
IBM are trying to achieve increased sales but, at the
same time, increased forecasting accuracy.	 Presumably
this is important for production reasons. 	 The matrix
is a device for allowing management to decide precisely
which objectives it wishes to reward and provides a tool
for allowing it to be done.
Steinbrink (1978) surveys the practices of 380
companies in 34 industries which includes over 15,000
salesmen.	 From this survey, and his experiences as a
consultant, he concludes that the 'combination' plan of
salary and commission is the best method of payment.
He regards its advantages as;
Flexibility, the participants like it, there is a
greater range of earnings possible, salesmen feel
more secure, it maintains the ratio of selling
expenses to sales, compensates salesmen for all
activities and allows greater latitude of
motivational possibilities.
He goes on to suggest that commission should be
paid on gross margins rather than as a percentage of
sales, an idea which fits the Farley (1964) model of an
optimal payment system.
Many payment systems in practice today are based
on the published experience of men such as these rather
than empirically derived theories of the behavioural
sciences.
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However, if the behavioural sciences are to have
any ecological validity it should be possible, using what
is known, to create a workable and motivationally
effective sales payment system. 	 As the ethos of
salesmen (and sales management) is that individuals
respond to a commission based incentive, perhaps a
workable payment system for salesmen can be designed
using the Expectancy Theory Model (Lawler, 1971), a
boundary condition of which is that payment should be
continguent on performance, or the performance to outcome
probabilities must be as near as 1.0 as possible (Graen,
1969).
A Proposed Car Salesmen's Payment System
Current Practice 
The purpose of any payment by results system is
to link pay directly to performance so that any economic
gains or losses resulting directly from changes in an
individuals performance accrue to him.	 As explained in
Chapter 2, this is quite a complex concept to implement
in the retail motor trade, for three reasons:
1. There is a conflict between optimizing unit sales or
maximising profit on the sale.
2. The only behaviour rewarded is the car sale (unit
sale) yet salesmen are required to undertake other
tasks such as administration, customer follow-up etc.
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3.	 There is a problem in the definition of the profit
on the sales of a car because of the necessity to
take another car in part-exchange.
As explained earlier (Chapter 2) there are many
minor variations in how car salesmen are paid, but
essentially they receive a modest basic pay and a
percentage of the 'retained gross profit' on the sale
of a car. Popular opinion and some theory then predicts
that they will optimize their personal income and company
profit (Farley, 1964).
Generally, payment by results systems can be
classified into group and individual systems. In some
environments, group systems have been known to work
moderately well (International Labour Office, 1968;
Whitmore and Ibbetson, 1977:118; White 1981) but they
have never found favour in the retail motor trade, where
almost all payment systems are direct individual systems.
A good example of such a system is provided by one
of the research sites which is fairly typical of Ford
dealers in the UK.
	 In this dealership all salesmen are
paid a basic salary of £2,500.00.
In addition to basic pay the salesmen received 11%
of the Retained Gross Profit on new cars sold and 13% of
Retained Gross Profit on used cars sold.
	 Retained Gross
Profit (RGP) in this dealership was defined as:
. . . profit remaining after deduction of VAT, car
tax, trading allowance and discounts.
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The definition of profit tends to vary from
dealership to dealership, some reducing the RGP by
charging a "house charge" designed to reflect the direct
costs of the dealership.
Earnings of salesmen in this particular dealer-
ship ranged between £6,000 per annum to £13,000 per
annum, so commission represented from 60% to 75% of total
income.	 These total earnings are about average for
durable goods salesmen in the UK whose average income in
1979 was £10,272 with 29.3% of that arising from commission
earnings (Dunkelds and Caslin, 1979).	 Income Data
Services (1983:52) also report a range from £5,751 to
£10,182 for similar jobs. The level of income is fairly
typical in the motor trade.
Problems with System
There are considerable problems with the pay system
generally.	 For example, in the above dealership the
profit on each deal and the resultant commission was
often influenced by bargains struck between salesmen and
the sales manager, a practice that varies from dealership
to dealership depending on profitability and the sales
manager.	 In one dealership surveyed 50% of sales were
subject to a 'special arrangement.'
Other external environmental factors apart from the
salesman's ability to sell have a profound effect on a
salesman's performance, his subsequent expectation that
effort will lead to performance (ER) and his consequent
income.•
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Over the last few years a depressed economic
climate has reduced the overall market for cars and so
each saleman sells fewer cars, while currently over-
production in a buoyant market has led to the necessity
for dealers to give large discounts.	 This reduces the
profit on the sale and consequently sales commission
levels.
As in other industries, the rate of inflation
over the last few years has radically changed the
proportion between basic pay and commission: with little
effort being made to correct any distortion, as
employers argue inflation also increases commission
earnings.
The commission element of the system currently
represents about 65%	 of a car salesman's total
income. In comparison with other salesmen this appears
to be a very high proportion to be directly dependent on
performance.
A recent survey by the British Institute of
Management (Philpot, 1976) showed that 53% of marketing
companies have some form of incentive element, but they
also report that the percentage of companies offering
incentive schemes had declined quite rapidly over the
preceding five years.	 The survey also reveals that in
only 16% of companies does commission represent more than
40% of total income, so that the ratio found among many
car salesmen is most unusual.
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The car salesman must hold one of the few jobs where the
majority of his income is dependent on individual effort
and ability.
A further major problem with the pay system is
that management appears to have a fear of paying too
much commission and subsequently tends to adopt
strategies which reduce the pay of successful salesmen.
Some evidence of this is provided by the remarks of the
Sales Manager (Appendix B) who considered the salesmen
earned too much in relation to effort.	 The fact that
pay was related to performance not effort, is ignored.
One dealership has a 'regulator or charge' which can be
levied as a variable cost before calculating the retained
gross profit on which salesmen are paid.
It has been suggested elsewhere that management
have a perception of a particular weekly wage value
which is related to effort rather than performance and that
wage rates are set in relation to this perceived value
(Baldamus, 1961:115). 	 Perhaps management manipulation
of the system in the motor trade is further evidence of
this.
The conventional managerial belief is that
salesmen have the opportunity of optimizing their income;
but it is apparent that, among car salesmen the perception
that performance will lead to an optimal outcome is low.
This is in spite of a system which, by linking pay to the
profit on the sale, is supposed to optimize both income
for the salesman and profit for the company.
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There are many problems within the system itself.
As car salesmen are paid a flat percentage commission
on each particular deal in sequence, this tends to
focus attention on the first few transactions of any
particular accounting period and the profit thereon
until a desired level of income is reached. 	 The fact
that car salesmen tend to earn a consistent income year
by year and that the rank order of salesmen from best to
worst rarely changes, suggests that salesmen set
themselves an anticipated satisfactory level of income
and when this is earned they cease to perform as
effectively.	 Empirical confirmation that this is a
facet of mature pay systems is provided by Darmon
(1974:419).
There is also evidence that as the amount of pay
a person receives increases, so the valence of the
incremental income decreases (Gellerman, 1968:144;
Lawler, 1981:88).	 This means that the perceived value
of the commission paid on the 15th car sold in the month
is far less than the value of the commission on the 1st
car.	 Motivation to perform, therefore, decreases during
any accounting period as the salesman sells more cars.
All such problems with the payment system effect
the salesman's perception, either that his effort will
not result in a successful performance or that his
performance is not going to lead to the desired optimal
outcome.	 As a consequence he is unlikely, at any time,
to be operating as his optimum performance level.
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Implications for Developing an Improved Pay System
If it is wished, to
performance and if we wish
sustained high level, then
optimize a salesman's
to continue to operate at a
the Lawler Model (1971:108)
would predict success if the system
a. Creates the belief that effort will lead to
satisfactory performance, ie increase E 	 P ratio.
This is a function of the salesman's self-esteem,
previous experience and the internal or external
attribution of causality. 	 (Weiner, 1974:37)
b. Creates the belief that performance wi l l lead to
satisfactory outcomes (P	 0) .	 At the first level
the outcome is the sale of the car, a sense of
achievement and enhanced self-esteem.	 Second level
outcomes are simply being paid the expected amount
for satisfactory performance (Galbraith and Cummings,
1967:239).
c. Maintains the valence of desired outcomes bearing in
mind that the perceived value of incremental amounts
of pay decrease as income increases.
d. Reduces and mitigates the effect of constant rejection
(anxiety) by methods of enhancing self-esteem.
e. Rewards those activities which it is wished the
salesmen to perform and which are not directly sales
related.	 (Jenkins and Gupta, 1983).
f. Appeals to personalities with a high valence for pay
and maintain that valence over time.
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In addition the administration of the scheme
should not act to reduce the direct relationship between
the act of selling and pay (Dubinsky and Berkowitz, 1979)
(ie reduce the subjective probability that selling leads
to desired outcome) and the system must be readily
understood by the salesman.
The problem with payment systems based on such
complex concepts like 'added value' is that the link
between performance and reward is so difficult to perceive
and evaluate (Moulder and Murray, 1980), and that it is
so very different from systems currently being used that
neither salesmen nor management find it acceptable. 	 As
the weaknesses of current pay practice have been
identified, it is not difficult to devise a revised
system based on the concepts of Expectancy Theory (Lawler,
1971:108).	 There can be little wrong with the current
practise thschroVoLe i basic pay, but a more effective
method of enhancing the salesman's self-esteem would be
to use a system of job grading which recognises
individual variation in the salesman's experience,
maturity and expertise. 	 Such systems are rare in the
motor trade.	 For example, a car salesman could be paid
a basic salary in accordance with his experience and
expertise along the following lines:-
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Grade Title Age Experience Pay/Range
I Junior Salesman 20/24 1 year £1000/£1750
II Salesman 23/29 1 year £1500/£2250
III Senior Salesman 28/35 3 years £2000/£3000
IV Sales Consultant 30+ 5 years £3000 +
Individual basic pay rates can be determined by
means of compensation survey of local dealers (Henderson,
1979:246) so that the levels of basic pay are perceived
to be fair by the salesman (Adams, 1963).
The effect of such an equitable basic pay structure should
be to reduce anxiety and so enhance sales effort.
Such an arrangement is important because research
(Cooper, 1981:202) has identified three consequences of
high levels of stress or anxiety; ill health, job
dissatisfaction and apathy and absenteeisn - all of
which degrade the amount of effort put into the job.
Research also indicates (Wells and Marwell, 1976:74) that
anxious individuals perform less effectively under stress
and failure, and are less socially effective. 	 Conversely
high self esteem is a cause of successful performance
(Tharenou, 1979:323). 	 There are also researchers and
practitioners who regard ego-strength (a synonym for self
esteem) as the definitive attribute for a successful
salesman (Mayer and Greenberg, 1964; Greenberg and
Greenberg, 1976), so maintenance of self-esteem in this
way is vital.
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Increasing the salesman's self-esteem improves his
perception that increased effort will lead to
successful performance (E --> P), and also enables him to
deal more effectively with constant rejection, the effect
of which must be to reduce the subjective probability of
his expectation of a sale.
Such a grading system which gives what salesmen
consider to be an equitable basic pay, also has the
advantage that it enables an employer to reward those
parts of the job that do not involve selling, and enables
him to promote a salesman for sustained high performance,
or for accepting additional responsibility.
Commission
The key element of the sales pay system is
commission, particularly in the car trade where it can
represent 60-80% of a salesman's income.	 There is no
evidence to suggest what proportion of a salesman's
income should be dependent on commission to stimulate
optimal performance.	 In other sales related jobs, the
proportion rarely exceeds 40% (Philpot, 1976), but as
long as the basic pay acts to mitigate anxiety, provides
for basic needs and is perceived to be fair, it should
make little difference.	 The fact that commission is
such a high proportion of income may, in some cases,
appeal to salesmen with a high need for achievement and
a high and secure self-concept.
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The Calculation of Profit 
Commission payments are normally calculated on the
Retained Gross Profit which is the contribution of the
individual sales to the departmental profit.	 This can
be calculated as follows:
RETAIL SALE PRICE
Less	 BASIC COST OF CAR
GROSS CONTRIBUTION
Less	 OVER ALLOWANCE ON PART-EXCHANGE (1)*
HOUSE CHARGE
NETT CONTRIBUTION OR RETAINED PROFIT
It is important that salesmen perceive this
calculation to be fair; many do as it is the commonest
method used.
*Note 1.	 Because in almost every car sale a part-
exchange is taken in, no profit is made until all cars
in the chain are sold.	 The 'wash-out' system suggests
that no commission will be paid to the salesmen until all
the cars in the chain are sold and profit calculated.
The alternative is to write down the part-exchange
notionally and calculate profit allowing for the notional
write-down, or over-allowance, to give a 'stand-in' value.
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The house-charge is a commonly accepted concept in
calculating the profit on car sales.	 It used to
represent a deduction from the gross profit of the
sales departments direct expenses but, as with many
aspects of commission systems, the principle is now
rarely applied, and in the research sites the house-
charge was a figure plucked out of the air by the sales
manager.	 This charge could easily be calculated and
subsequently perceived to be fair, by taking the sales
departments direct expenses and dividing by the number
of units budgeted to be sold. 	 This would provide a
logical basis for the figure and allow it to be
reviewed annually when budgets are reviewed.	 It would
also give the salesman some control over the figure as
he is able to influence costs by saving expenditure
(electricity, advertising, etc) or by selling more units.
The negotiating and settling of part-exchange
prices is probably the chief cause of perceived
unfairness.	 If possible the evaluation of the part-
exchange should be independent and objective.
The Sales Director of a major Ford dealership
recently reviewed his pay system.	 He commented, (in a
letter to his Managing Director):-
Ideally, a commission system should be linked to the
part-exchange on a 'wash-out' basis as certain problems
exist when a part-exchange is taken in for retail.
The 'stand-in' value causes constant problems on clean
retail units and it is much easier for a salesman to
buy a 'trade'.
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The present gap in Glass's Guide (2) makes it very
difficult to buy a part-exchange and then stand it
close to 'bottom book' or thereabout.	 However,
due to the complexity of a wash-out system and the
problems involved with warranty, VAT, reconditioning,
etc., on used units have made me discount this
system entirely.
There is no simple answer to this problem, but
management should be aware that it exists, bearing in
mind that if salesmen are paid on the Retained Gross
Profit and are allowed to control the price they should
"act optimally both for themselves and the firm"
(Weinberg, 1975:937).	 It is important to try to make
sure that the method of valuing part-exchange is
consistent, and ensure that the salesman's commission
is not part of the bargaining process to establish the
price of the part-exchange.
The Commission Matrix 
Currently the commonest way of calculating
commission is to pay a flat percentage of the Retained
Gross Profit.	 The percentage varies slightly from
dealer to dealer but is in the region of 10%.
Sometimes the dealer will pay 10% on new car sales and
12% on used car sales.	 80% of dealers pay between 2.5%
and 10% (Sewell, 1978).
Note 2.	 The standard trade guide which gives a market
price for all makes and models of cars.
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This method has two major disadvantages.	 Firstly,
the salesman is constantly faced with a conflict between
unit volume or optimizing profit.	 He is constantly
being exhorted to sell more cars as the dealer is set
targets by the supplier. 	 The governing factor in many
sales is the price of the part-exchange.	 By allowing
a higher figure on the part-exchange the salesman can
take OA easy route to selling another car.	 The effect
of this is to reduce the profit on each unit when more
sales effort could have resulted in a sale at a higher
profit.	 As the salesman is paid a flat percentage of
the profit, the tendency is to accept a slightly
reduced commission, but make sure of another sale, the
amount of profit being perceived as making only a
marginal difference to the salesman's income.
Secondly, the perceived value of 10% commission
on the 15th car sold in a month is much lower than the
perceived value of the first as the perceived value of
incremental income decreases as actual income increases,
(Lawler, 1981:88).	 A flat rate, therefore, does not
sustain motivation, which decreases over time as the
valence of additional income decreases with increased
sales.	 Consequently the level of motivation decreases
during the accounting period.
In order to overcome these problems the author has
designed a commission matrix which could apply to car
salesmen (see Figure 5:1). 	 The principles of such a
matrix were suggested in an article by Stata and
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Maidique (1980).
	 The objective is to reward selling
performance for both units sold and profit per unit,
thereby avoiding the traditional conflict.
Under the matrix the salesman is paid a sliding
scale of commission which ranges according to the units
he sells from 6% for 1 and 2 units to 22% for 30 units
(see figure 5:1).	 At the same time, the percentage
increases as the profit on the unit sold increases.
A salesman would receive 28% commission provided that
the profit on the unit was £301-£350, and it was the
23rd or 24th car sold in the accounting period.	 The
rate of commission increases by 2% per transaction until
20% is reached and then by 4% per transaction.
The matrix is calibrated by establishing the
critical percentage to be paid for acceptable performance.
There is no reason why, where different standards of
performance are expected (say from Junior to Senior
Salesmen) each standard should not have its own matrix
Careful thought should be given to establishing the 'key'
percentage.	 This should be set by deciding on acceptable
sales and unit profit standards evaluated by detailed
comparison with departmental budgets.	 In this way
exceptional performance (say twice the acceptable number
of units sold at twice the profit) can be rewarded well,
bearing in mind that any profit above budget attracts
only variable costs and is marginal, incremental profit.
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The particular matrix shows that a figure of 10%
will be paid for a standard performance of 11-12 cars per
month at a profit of £151-£200 per unit. 	 Performance
below the standard is penalised (6-8%) but performance
above the standard is well rewarded.
	
For selling three
times the number of cars at twice the profit per unit,
a salesman chould earn 40% of the Retained Gross Profit.
The graduated differences of 2% and 4% between the
different levels have been set to ensure that the sums
of money paid are perceived to have value irrespective
of the previous level of earnings; so the valence of
income is maintained.
It is assumed that the magnitude of the difference
between figures in the matrix will maintain, at least
the valence of the desired income - commission. 	 The
revised system is not some complicated Value-Added System
with complicated formulas or even a group scheme. 	 It is
a simple theoretical adaption of the existing system
which has worked, if not well, for a long time. 	 Any
differences are theoretically based, critical and vitally
important.	 The scheme should enable the system to be
cost effective and to increase the unit profit while
allowing salesmen to earn more commission.
To summarize, current payment systems operated by
much of the motor trade do not appear to work very well.
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The system suggested here is predicted to enable the
salesmen to optimise his income by achieving the dual
goals of unit sales and optimal profit required by the
dealer.	 There is no additional cost to the dealer who
can afford to reward incremental sales well.	 The
system should continue to motivate as the perceived
value of payment increases during the accounting period
so the salesman's selling effort will be highest (rather
than lowest) at the end of period in order to earn
at the highest level.	 As the system is linked to goals
and budgets it will automatically be reviewed yearly
and revised in the light of economic circumstances and
the rate of inflation.
CHAPTER 6 
THE RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT 
The Motor Industry 
No account of research in the motor trade would be
complete without some attempt being made to describe the
environment and to emphasise its importance both to the
economy of the UK and to our way of life.
The industry is vital to our economy. It employs
directly about 500,000 people and it is estimated that
over 1 million people depend on the production of vehicles
for their livelihood. Currently, it contributes about
12 billion pounds to the Gross Domestic Product.
There are about 19 million vehicles on the road in
Britain and 92% of all journeys are by road. Vehicles
have, over the last few years, become more reliable,
safer and more economical. Servicing intervals are longer
and breakdowns are rare. Death from road accidents have
decreased from 7406 in 1973 to 5577 in 1983 in spite of an
increase in the vehicles on the road and fuel consumption
has improved from an average of 25.00 per gallon in 1978
to 29 miles pergallon in 1985. The motor trade sells and
maintains the vehicles produced by the industry.
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The Motor Trade 
The retail motor trade consists, according to the
Road Transport Industry Training Board (RTITB, 1982:8)
of 20,200 companies employing 302,350 people.	 About
11,000 of these are so small that they are below the
RTITB's levy cut-off point of a £21,000 total wage bill,
and only about 1,000 garages employ more than 50 people.
These larger dealers employ 55% of the people in the
industry.
Most of the total sales of vehicles and repairs
are handled by the comparatively small number of
franchised retailers. 	 A count of the manufacturer
franchise list revealed that there are about 8,500 of
these dealers, who according to the RTITB (1979:75),
employ a labour force of about 216,000 employees or 63.3%
of the total labour force in the retail motor trade.
It is in the franchised sector of the retail motor trade
that this research is based. 	 It is an area which demands
high levels of managerial skill, high levels of engineering
skill, and the continual co-operation of the manufacturer,
importer or concessionaire.
This sector can be contrasted with the much smaller
'used car' lot, which typically consists of an owner -
salesmen with few back-up facilities. 	 It is suspected
that it is this sector which accounts for much of the bad
reputation ascribed to the motor trade.
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Franchise dealers employ 12,805 sales persons (an
average of 1.5% per dealership), 197 of whom were female
(RTITB, 1981:36).	 Whether we like it or not, selling
cars still appears to be a male preserve, and many of
the conclusions of this study probably can not be
generalised to female sales persons.
72% of these salesmen were aged under 40 with only
25% being between 41-60 years old. 	 Not only is it a
male preserve, it also seems to be a young mans
occuptation, with even 58% of Sales Managers being under
40.
For the year ending December 31st, 1983, salesmen
in franchised dealers sold 1,792,000*new cars. 	 This was
a healthy increase of 15.2% over the 1982 figure and
a record market.
In addition there were something like 1.5 million
used cars sold, although there is some evidence that the
number of used cars sold by the retail motor trade
decreased during 1980, 1981 and 1982 (Lacey, 1983:115).
Yet in spite of what appears to be a healthy
market, car dealers are experiencing some difficulties.
On August 18th, 1982 , Motor Trader (the trade magazine)
reported,
For every car dealer in England who is making an
increased profit, two are making losses according
to current surveys by Inter-Company Comparison
Limited.	 The latest financial accounts in two
surveys of a total of 854 companies in London, the
South, the Midlands and the North show that 42.5%
of quoted firms had losses compared with 15% with
increased profits.
* Statistics supplied by the Society of Motor Manufacturers
and Traders
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These figures are explained by ICC as being the
consequence of the economic recession, the cutting of
profit margins, price wars, and the recent problem of
'parallel' imports or cut-price imported cars from the
EEC.	 They go on to say,
If the retail motor trade in the UK is to survive in
its present form, then attitudes and practices
within the trade may have to change.	 Margins need
be kept at sensible levels especially when dealing
with company fleets or further liquidations seem to
be inevitable.
These problems have continued into 1983 and 1984.
The trade, in spite of record markets shows no sign of
economic recovery. 	 The Sunday Times (3rd July, 1983)
comments,
... bargain buys - on many makes and models have been
common place as rival makers and dealers slug it out
in the most intense struggle for sales ever
experienced.	 Crazy discounts, special incentives,
zero interest, HP deals, multi-million pound
advertising campaigns ...
All have been mobilised to snatcha bigger share
of bumper 1983 sales, currently running 17% up on last
years total.
	
'Its very bloody out there', says Trevor
Taylor the Sales and Marketing Director of Austin Rover.
Many of these problems are caused by new product
'discounting' as the manufacturers compete amongst
themselves for an increased share of the market.
British Leyland dealers in particular have suffered
watching their share of the market decline from 23.5% in
1978 to 18.6% in 1984, while Ford has increased its
market from 24.7% in 1978 to about 30% in 1984.
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Price cutting is not the preserve of the motor
trade alone as activities in the supermarkets and the
petrol industry show, by Millman (1983:1) suggests;
In motor cars, Ford UK's widely publicised round of
price cutting over a range of models in 1982,
provided clear evidence of the lengths to which
some companies are prepared to use the price
weapon from a position of relative strength.
BL's answer to the problem was, once again to
reduce its franchise network by about 30% - terminating
the franchise of a minority, BL argued, so that the
majority can survive and be profitable. 	 In 1975, BL
had 3,500 dealers and 31% of the market, in 1982, the
company had 1,560 dealers and 17.8% of the market.
	 The
situation looks as if it will continue into 1985.
The Market Culture 
The culture of the industry is unusual.
	 By
culture is meant,
... sets of values, norms and beliefs - reflected in
different structures and systems ... climate of the
present, by technology of the type of work ... (Handy,
1980:176)
The principle manufacturers, Ford, British Leyland
and General Motors, insist on a solus franchise
arrangement with a dealer.
Under this system the retailer agrees to sell only
one make of vehicle, in return for which, he is granted
a monopoly within a certain geographical territory.
It is the manufacturers who market the product, rather
than the retail dealer.
- 217 -
The dealers total marketing effort consists of an
advertisement in the local newspaper, the occasional
launch of a new product under the direction of the
manufacturer, and of course, the sales effort and
organisation.
The manufacturers argue that this arrangement
reduces costs; both for the manufacturer and the
retailer (Marx, 1980).	 In practise this arrangement
puts the manufacturer in a position of power over the
retailer who must comply with manufacturer demands or
lose the franchise. The sources of power in the motor
trade and its measurement are the subject of studies by
Lusch (1976), Lusch and Brown (1982) and Frazier (1983).
For some people, the arrangement can be very
profitable (Vanderwicken, 1972) but the manufacturer is
clearly dominant in the relationship, insisting on
compliance with a variety of criteria.	 These criteria
lay down time standards in the workshop, levels of display
and showroom space, the number of vehicles to be run as
demonstrators and levels of stock.	 In many cases, the
retail dealer will either pay for his vehicles in
advance (in the form of a bulk deposit), or pay for them
immediately they have left the factory gate.	 Certainly
the dealer pays for vehicles before they are received.
The reasons for such an arrangement are lost in the
evolution and development of the trade, but a consequence
is that the bulk of marketing and business expertise
resides in the manufacturer organisation rather than the
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retail side of the motor trade. 	 Many of the companies
in the retail motor trade are old established family
companies, and this includes some of the largest.
These companies have come to depend on the manufacturer
to provide training, business advice and marketing
direction.	 Very few dealers have any recognisable
market strategy.
The dealer culture is car sales orientated as
opposed to marketing or profit orientated (Vanderwicken,
1972; Khan, 1983:13). 	 Many Managing Directors come from
the sales floor and have little financial or commercial
expertise.	 They tend to value experience in the trade
over academic education and employ few business graduates.
The general ethos is that of practicality and intuition
rather than of planning, strategy, theory and return on
investment.
Within this environment, British Leyland have
something like 1,500 dealers operating nationwide. 	 The
size and composition of each dealer varies enormously,
but among them there are a number of large companies who
own somewhere between . 25 to 150 dealerships. The bulk
of this research and the pay manipulation was conducted
in one such group which has 93 dealerships, and which
will be called 'Britcars Limited'.	 A number of other
BL dealers and Ford Dealers provided information when
requested.
- 219 -
Britcars has a national network of branches, most
of which sell British Leyland products.	 Because of the
decline in British Leyland market share, this group has
been at risk and has been operating on reduced
profitability since 1978.
	 In 1981 and 1982, the group
lost money.
As part of its recovery programme, the group has
been taking remedial action by changing the franchise in
a number of dealerships or by buying into non-motor trade
companies.	 In January, 1983, the Chief Executive of
the group described the last twelve months as, 'A
traumatic twelve months.' 	 He commented,
The large losses meant that there simply had to be
major changes involving difficult decisions and a
very considerable restructuring.	 The fact that
this happened to many other companies with equal
severity over the same period is of little
consolation to any of us.
He described an action plan in which he stated
that the group will need to close branches that are
losing money, sell property previously occupied by loss
making branches, undertake more training to give employees
better skills, strengthen the management team and spread
the risk and group coverage by taking Ford, Vauxhall,
Talbot, Renault, Rolls Royce, Dodge and other dealerships.
Following the half year results announced in April, 1983,
where a further loss was announced, the Chief Executive
was replaced.	 Early in 1984 the group was taken over by
a financial conglomerate.
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The experimental research was conducted within a
number of this groups dealerships based in the Midlands.
These dealerships were not selected or allocated to a
research condition randomly. 	 A presentation of the
research objective was made to a group of General
Managers, a number of whom subsequently agreed to
co-operate.	 All the research dealerships were Austin-
Rover franchised and operated under the management of
the Midland Regional Director. 	 They were located in
various industrial towns in the Midlands.	 Apart from
such variables dictated by the physical layout of the
building and the contract size, there is no reason to
suppose there were any major factors which made any one
dealership peculiar, or which made the experimental
variables (ie car sales and profit) any different in
any of the locations.
CHAPTER 7
METHODOLOGY
Introduction 
The idea which gave birth to this research was the
consideration of the motor trade aphorism quoted in a
magazine.	 The comment was made 'A hungry salesman is
a good salesman', in support of an argu ment for abolishon9
the basic pay and paying salesmen on a commission only
basis.	 It was interesting that although there was a
strong belief amoungst Salesmen, Sales Managers, and
General Managers in the retail motor trade, that money
is the critical motivator of sales performance, this
concept did not appear to be accepted by business school
teaching and consultants in the field of management
and motivation.	 The Hawthorne Studies appeared to have
established the paradigm that money was not a critical
motivator of performance (Roethlisberger and Dickson,
1964; Mayo, 1975), yet people in the motor trade still
behaved as though it were. 	 This research attempts to
establish a design which could establish whether pay was
the cause of sales behaviour and the performance of
salesmen in the retail motor trade. 	 The hypothesis to
test was, whether, if the opportunity for the optimal
pay were linked directly to sales and profit
performance, would salesmen, with the appropriate
personality traits exert more effort in order to improve
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performance and obtain more of the desired outcome,
'increased pay'.
Principles of Research 
The approach is psychological rather than
sociological, and experimental rather than experiential.
Although the case study approach has much to commend it
and provides insights and much information, it is
inevitably highly subjective and consequently it is
difficult to generalise from the particular situation.
Indeed, the authors knowledge, which comes from the
experience of working for many years in the motor trade,
and being aware of the ethos, the culture and common
practise has helped this research. 	 Nevertheless, the
authors	 view of the motor trade is subjective and
his attitudes coloured by many prejudices, one of
which is about payment schemes.	 Fact, can only be
ascertained by unambiguous, experimental research.
There are those who are critical of such
experimental methodology in sales research.	 Arndt (1977:
185) vehemently comdemns this approach, suggesting:
'Results from this (empirical) research are a narrow
methodological repetoire, conceptual poverty and a
conceptualisation of marketing as mainly a sellers'
technology.'
This may well be true but dealing with narrow
issues, one conceptual step at a time is a way to truth.
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Popper (1979) suggests that the principle method for
seeking truth and causality should be to develop a
theory and then, by trying systematically and empirically
to destroy it, establish a preference for those theories
which have not yet been disproved, but which of course
are disprovable.
The limitation of the methodology is that it is
narrow, but its strength is that it provides a hope of
establishing fact and causality rather than opinion and
correlation.
This research is also intended to be applied rather
than theoretical.	 Duckworth (1981:237) talking about
the limitations of many psychological theories, suggests
that, 'Another source of difficulty is the fact that
most psychological theories have not been developed with
practitioners in mind,' and goes on to explain that,
although the foundation of psychological research is the
theoretical model, many,
Existing theories do not lend themselves to being
assembled into the broader conceptual framework
required for problem solving, nor to being
amalgamated with other potentially relevant theories
such as theories of organisation.
By using the Expectancy Theory Model developed by
Lawler (1971) it is anticipated that such problems will
be avoided in this research.
This research is intended to build a bridge
between theory and practicality. 	 With this in mind, it
was decided to take Lawler's (1981) advice when, in the
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preface, he suggests that one of the best ways of
advancing understanding of pay in organisations is to
design, implement and evaluate a theory driven pay
system in an organisation. If one is to understand
and control as many of the potential variables as
possible, and establish the causality of motivation it
seems unlikely that there is any other way of tackling
this particular problem. Such research would provide
such a bridge between academic psychology and the
practical world.
This research is also essentially a field study
rather than a laboratory study. Laboratory studies
have an immense value to the researcher as they control
many variables very precisely, but they lack ecological
validity. Theories also need to be tested and evaluated
in the environment where they belong. It is difficult
for the practitioner and the layman to translate
principles from a study involving psychology undergraduates
performing trivial meaningless tasks to the reality of
the world of work. For example, some of the work on
intrinsic motivation is founded on two laboratories
studies (Deci, 1971). It is difficult to convince
practicing managers that the principles which motivate
students to solve a puzzle for a dollar can be applied to
mature salesmen earning a living in this modern world.
This research consists, essentially, of two
exploratory studies and a field experiment.
RESEARCH DESIGN
STUDY 1 
This is a simple attitude study to try and
establish car salesmens perceptions of their environment,
(see Chapter 8). The technique used is the Kelly
Repertory Grid (Fransella and Bannister, 1977).
STUDY 2 
This is a correlational study to ascertain whether
the personality characteristics identified as salient,
for effective selling, for the literature and the job
characteristics, are apparent at fairly high levels
in car salesmen. The personality traits identified were
Need for Achievement, Need for Dominance, Need for
Autonomy, Need for Affiliation, Self-Esteem and
Machievellianism.
The personality tests used were selected according
to the criteria that they had construct validity (being
based on a body of theory) were widely used in research
(to make available comparative data) and were reliable.
Research Instruments 
Steers And Braunstein Behaviourally Based Measure of
Manifest Needs (MNQ)
nAchievement, nAffiliation, nAutonomy, and
nDominance were measured using a recently devised test
constructed by Steers and Braunstein (1976).
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Although a comparatively new test (and hence comparative
data is scarce) it had the advantage of being short and
specifically relevent to measure these needs in a work
context.	 The researchers report a Cronbach Alpha
Reliability of 0.66 (nAch), 0.56 (nAff), 0.61 (nAut)
and 0.83 (nDom) which on test re-test became 0.72, 0.75,
0.77 and 0.86 respectively.	 These are regarded as
acceptable levels of reliability.
Two researchers (Williams and Woodward, 1980;
Joiner, 1982) have been critical of this measure on the
grounds that it has low reliability. 	 It is important
when evaluating a psychometric measure to keep in mind
that internal consistency is only one measure of a test
and that it is possible to have low internal consittency
and hightest re-test results. 	 Indeed this is what is
reported by the creators of the test (Steers and
Braunstein, 19761.	 It shouLd also be remem6ered tf\at
the internal consistency of a complex measure is more
likely to be lower than a simple concept and that it is
possible to have spuriously high internal consistency by
composing questions which are very similar to each other.
Consequently it is argued that the moderate levels of
reliability reported in this research should indicate
caution in the interpretation of results rather than a
total rejection of the findings.	 (See Table 7:1)
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Janis-Field Measure of Self-Esteem
Self-Esteem was measured using the Janis-Field
Feelings of Inadequacy Scale (Eagley, 1967). As well as
being a widely used scale, it measures self-esteem in a
social context and so seemed situation specific. Eagley
(1967) reports split-half reliability of 0.72, while this
research reports Cronbach Alpha of 0.83 (See Table 7:1).
Machievellianism
Social Manipulativeness, a construct based on a
body of research by Christie and Gies (1970) was
measured using the MACH IV test devised by the
researchers. The test measures moral attitudes in a
personal interactive situation. It is comparatively
short, is widely used and the researchers report
reliabilities(for the first nine sampl+.79 (Christie
and Gies, 1970:16). This research has acceptable levels
of reliability reporting a Cronbach Alpha of 0.68 (see
Table 7:1).
The Samples 
The subjects selected were not random, being
selected for practical reasons of availability rather
than any other reason. However, none of the samples
used were volunteers, thus avoiding volunteer bias
(Maslow and Sakoda, 1952; Rosenthal, 1965), and there is
no reason to suppose that the samples of car salesmen,
nurses, and finance company managers are any different
from any other car salesmen, nurses and finance company
managers.
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In the case of nurses there is a 100% sample of
community nurses in one geographical location, so unless
nurses vary geographically they should be representative.
The sample of managers is a 100% sample of a particular
geographical area.
With the car salesmen the tests were administered
to all participants on a particular sales training course,
so although they were not selected randomly from the
population there is not likely to be any selection bias.
In order to establish the predictive validity of
the battery of tests they were administered to the entire
sales force of a Ford main dealer (n = 13) and the results
correlated with performance figures for the previous
twelve months.
STUDY 3 
The Experiment
This is a quasi-experimental field study (Campbell
and Stanley, 1963; Cook and Campbell, 1976) with two
experimental conditions (pay and training) and two control
groups - one 'in-company', to control for organisational
variables and one in a nearby location to control for
market variables. This gives the following design:
O X 0 (Pay Manipulation)
O Y 0 (Training Manipulation)
O 0 (Company Control Group)
O 0 (Market Control Group)
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Observations were made up to a year before
treatment and for six months afterwards, although some
data is available for up to a year after the
experimental period.
Allocation to each condition was not random, the
management of the company selecting the experimental
condition (thereby allocating salesmen) and the market
control dealership is the only other BL dealership
operating in that market.	 It is of similar size and
employs six salesmen at the market control location.
Such a design controls for many of the threats
to internal validity as History, Maturation and Testing
effects are common to all groups.
Mortality, in this experiment, was a problem as
salesmen joined and left the company during the research
period.	 Indeed the reason that the experimental group
is small is that four salesmen left and others joined.
Where a salesman left, no data, except personality test
data has been used.	 Where a salesman joined the company
data has only been used where it has been possible to
obtain exact reliable comparative figures. 	 Where this
has happened the situation is identified.
Instrumentation is a problem as performance
measures can vary according to the rate of inflation and
local market conditions. 	 Inflation however is common to
all groups.
	
Market conditions are the subject of a
specific control group trading in the same market.
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As there was little communication between various
research sites none of the compensatory problems suggested
by Cook and Campbell (1976) are relevant.
Sample Size 
The size of the sample is a threat to external
validity although there is no reason to suppose that the
salesmen used in the experiment and as controls are
anything but typical.	 They have similar backgrounds to
other salesmen, are about the same age and appear in
many ways typical car salesmen.
The size of the sample is important for two
reasons.	 Firstly, the sample needs to be big enough to
enable one to do some statistical calculations.	 This
reduces the possibility of regarding phenomena as general
attributes when they could be due to chance or a random
fluctuation of behaviour.
Secondly, the sample must be big enough so that
it can be considered representative of the entire
population.
Unfortunately the practicalities of research in
the field often prevents this, particularly in the motor
trade where the number of people employed at any one site
is small.	 For research to continue in this area the
limitations of small samples must be accepted. 	 It is
worth recalling that some of the most influential studies
have used small samples.
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The Hawthorne Studies (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1964)
used groups of five girls and Deci (1971) influenced the
paradigm with a laboratory experiment using a group of
12 and a field experiment with a total sample of 8.
It is, therefore, possible to generate some sound and
influential hypotheses using a small sample.
Statistics 
Both the design of the experiment and the size of
the sample make the selection of appropriate statistics
difficult.	 As Cook and Campbell (1976:232) comment
no adequate statistical test for non-equivalent groups
who pre-test performance varies, yet exists.	 However,
even if such a test did exist the size of the sample and
the unequal numbers make its application to this
experiment difficult.	 As a consequence non-parametric
statistics have been used, in the analysis.
The use of non-parametric tests needs no apology
as, although no assumptions are made the distribution of
the characteristic in the total population, the Wilcoxon,
Mann-Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis are about 95% as powerful
as the parametric equivalent, the t-test. (Klugh 1974:308).
In this analysis where a group is compared across
two time intervals the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed
Ranks Test has been used (Siegel, 1956:75). 	 Where
different groups are compared the Mann-Whitney u-test is
more appropriate (Siegel, 1956:116).
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Personality Measures 
All the personality measures used in Study 2 were
used however, in view of the importance of self-esteem it
was decided to include another measure for the experiment.
As the Lawler (1971) model also specifically includes a
measure of Locus of Control it was decided to measure
Locus of Control in this group of salesmen using the
standard measure (Rotter, 1966).
Ecological Validity 
This experiment has high ecological validity as it
manipulated the actual pay of real salesmen in their
usual work environment.
Research Problems 
Because it was considered that the sales franchise
and the culture of the manufacturer was an important
variable the original experimental research design included
six dealerships; one experimental and matched control group
for British Leyland, Fiat and Ford dealers. The intention
was to implement a revised payment system in one of each of
the franchises, to monitor sales performance for a year
after the implementation of the new payment system and to
compare performance with the previous twelve months as well
as with the performance of the control dealerships.
Such a research design would provide a large enough
sample of salesmen to give statistical credibility while
controlling or evaluating all the key environmental
variables. These were considered to be:
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a) Manufacturer Culture
b) Market Variations
c) Size of Dealership
d) Managerial Influence
An experiment using such a research design was
agreed and arranged with the assistance and co-operation
of three seperate retail motor groups.	 Unfortunately
a number of practical problems prevented the implementation
of such an ambitious project. 	 The Training Manager of
the BL franchise who was supporting this research, was
appointed Sales Development Manager.	 He subsequently
wrote a letter saying,
My principle concern with your study is that I do
not wish to be seen to make arbitory changes of any
sort until my initial period is completed.	 In
other words, I do not wish to be seen to te pusi\ig
an untried approach in the light of our current
performance across the group.
He therefore opted out of implementing an untried
payment scheme because it was experimental and because of
the current economic circumstances.
The Ford dealer, after the salesmen had been
interviewed in some depth and personality measures
obtained, asked for a report giving a critique of the
company's current pay system.	 This had been evaluated
in order to suggest the change, and presented, together
with a summary of the befiefits of the experimental system
so that he could obtain Board approval.
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Unfortunately, the Board would not approve any change in
the pay system as the dealerships were experiencing a
number of financial problems and the salesmen had joined
a Trade Union.	 This particular dealership closed down
six months later.
This only left two small Fiat dealerships from the
original research design.	 The group which owned these
dealerships was taken over by a financial group based in
London.	 The new Board of Directors, although qilite
sympathetic towards research, were involved in selling
dealerships and changing the management structure of the
group.
	
Unfortunately, there would be so many changes
effecting performance during the period of research that
it would be impossible to identify any experimental effects.
As six dealerships had proved too ambitious an
aim in this particular economic climate, it was decided
to re-structure the experiment using two Ford dealerships,
knowing that this would limit the generalisability of any
subsequent findings.	 It was intended that one dealership
be experimental and one the control dealership. 	 This
meant not being able to identify manufacturer influence
or evaluate the effect of dealer size as both dealers
were similar.
Ford as a franchise was chosen because Ford dealers
tend to be larger dealers than other franchise and employ
more salesmen.	 One of the problems with research in this
area is that dealers employ, on average, only two or
three salesmen so that even if one is able to obtain
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perfect performance data it is often impossible to obtain
a large enough sample of salesmen to calculate reliable
statistics.
The Managing Directors of the two Ford dealerships
agreed to co-operate.	 One of the dealerships employed
15 salesmen and the other 10. Both were trading in
similar Midland industrial towns so there was little
difference in market size or market environment.
Some time was spent in talking to Directors
interviewing salesmen, and obtaining personality
measurements.	 As part of the process, the Group
Managing Director was given a paper on the proposed new
incentive payment scheme.	 It was agreed the system
would be implemented in the experimental dealerships as
from the 1st January, 1982. 	 All this discussion at
Board level on the sales pay system appears to have
started a general review.	 The Personnel Manager
subsequently decided, after consultation with the Board,
to change the commission structure in all of their
dealerships as soon as was practical.	 He explained	 that
although it would, no doubt, be scientifically interesting
to monitor the effect of such a payment system they were
already fairly convinced that such a system would work
and, with a number of minor alterations which would make
it more practical from their point of view they intended
to implement a similar system in all the dealerships.
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In addition to altering the method of payment they
also decided to change the structure of the sales force
allowing more salesmen to sell both new and used cars
and to sell in sales groups of three.	 The effect was
to destroy any possibility of using this as a control
dealership, and to make any longitudinal comparisons
invalid.	 It would also make the cause of any performance
change impossible to identify. 	 It was possible to obtain
performance data on the salesmen to match the personality
data.	 This formed the basis for a small correlational
study between personality and performance which would test
the predictive validity of the battery of tests.
Early in 1982, the economic climate was such that
dealers were reluctant to co-operate with a pay
experiment.	 One Chief Executive approached commented,
I would very much like to co-operate with you but
unfortunately it will not be possible in the foreseeable
future because of a considerable number of
re-organisational changes we are implementing at this
time.
This was fairly typical of the response received
and to some extent understandable as the motor trade, in
the depth of an economic recession, was focusing all its
managerial attention on survival.
However, as detailed earlier, one major British
Leyland group agreed to co-operate with this experiment.
The general proposal was put to a group of ten General
Managers and several of them volunteered to participate
in the research; one as an experimental dealership in
which the pay system was to be altered, and the others as
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controls.	 The experimental period was reduced to six
months, this being the maximum period during which they
would agree not to make any managerial or sales personnel
changes in the experimental dealership. 	 It was agreed
that the experimental pay system would be implemented
from the 1st January, 1983 to run to the 31st June, 1983.
Personality measures were obtained on all the
research salesmen in all locations. 	 In December the
experimental salesmen were interviewed (individually)
and briefed as a group on the new payment system.	 They
were informed about the system under which they would be
paid as from the 1st January, 1983.	 Two days later the
main board decided to implement a structured sales system
throughout the entire group and suggested it would be
necessary to train all salesmen employed by the company
in this scheme starting in January. 	 If the experimental
salesmen were to be trained in this way, it would not be
possible to isolate the effect of the pay system.
Fortunately, it was possible to persuade management
not to implement the structured sales system in the
experimental dealerships or the control dealerships. 	 It
was also decided to include another dealership in the
field experiment in order to evaluate the effect of the
new structured sales system and to construct some form of
comparison between this and the effect of the payment
scheme.	 So out' of this particular problem came a better
experimental design.
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At this time, the group personnel officer also
launched a revised payment system for all group salesmen.
The researcher was assured that even though the scheme
had appeared only one month after he had submitted
details of his scheme to the management, and in spite of
the fact it was based on a matrix paying commission on
unit profit and units sold (a critical and rare concept
never used in the trade before) any similarities were
entirely coincidental.	 It proved possible to prevent
implementation of the new scheme in all research
dealerships.
Two other problems have become apparent during this
research which are endemic to field experiments.	 There
have been a number of natural changes in staff.
Salesmen appear to come and go between dealerships quite
regularly.	 This had reduced the opportunity of compare
before and after sales performance and reduced the size
of an already comparatively small sample of salesmen.
There have also been a number of management changes
within the group, the effect of which it is impossible
to quantify.	 In the 'structured sales' dealership the
General Manager left his job in March, 1983, and the
Sales Manager in February. 	 The Sales Manager was
replaced.
	
While it seems probably that the Sales Manager
has a marked effect on the sales team (Ryan	 and Weinberg,
1981), it would prove almost impossible to quantify.
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Such are the problems of field research, but it is
considered vitally necessary to attempt such research and
to try and establish the results of laboratory experiments
as having credibility in the 'real world'.
Research Morality 
One of the reasons for the concentration of
psychological research on laboratory experiments is the
difficulty in justifying, morally, the manipulation of
other peoples lives and the interference with an
organisation.
After all, this experiment has an effect on the
lives of all the salesmen concerned, particularly those
in the experimental dealership who had their method of
pay changed.
	
In order to overcome such problems it was
suggested by the management that the two schemes be run
in parallel but the experimental problems of identifying
causality prevented serious consideration of this option.
To get a clear result and ecological validity it is
necessary to actually manipulate someones pay system and
hence their income.
It is argued here that this manipulation was
justified for a number of reasons:
1. It is the only way of establishing ecological validity.
2. The current pay system within the dealership was in
a state of decay and would have been revised whether
or not the experiment were suggested.
- 241 -
3. The calculation of the various commission rates was
set deliberately high so that, given the same sales
performance as last year the salesmen would earn more
income.	 This was agreed anticipating an increase
in the market.
It is considered that this research in no way
breaches the Code of Conduct (BPS, 1983:242).
Specifically, the research was carried out,
In keeping with the highest standards of scientific
integrity and that the interests of participants are
safe-guarded.
The participants were the organisation and the
salesmen.	 Great care was taken to ensure that neither
was harmed by the experiment the condition of which were
intended (and expected) to benefit both.
Although it was not possible to ask the consent of
some of the participants to an alteration in their method
of pay (Clause 3), the organisation did consent and, the
interests of the salesmen were safe-guarded.
Furthermore,
... all reasonable steps (were taken) to ensure (the
subjects) adequately understood the nature of the
investigation or intervention and its anticipated
consequences.
Finally there was no breach of confidentiality, all
participants being anonymous and no information was given
to management about the personality or performance measures
of the salesmen.
It is argued that the experimenter and management
were concerned and took active measures to ensure that
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salesmen were not harmed in any way. 	 It could be a
critism of this experiment that salesmen involved were
not given any choice as to whether to choose the
experimental pay system or remain as they were.
Comments from the experimental salesmen (Appendix
C) and subsequent earnings show that salesmen preferred
the new system and earned substantially more income during
the experimental period than they had anticipated.
To summarize, it is apparent that there are
considerable problems in establishing a valid field
experiment which identifies and controls the variables
of interest.	 Nevertheless, it did prove possible to
establish an effective experimental design.	 Although
the experimental pay group is comparatively small, there
is a viable control group and the second control group
enables one to control for any Hawthorne effect.
CHAPTER 8 
STUDIES 1 AND 2 
Individual behaviour can be viewed as an interaction
between an environment and the personality or other
characteristics of an individual.
Chapter Two, for example, suggests that salesmen
form ideosyncratic perceptions of their customers which
, influence the sales approach, while Chapter Four, concludes
that there are a number of personality traits which appear
to be common to salesmen which, therefore, one assumes,
facilitate selling.	 In order to examine further these
characteristics and to seek a solution to the simple
question, 'What are Car Salesmen like?'and 'How do they
differ from people in other occupations?', a number of
of limited studies were undertaken.
1. An attitude study
2. A personality study
3. A personality and performance study
STUDY 1 
How Salesmen Construe People in the Work Environment
Introduction 
Chapter Two suggests that Car Salesmen are
particularly good at evaluating people and form accurate
stereotypes.	 Certainly the model proposed by Weitz (1981a,
1981b) suggests that impression formation is an important
aspect of the selling interaction while Cook (1979:119)
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states that,
An incorrect first assessment will lead to the wrong
move being made, and incorrect interpretation of the
effects of the first move will make things worse,
which all tends to imply that most people, profiting
from speedy recognition of their mistakes,will become
accurate judges of character and intention. 	 Somehow,
they mostly fail to do so; the most striking finding
to emerge from the extensive, jumbled literature on
'Accuracy of Person Perception', is how very
inaccurate most people are most of the time.
It could be that this ability to create accurate
first impressions is an important component of the sales
character.	 To examine this aspect of salesmen and to
establish whether there was any common system used to
categorise people in the working environment an exploratory
study was undertaken.
Method 
Using the Repertory Grid Technique (Fransella and
Bannister, 1977) a group of salesmen were interviewed.
The constructs elicited were then subjected to manual
classification.
Subjects 
The subjects were a group of ten car salesmen all
working for a Ford Main Dealer.	 The average age was 40.4
(S.D.9.5.) and they had been employed in this job for 57.5
months (S.D.25.5)
Procedure 
In accordance with Repertory Grid Procedures
(Fransella and Banni ster, 1977) each salesmen was asked
to identify and write on a card the name of certain
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specified elements. These were:-
1) A Sales Colleague you like
2) A Sales Colleague you dislike 	 Peers
3) The most successful salesman you know
4) The Sales Manager	 Authority
5) The Managing Director
6) A customer you like
7) A customer you dislike 	 Customers
8) A good customer
9) An interesting customer
10) A workshop mechanic
Other Departments
11) A service receptionist
The purpose in specifying particular elements was
to focus elicited constructs on the work environment and
explore as many aspects of this as possible.
The elements were then presented to each salesmen
in triads and the salesmen asked to suggest a way in
which one element differed from the other two. Each
salesman was presented with the same triads in a pre-
arranged sequence. These were:-
Presentation 1 1 2 3
Presentation 2 7 2 3
Presentation 3 4 1 2
Presentation 4 1- 4 7
Presentation 5 2 10 8
Presentation 6 3 7 6
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Presentation 7 2 8 11
Presentation 8 8 11 5
Presentation 9 3 6 11
Other triads were prepared but no salesman was
either prepared to, or able to, suggest additional
constructs after the ninth presentation and some did not
reach that far. Salesmen were asked to evaluate
constructs on a scale 1 to 7.
Results 
The constructs elicited for each salesman are shown
in Table 8:1. Attempts at classification by individual
presentation and a comparison of individuals did not
produce any consistent results, but a subjective manual
classification (see Table 8:2) suggests that the
fall into five general categories; friendliness, co-
operativeness, character, appearance and temperament.
TABLE 8:1 
CONSTRUCTS ELICITED FROM A GROUP OF CAR SALESMEN USING THE REPERTORY GRID
Salesman 1 
Reliable-Temperamental
Manual Worker-Non Manual
Has Authority-Colleague
Knowledge of Cars-No Knowledge
Amiable-Bad Tempered
Patient-Hasty
Patient-Hasty
Salesman 3 
Pushy-Not Pushy
Easily Upset-Placid
Even Tempered-Volatile
Self Opinionated-Open Minded
Gentlemanly-Coarse
Pleasant-Unpleasant
Smart-Untidy
Tactful-Tactless
Salesman 5
Likeable-Not Likeable
Honest-Dishonest
Methodical-Inconsistent
Enthusiastic-Not Enthusiastic
Salesman 7 
Easy To Get On With-Not Easy
Argumentative-Not
Extrovert-Introvert
Earns More Money-Does Not
Salesman 2 
Unreliable-Reliable
Off Hand-Amicable
Forcing-Weak
Happy Go Lucky-Miserable
Pleasant-Unpleasant
Helpful-Unhelpful
Hard Worker-Idler
Confident-Shy
Salesman 4
Placid-Aggressive
Sensible-Not Sensible
Logical-Illogical
Hostile-Friendly
Threatening-Not Threatening
Nice-Difficult
Scruffy-Smart
Fair Minded-Biased
Consistent-Inconsistent
Salesman 6 
Like-Dislike
Unwilling to Believe-Trusting
Speak Their Mind-Close
Enjoys Sport-Not Sport Minded
Successful-Unsuccessful
Hard Bargainer-Not Hard Bargainer
Amiable-Not Amiable
Salesman 8 
Nice-Nasty
Aggressive-Not Aggressive
Intelligent-Not Intelligent
Good Salesman-Not Good
Self Important-Equal
Smart-Untidy
Sports Minded-Not
Salesman  9	 Salesman 10
Friendly-Unsociable	 Co-Operative-Not
Unlikeable-Likeable	 Arrogant-Easy Going
Helpful-Unhelpful	 Sociable-Not
Awkward-Easy Going	 Smart-Sloppy
Arrogant-Not Arrogant 	 Strong Character-Unreliable
Easy To Deal With-Not 	 Self Confident-Easy Going
Slow-Quick
Mean-Generous
Self Opinionated-Not
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TABLE 8:2 
MANUAL CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTRUCTS ELICITED FROM A GROUP
OF CAR SALESMEN (n = 13)
Friendliness (attitude)
Friendly/unsociable/likeable/nasty/amiable/
pleasant/easy going/easy to get on with.
Co-Operativeness (behaviour)
Helpful/awkward/co-operative/argumentative/
reliable/easy to deal with/arrogant/aggressive/self-
important/pushy/self-opinionated.
Character 
Strength of character/self confident/successful/
hard bargainer/hard worker/sensible/logical.
Appearance 
Smart/scruffy/sloppy/untidy.
Temperament 
Generous/mean/extrovert/introvert/happy-go-lucky/
even tempered/honest/trusting/unwilling to believe.
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Discussion 
The objectives of this study are, and were,
intended to be limited. They were essentially to give
the researcher a feel for the world of the car salesman,
and to suggest areas which might repay further research.
Because of this it is difficult to draw firm
conclusions. Although all the salesmen working at the
dealership were interviewed the sample consists of ten
individuals who may, or may not, be typical of the
population of car salesmen.
Neither was the attempt to have the salesmen rank
the constructs successful as, having established a bi-
polar construct the salesmen appeared to have difficulty
in suggesting an evaluation along a continuum. The
customer or colleague was either likeable to not -
efforts to establish a consistent degree of the construct
were not successful, took considerable time and were
subsequently abandoned.
The attempt to focus attention on specific aspects
of the workplace either did not work or was not salient.
There appears to be no general category of construct to
evaluate a customer, (Presentations 4, 5 and 6) all
1
salesmens perceptions being phenomenological.
Consequently, these results, in view of the weakness
of the research design, the difficulty with the research
implement and the subjective nature of the classification
supply only a weak indication of the nature of the
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salesmens perception.
This indication does however, support the view that
salesmen do use some general format for categorising the
environment (including customer interaction) as indicated
in Table 8:2. As Cook (1977:99) suggestsI the mechanism
by which individuals perceive each other and form
impressions is an open question which, in view of its
importance in the sales interaction, would repay further
detailed, systematic research.
STUDY  2
The Personality Characteristics of Car Salesmen
Chapter 4 concludes that perhaps the particular
nature of the job of a car salesman calls for a certain
personality profile. To some extent the literature
supports that view, and a number of studies have reported
significant relationships between personality traits and
performance (Greenberg and Meyer, 1980; Williamson 1980)
or other sales behaviours 	 (Teas 1981; Saxe & Weitz 1982).
In order to investigate further how car salesmen
are different from other people in other occupations (if
indeed they are) a personality study was undertaken.
Method
Groups of people in different occupations were given
a battery of personality tests. These tests were the
Manifest Needs Questionnaire (Steers and Braunstein, 1976),
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which measures nAchievement, nAffiliation, nAutonomy and
nDominance, together with the Janis-Field Feelings of
Inadequacy Scale (Eagley, 1967),as a measure of social
self-esteem;and the Mach IV Scale (Christie and Geis,
1970) f as a measure of social manipulativeness (see
Chapter 5 for details of Research measures).
The subsequent scores were then subject to
statistical analysis.
Sample 
The participants were ninety-one car salesmen,
forty community nurses and forty-one finance company
branch managers.
The car salesmen all sold new cars for either Ford,
British Leyland or Volvo. 	 They had amean age of 27.6
years and had been employed in that particular job for
15.39 months.	 Although the selection of these salesmen
was not random, there was no bias other than that imposed
by selecting salesmen to attend a sales training
programme.	 Dealers are required by their contract to
send so many salesmen a year to a training course. As
they had been employed for some time it is assumed that
they reached the minimum level of performance to survive
in the job.	 No performance measures were available.
The nurses consisted of the entire population of
community nurses for one area.	 Nurses were selected as
a comparative group as they appear, subjectively, to provide
a natural contrast to car salesmen.
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They should be caring, and concerned, but not devious or
manipulative.	 The average age of the nurses, who were
all female, was 41.4 years and they had been employed
in that particular job for 66.5 months.
Finance company managers, on the other hand, form
a natural comparative group.	 The job is a selling job
and they sell to those in the motor trade.	 There is
some movement between the two occupations and at least one
of the group of Finance company managers has been a car
salesman.	 As they are salesmen onewould expect a great
similarity of personality traits although r as they are
managers perhaps they should have a higher nDominance
that the car salesmen. 	 The group had amean age of 40.5
years and had been employed in that particular job for
78.6 months.
Procedure 
With both the car salesmen (n = 91) and the finance
company managers the tests were completed under classroom
conditions at a training school.	 The car salesmen were
on training programmes at Ford, British Leyland or
Volvo.	 There was no significant difference between the
three groups.
The finance company managers were attending a
training programme on 'motivation'.	 These were three
batches representing different geographical locations.
The sample represents half of the population of this
particular company.
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The community nurses were handed the questionnaire
at one of their routine meetings. The purpose of the
research was explained and the questionnaire were returned
during the following 14 days.
Results
Table 8:3 sets out the scores for each occupational
group for the various traits.
nAchievement
As one might expect finance company managers and
salesmen have similar nAchievement score. Car salesmen
have a significantly higher score than nurses (t = 7.7,
df 129 p C 0.001 two tailed). However, as the reliability
of the nurses score is low (Cronbach alpha = 0.02) the
conclusion that salesmen have a higher nAchievement than
nurses is not justified. However, the low reliability
of the nursestcore could suggest that nAchievement is
just not a salient concept with nurses (although the
moderate levels of reliability in the other groups confirm
the evidence which suggests that nAchievement is a male
trait	 (Patty and Safford, 1977).
nAffiliationl
As predicted nurses have a significantly higher
nAffiliation than car salesmen (p(0.001. t = 4.93 df 129
two-tailed), however an interesting finding is that some
finance company managers have artiarly significantly higher
nAffiliation than car salesmen (nol-so5fiff0con1t = 1.39 df 131-
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This is, again an indication of the
competitive nature of the job of a car salesman compared
with the cooperative nature of the other two occupations.
A car salesman competes with his peers, the other two
groups co-operate.
n Dominance 
As one mightanticipate the branch managers have the
highest nDominance being significantly higher than car
salesmen (p<0.001 / t = 4.1 / df 130, two-tailed).
However, salesmen have a significantly higher nDominance
than nurses (1)(0.001, t = 3.64 1 df 129, two-tailed).
Self-Esteem
It is surprising to find that both salesmen and
branch managers have a significantly higher level of social
self-esteem than nurses (salesmen p<0.001 1 t = 6.88,df 129,
two-tailed).	 Perhaps this is an indication of the
salesmans higher than average self-esteem rather than the
nurses lack of confidence in a social situation.
Manipulativeness 
It would appear that car salesmen have a
significantly higher level of social manipulativeness than
nurses (p<0.05, t = 2.1 p df 129, two-tailed). 	 This one
would anticipate given the nature of the two occupations.
However, it is surprising to find that car salesmen have
a significantly higher level of social manipulativeness
than finance company managers (p<0.001 1 t = 6.74 9 df 130,
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two-tailed).	 Perhaps the nature of the finance company
managers product (money),with the ethos of having to be
beyond reproach to handle such a product is reflected in
this result or perhaps the car salesman has to be a little
more devious to survive.
	
It is worth stressing that
Christie and Geis (1970:193) regard a score of about 80 as
'normal' with 100 to 120 being considered high. 	 The
ethos of nursing would suggest that their score should be
low.
Discussion and Conclusions 
The results do suggest that there are differences
between the personality profile of car salesmen and other
groups.	 They appear to have a higher level of social
self-esteem and a higher level of social manipulativeness
than others.
Because of the problems of reliability of
measurement (see Chapter 6) conclusions drawn about the
level of needs as measured by the Steers and Braunstein
(1976) MNO need to be treated with some caution.	 However,
the moderate levels of reliability mean that the results
can be indicative. 	 So it would appear that car salesmen
are likely to have a higher nAchievement (as high as
managers and higher than nurses) with a low nAffiliation,
a high nAutonomy and a moderate level of nDominance.
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STUDY 2a
Personality and Performance
Given that car salesmen appear to have specific
personality which is different from that of nurses and
finance company managers, one needs to establish which,
if any, of these characteristics influence performance.
In order to obtain some indication a limited sample study
was undertaken.
Method and Sample 
Subjects were 13 car salesmen employed by a large
Ford dealership.	 The mean age was 40.4 and they had been
employed in this particular job for 57.5 months.	 They
were given a battery of personality tests which were the
Manifest Needs Questionnaire (Steers and Braunstein, 1976),
the Janis- Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale (Eagley,
1967) and the Mach IV Scale (Christie and Geis, 1970).
Results 
Table 8:4 sets out the correlation between
Performance (in terms of units sold during the previous
12 months) and personality traits.
TABLE 8:4
CORRELATION OF PERSONALITY TRAITS
WITH PERFORMANCE PEARSON CORRELATION
Age 40.4 (S.D.9.9) -	 0.31 Adg
Mach IV 77.1 (S.D.11.5) -	 0.42 Ai/S
Janis 146.5 (S.D.21.3) 0.45 p <0.1 NiS ,
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None of the needs measured by the MNQ were
significantly correlated with the measure of performance.
Discussion 
The results of this study are not conclusive.	 The
sample sizeis small and may or may not be representative.
The levels of significance of the correlations artf/01/-etc‘14-4WC
and the correlations themselves are, at best, moderate,
converting into a forecasting efficiency between 7% to
10% (Annett, 1974:64).
However, the results are an indication that both
social self-esteem and social manipulativeness are related
to performance, social manipulativeness negatively
suggesting that the more honest salesmen aelethe most
effective.
SUMMARY
Both Studies One and Three can be regarded as
inconclusive as, for a variety of reasons t the results are
not statically significant.	 However, as case studies
in an area which there is little knowledge and little
research they are "straws in the wind" and a guide to
further research in important areas.
Study Two however, clearly suggests that car
salesmen are different in their personality profile from
other occupations - in particular nurses and finance
company managers.	 The differences are those you would
expect, given a knowledge of the job of a car salesman
and can serve to guide the selection of salesmen.
CHAPTER 9 
THE EXPERIMENT
Introduction
It has been established from the review of the
literature that there is more than enough evidence to
suggest that money can modify the behaviour of, if not
everybody, some people.
	
It also seems probable that
whether or not money influences behaviour depends on the
nature of the task (Kruglanski et al 1975) and the
individual personality; those with certain personality
traits (Needs for Achievement, Machievellianism, High
Self-Esteem and Internal Locus of Control) being
particularly strongly influenced by pay provided that the
expectation that pay will follow performance is strong.
In order to establish whether pay can influence behaviour
of salesmen a field quasi-experiment (Campbell and Stanley,
1963) was carried out, manipulating the pay of car
salesmen.	 It was designed to establish:-
a. Whether, by allowing a salesman the opportunity to
increase his pay provided his performance improves,
his performance will improve.
b. Whether the personality variables mediate the
influence of pay on performance.
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Method
Subjects 
Subjects were 28 car salesmen employed by two motor
companies.	 They were located in seven dealerships in
different towns in the Midlands. 	 The largest dealership
employed eight salesmen and the smallest three. 	 All
would be regarded, by motor trade standards, as large
dealerships.	 They all sold a range of Austin-Rover
products and had the opportunity to sell used cars.	 It
proved impossible to obtain complete data for the entire
sample.	 Three salesmen in one dealership refused to
complete the demographic data forms and personality traits.
Other salesmen had not been employed long enough for
comparative data to be available, some salesmen left the
company and in some cases, particularly in the Training
dealership, the organisations records were incomplete.
It has been found necessary, therefore to use measures from
different sub-groups of the total sample.	 These have
been indentified where appropriate.
The average age (n=22) was 37.4 years (SD 9.8), and
the average tenure was 81 months (SD 89.7).
	 They were
moderately well educated, 13% having 'A' level GCE, 46%
having '0' level GCE and 15% had completed a technical
apprenticeship in the motor trade.	 82% of the subjects
were married and 91% were house owners.
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Research Instruments 
(See Chapter 6).	 The battery of personality tests
consisted of a demographic information form (which also
contained five questions on the subjects attitude to pay),
the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Robinson and Shaver,
1973:81), a Locus of Control Scale ( Rotter, 1966), a
Feelings of Inadequacy Scale (Eagley, 1967), a measure of
Need for Achievement, Need for Dominance, Need for
Autonomy and Need for Affiliation (Steers and Braunstein,
1976) and a measure of Social Manipulativeness (Christie
and Geis, 1970).
The tests took about half an hour to complete (See
Appendix E).
Performance Measures 
Those selected were the number of units sold (the
definitive and generally accepted measure of a car
salesmans performance) and the profit per unit sold, a
measure not normally available in dealerships but which
is a measure of dealership income.	 Details of salesmens
income were obtained from company records.
Because of the small size of the sample and the
nature of the experiment non-parametric statistics have
been used where necessary.	 The personality data has been
correlated using the Pearson Product Moment Correlation
on the SPSS programme.
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Procedure 
Subjects were allocated, 'non randomly, in a
quasi-experimental design (Cook and Campbell, 1976).
The conditions were an Experimental Pay Condition, a
training condition, a company control condition and a
market control condition giving the following design,
(See Chapter 6):
Observation	 Experiment
	 Observation
Observation	 Training	 Observation
Observation	 Observation (Company)
Observation	 Observation (Market)
The principle contaminating variables were the
internal environment and the external environment. 	 By
having a control group of salesmen (n = 15) all of whom
were employed by the same company as the experimental
group, worked under the same management, 	 were paid from
the same central group accounts and were paid according
to the group system, most internal factors were controlled.
However, salesmen in the company control were located in
several different geographical locations, some 15 to 20
miles from the experimental dealership.	 It was, therefore,
decided to include salesmen employed by a local dealership
competing with the same products in the same market as a
local external environment control (n = 11).
Both controls were Austin-Rover dealers of about
the same size, but the market control salesmen were paid
under a different incentive payment system.
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The market control salesmen received no basic pay but
only commission of 11% of the Retained Gross Profit on
new cars and 13% of the Retained Gross Profit on Used
Cars.	 Retained Gross Profit was calculated in a similar
manner to the experimental dealership except that a
house-charge of £75.00 was levied before commission was
calculated.
All other salesmen were on the same company sales
payment scheme, receiving a basic pay of between £3,000
to £3,500 and 10% of the Retained Gross Profit.
Experimental Group (Pay) 
In the experimental pay group, the method of
paying salesmen was changed from the 1st January, 1983,
for a period of six months.
	
Senior management, undertook
not to interfere with or to alter the system once it had
been implemented and not
	
make any staff changes during
the experimental period.
The suggested method of payment was discussed
beforehand in great detail with the General Manager and
Sales Manager of the dealership.
In the interest of making the scheme acceptable
to the salesmen and to avoid confusing the experiment by
too many variables it was decided to keep the existing
basic pay structure.	 However, instead of being paid 10%
of Retained Gross Profit salesmen would, during the
experimental period, be paid the percentage of Retained
Gross Profit shown on the sliding scale matrix which
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rewarded both units sold and profit per unit (Chapter 5).
The critical point of the matrix was established
(or the matrix calibrated) by agreeing with the General
Manager and Sales Manager an acceptable performance
standard of 11 - 12 cars per month per salesman and a
profit of £151 - £200 per unit. 	 This figure was agreed
by them after referring to their company budgets for the
next 12 months and by utilizing their professional
judgement that this was an acceptable average sales
performance for salesmen in their particular dealership.
The matrix was calibrated to pay 10% for this acceptable
standard, reduced amounts for below standard and
substantially higher amounts for above standard performance.
Test calculations on the subsequent matrix, using the
previous years performance, showed that given the same
level of performance in 1983, salesmen would earn more
under the revised system.
	
Other decisions made regarding
the method of implementing the new pay systems were:
1. Salesman's pay would be calculated on sequentially
numbered order forms but 	 would be paid on
delivery of the vehicle.
2. If a deal fell through, all subsequent deals would be
re-calculated.
3. There would be no minimum commission.
4. There would be no special deals during the experimental
period.
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5. MCP* cars would be included in normal commission
calculations.
At a meeting in December with the General Manager
and the Sales Manager present, the salesmen were informed
by the experimenter;
As from the 1st January the method of calculating your
commission will be changed.
	 The purpose is to
present you with the opportunity of earning more money
by selling more vehicles at an additional profit.
This dealership has been chosen as a pilot operation
so that this scheme will be in operation here for six
months only from the 1st January, 1983, to the 31st
June, 1983, when it will be withdrawn.	 During this
period, instead of being paid 10% of the Retained
Gross Profit, you will be paid on a sliding scale.
The percentage commission will increase depending
on the number of units you sell in a month and on
the Retained Gross Profit you make on each unit.
(At this point the salesmen were given the sales
commission matrix).
As the percentage depends on the sequence of sales,
it is important that when you have concluded a deal
it is signed up on the numbered order form and handed
to your Sales Manager immediately.	 You will be paid,
as you are now, on the 1st month end after the
delivery of the car, but commission will be calculated
on the order form. 	 If a car is not delivered or the
order subsequently cancelled the commission on all
subsequent deals will be recalculated.	 There will
be no minimum commission and no special commission on
deals.	 Instead where the sales manager decides he
wishes to a deal for little or no profit he will
write a notional profit into the deal for the purpose
of calculating commission.
The sales manager subsequently donfirmed that
there were no problems in the administration of the scheme
(see Appendix B), and subsequent conversations with the
experimental salesmen confirmed that their expectations
MCP cars are 'Management Car Plan' vehicles. 	 Being
close to several British Leyland factories this dealer
sells cars to the employees of BL under a special
management plan.
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regarding the probability of earning more money were high
(see Appendix C).
Experimental Group (Training) 
As the company had decided on a sales retraining
programme in many of its dealership it was decided to
evaluate the effect of this training on sales performance
of the salesmen in one dealership (n = 3).
	 By
incorporating this evaluation into the research design
the results could act as a control for the pay experiment
and assist in its evaluation.	 The system of training
selected was the 'Pendle' system (see Appendix A), which
trained salesmen in the techniques of selling and
suggested a method of structured selling in the
dealership.
Implementation, which was the responsibility of
the Group Training Manager, consisted of deciding on a
start date and then sending the salesmen on the three day
training session.	 Local management were responsible for
any further implementation necessary.	 In this group the
start date agreed was the 1st March, 1983.	 A 'Controller'
was appointed and the salesmen sent on the training
session during February.
Personality and demographic data was obtained from
almost all of the company salesmen but was not available
from the market control salesmen. 	 All salesmen were
interviewed, those in the experimental condition at the
beginning of the experiment, and at the end.	 A transcript
of conversation with subjects in the experimental pay
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group is presented in Appendix C.
Performance measures for the period 1st January,
1982 to 30th June, 1982 were obtained from each dealership.
Similar information was collected for the period 1st
January, 1983 to 31st December, 1983 was obtained from
the pay experimental dealership.
Results 
According to managements own measures of
organisational performance (Table 9:1) the experimental
pay group exceeded managerial expectations (the Budget)
during the experiment by 28.2% in the sale of new cars
and 9.2% in used cars.	 Neither of the other dealerships
performed as well. 	 (Variance, in this sense, is an
accountancy term meaning variation from dget forecasJO.
They were a little concerned that the 28.2% increase in
sales had only increased profit by 8.3% but attributed
this to discounting trends in the market and increased
costs.	 Does a more detailed analysis enable us to
ascertain if salesmen will improve performance for pay?
Units Sold 
Full details of the performance of all groups
including units sold, income and profit per unit 	 during
the experimental period and before are shown in Appendix
D.	 Table 9:2 shows the mean monthly units sold for each
salesman in the various conditions, and any increase or
decrease.
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It can be seen that the experimental pay group increased
its performance by 6.0 units, the difference being no/-
significant	 while the company control and
the training groups showed non significant changes.	 The
market control increased performance by 3.5 units
(significant at p( 0.01) suggesting an underlying market
influence.	 Assuming this to be so the experimental group
still show an improvement of 2.5 units above the market
control group, although much of this result is the effect
of a major'increase in units sold by salesman No. 2.
Without his results the total increase of the experimental
group would average 2.6 units per salesman.
However, it is worth noting that the average of
units sold by the experimental group, in the six months
prior to experimental manipulation, of 20.2 units per month
per salesman is much higher than any other group; the
market control being 12.2 units per salesman per month.
Consequently the effort to increase on an already very high
performance must have been greater than that made by more
average groups.
It could be argued that the results are dependent
on the efforts of one salesman.	 However, there is no
reason to suppose that his performance was not influenced
by the payment system. 	 On the contrary as details of his
previous performance are accurate and his explanation of
his performance (see Appendix C, Salesmen 2) is that the
commission structure, '... did give us a little bit extra
go to sell more units - to rush a few more units in.'
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it seems he was influenced by the system.
	 It is also
apparent'that salesman 2, who had just moved his home, had
a particular need for additional income at this time.
It would be illogical to exclude as deviant the results of
this salesman because he is more influenced by the pay
system than the others.
It could also be argued that the results of the
three other salesmen were unduly reduced by the response
of management to the substantial commission figures being
paid.	 As Table 9:3 shows commission payments increased
gradually until March and then reduce.
TABLE 9:3 
COMMISSION PAYMENTS TO EXPERIMENTAL SALESMEN Cs 
1982 1983 Increase
January
_
499 638 + 139
February 531 612 +	 81
March 616 1921 +1305
April 834 1121 + 287
May 474 985 + 511
June 519 517 +	 2
(Figures are mean pounds per salesman per month)
After the substantial increase in earnings during
March (as a consequence of an increase in sales) the Sales
Manager wished to withdraw the scheme as he says (Appendix
B) I can't believe that a bloke worked any harder if
he had only earned two hundred peUn g15,..„, rather than
four hundred.	 He regarded the earnings as	 quite
horrenduous, ... quite disproportionate.'
- 276 -
After some discussion with the experimenter senior
management decided to keep the scheme in for the remaining
two months of the experimental period.
	
The salesmen were
well aware of these discussions and their performance and
income subsequently decreased.
To summarize, although there was a significant
increase in the units sold per salesmen in the experimental
group it is not possible to ascribe all of the increase
to the effect of pay.	 As the market control also increased
performance by 3.5 units per salesmen per month some of
the increase must be ascribed to market factors. 	 However,
it does appear that some increase was the consequence of
the system even if	 mainly affected salesman no. 2.
It seems probable that any lack of increase by other
salesmen could be a ceiling effect (they already sold more
than other groups) or caused by the actions of the Sales
Manager in wishing to withdraw the scheme during the
experimental period.
Profit Per Unit 
It is interesting that although the number of units
sold increased the profit per unit decreased in the
experimental pay unit while it increased in the company
control.	 Unfortunately, comparative figures for the
market control are not available, however the overall profit
per unit in the market control dealership did increase
according to reports by senior management.	 The differences
#L.
between the Control and Experimental Groups are riol'quir4L.
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significant (Mann Whitney ti-test, p40.10). Detailed
analysis is available in Appendix D, but Table 9:4 shows
a decrease of £74.00 per unit in the experimental group
and an increase of £16.00 in the control.
Such an effect supports conclusions reached in the
research of Dalrymple et al (1981) and Stephenson et al
(1979) who discovered that salesmen in a gross margin
commission plan, particularly salesmen who price bargain
will not optimise company profits. It would appear that
salesmen regard the route to increased income as increased
unit sales rather than an increase in gross margin. As
Table 9:5 demonstrates the correlation between income and
units sold was 0.95 (p( 0.001) in 1983 and 0.82 (p< 0.001)
in 1982 while the relationship between income and profit is
uncertain being -0.46 (p<0.05) in 1983, (probably as a
result of the reduced margins to make a sale) and 0.62
(p < 0.01) in 1982.
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TABLE 9:5 
CORRELATION OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES (n = 14) 
PROFIT/UNIT	 INCOME
1983
1982
Units sold
Profit per Unit
- 60
(p 4. 0.1)
4/S ,
0.95(p 4 0.001)
-0.46
(p c 0.05)
Units sold	 N/S	 0.82
(p < 0.001)
Profit per Unit	 0.62
(p < 0.01)
This decision by salesmen to pursue the number of
units sold to enhance income is quite a rational one,
which also points to a weakness in calibrating the matrix
which was designed to increase the salesmans awareness of
the link between profit and income.	 Obviously the link
during 1983 was not a strong one.
Income 
However, in spite of a reduction in profit per unit
the income of the experimental unit was substantially
greater than in the same period in 1982 and showed a
greater increase than both control groups.	 Detailed
analysis is available in the Appendix D, but Table 9:6
shows that while the mean earnings in the experimental
group increased by £387 per month (significant p 0.05)
earnings in the company control increased by only £36.00
(not significant) and the earnings of the market control
group increased by £92.00 (significant p< 0.01).
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As the link between income and profit does not seem
to be strong in the salesmans perception it seemed possible
that the salesman had an amount per car sold which he uses
as a reference point.
Consequently, the salesmans income per vehicle was
analysed. As Table 9:7 shows, although the income per
vehicle increased in the experimental group (excluding
salesman 2) as opposed to a decrease in the other groups
a Kruskal-Wallis One Way Anova showed the results to be
non significant. Neither does there appear to be a pattern
to the figures although it is possible that the high figure
of £25.1 per unit in the Experimental Group in March was
the figure subsequently adjusted in the minds of the
salesman following the Sales Managers protests. Additional
evidence that this might be the case is suggested by the
figures for the six months immediately after the
experiment (when the salesmen reverted to the old group
system of pay). The profit per unit increased from the
£189.75 per unit during the experimental period to £287.95
per unit, an increase of £98.20. One can only speculate
that, as it was no longer possible to enhance income quite
so easily with volume, the profit per unit had to increase
so the salesman could maintain his income.
As far as the training condition is concerned, as
Table 9:2 shows, there was a slight decrease in the mean
units sold per salesman in spite of an increase in the
market.
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This was not significant.	 The Sales Manager left the
company and, as recommended by the system, additional
salesmen were employed.
	 Only data on the number of units
sold was available; there appears to have been no
subsequent increase in sales or profitability.
To summarise, it would appear, as Table 9:8 showsi
that in the experimental pay group the number of units
sold increased, the profit per unit decreased and the
salesmans income was substantially enhanced.
However, it is not possible to ascribe causality
for any increase in the units sold to the pay system
because a market effect is demonstrated in the market
control group and the magnitude of the increase is caused
by one particular	 salesman.	 However, this particular
salesman seems to have been particularly influenced by the
pay system, and the performance of the others inhibited by
a ceiling effect (they were already selling much more than
average) and the reaction of the Sales manager to the
increased income of the salesmen.
Personality 
Table 9.9 shows the age and personality
characteristics of each salesman in the experimental pay
group together with mean scores (and standard deviations)
for all salesmen in the company and the mean scores (and
standard deviation) for the survey reported in Chapter 7,
Some of the scores need to be interpreted with caution for
reasons explained in Chapter 7 but they do present some
indication of the personality factors influencing performance.
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For example, it is interesting to note that
Salesman No. 2, who accounts for so much of the variation
in units sold that it distorts the experimental results,
has very high levels of Social Self-Esteem (over one
standard deviation higher than his colleagues in the
company and the survey sample). 	 He also has very high
levels of general self-esteem (one standard deviation
higher than the control) and a strong internal locus of
control (one standard deviation lower than the control).
He appears to have about average social manipulativeness
for a car salesman and two of his experimental companions
are higher.	 Are these the factors which account for his
remarkable performance?	 It was indicated in Chapter 7
(Table 7:3) that Social Self-Esteem and Social _
Manipulativeness are related to car sales performance.
As Table 9:10 indicates, the same seems to be the case
with this group.	 It is unfortunate that performance
measures were not available for the entire sample,
nevertheless with this sample (n = 14) it appears that
successful performance in 1983 is negatively related to
age (-0.38), positively related to both social and general
self-esteem, and related to internal locus of control.
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TABLE 9:10 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERFORMANCE AND PERSONALITY MEASURES 
(1983) (n = 14)
Performance Age Social General Social Locus of
S/E S/E Manipulative .	 Control
UNITS -0.38k* 0.4P* 0.62* -	 0.38**
PROFIT -0.39'th -0.41**
INCOME -0.38** 0.63* -	 0.47**
* Nor-	 (p ( 0.10)
** Significant at p	 0.05
Possibly because of the size of the sample Locus of
Control and Social Self-Esteem are not related to successful
performance if one takes the 1982 performance measures.
However performance in 1982 is negatively related to Need
for Affiliation and positively related to Need for Autonomy
(see Table 9:11).
TABLE 9:11
Correlations  between Performance and Personality Measures 
Performance General
Self-Esteem
Need for
Affiliation
Need for
Autonomy
UNITS
PROFIT
INCOME
0.64*
0.48**
-	 0.37**
-	 0.50**
-	 0.45**
0.63*
0.56**
* -r40 1- 515fri• gitemi-63 4 0.10)
** Significant at p < 0.05
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It is not possible to conclude from these results
that particular personality traits mediate successful sales
performance.	 However, three samples show a correlation
between self-esteem and successful sales performance, two
samples find that successful sales performance is
negatively related to social manipulativeness, and one
suggests that internal locus of control, a high Need for
Autonomy and a low Need for Affiliation mediate effective
sales performance.	 One can also wonder whether it is
because he has high self-esteem, strong internal locus of
control and only a moderate amount of social
manipulativeness that salesman no. 2 is the most successful
as he does not have a high Need for Autonomy and a low Need
for Affiliation.
Two samples also suggest that successful performance
is negatively related to age. 	 It seems likely that this
effect is mediated by the personality variables as a
correlation, again with comparatively small samples, suggests
that those characteristics which should effect sales
performance, particularly self-esteem reduce with age.
TABLE 9.12
CORRELATION BETWEEN AGE AND PERSONALITY TRAITS 
(Two Groups of Car Salesmen)
Age
Need for
Achievement Social General
Need for
Affiliation
Need -far
Dominance
n = 14
n = 22 - 0.50 **
-0.34
_
-	 0.35 +	 0.31
+	 0.38
,
-	 0.36
- 0.52"'
figures 0,011--ff,514,,,,g‘fr
*4 Sfilll fil(4111. p 4 0 VC
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However, it should be stressed that although this
research suggests that self-esteem is related to
performance NO evidence has appeared to suggest and
confirm literature findings that Need for Achievement
and Need for Dominance influence sales performance.
Conclusions 
It is clear that some of the findings of this
research must be treated with some caution. The size of
the sample makes generalising from the sample suspect and
the moderate reliability of some of the personality
measures would suggest caution in interpretation.
Nevertheless there are some indications that
salesmen do improve their performance in response to a
financial incentive (bear in mind that the controls were
also being paid on a commission scheme), and this research
suggests that they will reduce the profitability to the
dealer in order to enhance their own income. It is not
clear whether they have a specific amount per car that
they hope to earn and this could be an area for further
investigation.
It is also clear that there is a particular type
of 'car-salesman' personality (high self esteem and
internal locus of control), and that it is possible that
this is related to performance.
CHAPTER 10
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This research has attempted to resolve the apparent
anomday between the belief by proponents of the Human
Relations movement that individuals generally are motiv-
ated to improve work performance through such measures as
autonomous work groups, job enrichment and job enlargement
and the more traditional managerial attitude prevalent in
the motor trade that people work for money; so by offering
them the opportunity to earn more pay you can improve
performance. It addressed the basic questions:-
1. Does linking pay to performance and giving indivi-
duals the opportunity to optimise pay lead to
improved performance?
2. Is this true of the entire population?
3. Are personality traits a factor in whether people are
motivated by pay?
4. Does context influence work behaviour in relation to
pay?
This was a broad topic so, for a variety of reasons
this research has concerned itself with car salesmen.
Apart from the fact that performance measures are compara-
tively easy to identify for salesmen, car salesmen are
particularly interesting subjects amongst whom to study
motivation, as the garage environment, the management, the
motor trade experiential ethos, the culture, the pay
system and their unsavourary reputation would suggest that
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they should be a bunch of ineffectual 'con-men'. However,
those in this study are a group of normal young men
struggling for survival inthe face of a number of diffi-
culties and, on the whole, enjoying it. The environment
of the car salesmanhas variety,. the job has autonomy and
the feedback, so the job is, according to Hackman and
Oldham (1976) an enriched job. The opportunities for
increased motivation should bequite limited (Becherer et al
1982), and money, according to the theories of Deci (1971),
should not enhance motivation inthese circumstances.
However, a review of the literature on the role of
pay in motivation suggests that there is little support
for the view, put forward by proponents of the Human
Relations movement, that pay is not a primary force in
motivation. Others have been severely critical of the
Hawthorne studies. For example, Bramel and Friend (1981),
criticise the studies finding incorrect interpretation of
data which suggests a management, anti-marxist bias. From
the perspective of the pay conclusions, one can hardly
avoid saying that they were just plain wrong. Subsequent
attempts by proponents of the view to establish that money
was not a primary motivator have not been successful.
Maslow's (1943) theories, although widely popular in
management circles, have received no empirical support.
Neither have the derivatives (Alderfer 1969). Attempts
to suggest that money actually decreased motivation for
an interesting job (Deci 1971) have been so heavily
qualified by
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quent research (Kruglanski et al 1975a, Kruglanski et al
1975b, Farr 1976) as to provide evidence of little
except a meaningless phontmena; while Herzberg's et al
(1967) theory has proved to be, probably, an artefact of
its particular methodology.
However, research designed to test the simple
proposition, 'Does money influence productive behaviour?'
has received general support. Strong evidence for this
view is provided by the field experimental studies
(Burnett 1925, Wyatt et al 1934, Pritchard et al 1976,
Latham et al 1978, Luthans et al 1981) and while research
with a theoretical foundation (Adams 1963, Locke 1968,
Pritchard 1973) may not establish that the concepts of the
theory influence performance in the predicted way, the
results support the view that when money is linked to
performance, performance is usually enhanced. It seems to
depend, as Bowey et al (1982) suggests on the contingencies.
It is also fairly clear that salesmen have a
certain type of personality which would indicate that they
would respond well to financial incentives (see Table 4:1).
Popular lay opinion (Tosdal 1953, Smythe 1968) certainly
believe this and what academic research there is in the
area tends to support this view (Darmon 1974, Oliver 1977,
Darmon 1982), although they may not optimise profit for
their employer (Farley 1964, Dalrymple et al 1981).
This research has established that it is possible
to identify in car salesmen those characteristics which,
both make them successful salesmen and whichwould suggest
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they respond to financial .incentives. It would be
difficult to argue, from the evidence presented (Chapter
W that self-esteem and social manipulativeness are not
key factors in the performance of salesmen; and while the
evidence about nAchievement, nAutonomy, nDominance and
nAffiliation must be treated with some caution because of
the moderate reliability of the measure, the evidence
should not be ignored because, as Francella and Bannister
(1977:82) suggest, 'psychologists worship reliability.'
It is also recognised that the experiment reported
(Chapter 9) has its limitations, yet two findings support
the view that some people may be highly motivated by
money. Firstly, the units sold in the experimental group
increased significantly, although these results are
dependent on the performance of one salesman. However,
the simple fact that one salesman was motivated would
suggest that salesmen with his personality profile can
be influenced by money. The small size of the sample
makes generalising away from this specific environment
difficult.
Secondly, the reduction of the profit per unit by
the experimental group in an effort to increase unit sales
is an interesting phenomena reported elsewhere (Stephenson
et al 1979, Dalrymple et al 1981).
It suggests that salesmen make rational, if not
conscious, choices in the sales situation and pointed to
the need for a payment system which rewards all the
criteria for performance, not only unit sales. Such a
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system is presented in this research although the results
suggest that the link between profit and income was not
strong enough in the experimental situation.
Practical Implications 
This research has established, or at least
provided an indication, that a theory based payment
system can influence performance in car salesmen, and that
a system is needed which links profit to income more
directly. Such a system has been presented here, and will
be published by the motor trade publishers R Sewell and Co
some time in 1985. Other garages have shown an interest
in such a scheme, and it is possible that this will become
the basis of many systems in the motor trade.
The personality research has provided evidence that
a car salesman personality profile can exist, and a sales
aptitude test has been devised by the author which
measures self-esteem, Locus of Control, nAchievement and
Social Manipulation using 32 questions. The test may be
published by the Test Agency some time in 1985 but the
author would like to see more tests on salesmen, as
recent predictive validity as measured by correlating the
scale to past performance, for each scale has been
comparatively low.
General 
Clearly this research has not definitively answered
the questions it set out to do, neither has it definitely
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resolved the dispute between the Human Relations movement
and 'others; however, publications on pay systems in the
motor trade and the Sales Aptitude Test have, at least,
moved psychological theory - probably for the first time,
into the motor trade while other papers on the Hawthorne
Studies and Intrinsic Motivation may help change the
climate a little.
Research in this area has been inhibited by the
ethos of the Human Relations movement together with the
practical problems (and ethical problems) of manipulating
pay in a natural situation. If these problems are to be
overcome more research of this nature is needed.
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THE PENDLE SYSTEM OF STRUCTURED SELLING
APPENDIX A
THE PENDLE SYSTEM
This system is based on the premise that a sales-
man can be programmed, 'like a computer' (Maltz, 1960:5)
to follow precise behavioural patterns and on the
assumption that the behavioural patterns will then result
in compliance by the prospective customer with the
salesman's purpose, which is to sell a car. The system
consists of three components:
1. the sales process
2. the training
3. anxillarv systems
The Sales Process 
Under the system the process is separated into
seven stages. These consist of:
1. greeting the customer
2. qualifying the customer
3. selecting the car for him to buy
4. demonstrating the car
5. negotiating the sale
6. asking the customer to buy
7. finalising the sale
These seven steps have been categorised by the
deviser of the system into high skill and low skill
elements. He defines selecting the car, negotiating and
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finalising the sale as high skill; while greeting the
customer, qualifying the customer, demonstration and
asking him to buy are low skill elements.
The purpose behind separating the process into two
parts, is so that the high skill elements can be handled
by one individual, 'the controller' and the low skill
elements by another person, 'the salesman'. A controller
controls and directs the activities of four or five
salesmen, conse quently his abilities and time are not
wasted on low skill activities. Under the system the
sales process is precisely prescribed and the seven stages
broken down into 39 sequential elements.
The purpose of the sales system is to prevent the
salesman from prejudging sales probability. He should
attempt to sell, utilizing the routine, to every prospect
and so increase the conversion rate of customers seen and
sold to, from the current trade average of 25-30%, to a
more profitable 50-80%.
The structured sales process is described, by the
systems creator, as being founded on a model of human
behaviour which assumes that the customer is apprehensive,
wary and guarded and that the salesman, having been
conditioned to respond to the stimulus of a customer by
being friendly, helpful, knowledgable and trustworthy,
then follows a series of precise behavioural patterns.
The subsequent interaction should result in a new pleasant
experience for the customer, which under the system is
described as trauma, (not to be confused with the
- 303 -
Freudian definition) this being the emotional and logical
situation in which the customer is prepared to commit
himself to buy a car.
The Training 
The training of both salesman and controllers takes
three days and is founded on the behavioural model of
stimulus and response (Skinner, 1976). More precisely it
is based on the assumption that it is possible to
programme individuals in the same way as you can programme
a computer (Maltz, 1960:5), to follow an exact behavioural
pattern which when successful will reinforce itself.
In this case the behavioural pattern is the sales
process which consists of 39 seauential behavioural
elements. These assumptions are based on ideas contained
within a book by, Dr Maxwell Maltz, MD FICS, called,
'Psycho-Cybernetics' (1960).
Maxwell Maltz is a Californian surgeon who is
experienced in performing cosmetic surgery on peoples
faces. He describes his role as turning ugly people into
beautiful people. He also describes himself as unorthodox
He states that self image is the key to human personality.
Consequently, if you change self image you can change
personality and behaviour.
His ideas are based on observations of his patients.
He discovered that comparatively minor cosmetic improve-
ments to face radically altered behaviour. He sub-
sequently appears to have read into the psychology of the
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sixties and come to the conclusion,
that there was irrefutable evidence of success type
personalities and failure type personalities and that
it took twenty-one days to change. (Maltz, 1960:23)
There is little evidence for this assertion quoted
in the book, although research into consistancy theory
(Lecky, 1945, Korman, 1977) and self-esteem (Tharenou,
1979, Snyder and Williams, 1982) suggests that the self-
concept, either chronic or situational, does have a
profound influence on behaviour. Such research also
suggests that it is difficult to change an individuals
self-concept radically, quite so quickly, even by extended
psychotherapeutic methods such as psycho-analysis, group
therapy, T groups and so on (Rachlin, 1976:152).
The book claims to create, 'a synthesis of proven
psychological and physiological processes called Psycho-
Cybernetics' (Maltz, 1960:4). The three prime constructs
behind the idea of psycho-cybernetics appear to be:
1. consistency theory
2. programming people like computers
(extreme behaviourism)
3. De-hypnotizing yourself away from false
beliefs
Consistancy theory suggests the needs of indivi-
duals to pursue behaviour consistant with their beliefs,
but Maltz (1960) reinterprets these principals to suggest
that individuals rationally and cognitively evaluate their
own strengths, weaknesses and beliefs. Maltz (1960:17)
also states, 'psycho-cybernetics does not say that man is a
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machine, rather it says that man has a machine (a brain)
which he uses.' He goes on to draw parallels with
classical conditioning and to suggest that success
response behaviour can be programmed into the individual
and will be evoked by an appropriate stimulus. The
process of conditioning appears to be a complex inter-
action between imagination and the individual self-concept
which Maltz (1960) labels 'de-hypnotization'.
The Ancillary Systems 
In addition to the sales process and the training
of salesmen, the Pendle System calls for a number of what
are specified to be logically consistant ancillary
systems. Essentially these consist of:
Payment System. Salesmen are paid a fixed sum per
delivered vehicle. The sum increases retrospectively as
the profit per month increases. Controllers are paid on
an escalating percentage of the target gross profit. The
total being divided between all controllers.
Environmental Controls. The layout and specifica-
tion of the showroom is detailed. No vehicles are to be
displayed in the showroom and the resources available to
the salesman and controllers, the number of salesmen and
where their desks are placed are totally defined.
Job Description and Man Specification. Here the
system specifically describes that salesmen should be
inexperienced, over 25, and be ambitious. The job
description specifies his responsibilities for the
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appropriate sections of the sales process.
A Computer Based Customer Follow-Up System Conclusion and
Critique 
It is difficult to see how such a system can work
effectively. Although it is stated that the system is
based on psychological principals, this is not strictly
accurate. The psychological principals behind the
training process are confused, out of date, and lack
credibility in modern psychology. Certainly, if the idea
of psycho-cybernetics had any credibility in 1960 when it
was first propounded, it is unlikely to have any
credibility now. The only aspect of this part of the
process, which appears to have any validity, is the part
based on Consistancy theory (Korman, 1977). Even the
principals behind this appear to have been misunderstood,
distorted and are not implemented in the training process.
There appears to be no evidence to suggest that
the sales process, itself, is as described by the system,
in,spite of the fact that there is considerable academic
research into the interaction between salesmen and
customers (see Chapter 2). Modern research regards the
sale as an interaction between the unique personalities
of the individual salesman and the individual customer
(Poppleton, 1981) and sellinga social skill. It would
appear, therefore, that the psychological processes
behind both the training procedures and the selling
procedures of the Pendle System are suspect.
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The Structured system of sales control advocated by
the system may have a number of practical benefits.
For example, it could focus the salesman's mind on
the necessity not to prejudge the sale. The customer
follow-up system could have practical benefits. However,
there appears to be no other evidence to suggest that such
a specifically structured system could work to enhance
sales performance.
The system appears to lack credibility with the
salesmen, it is supposed to train and motivate. The story
is told (probably apocrophal) of how the founder of the
system, visiting a dealership to show them how it was done,
sold ten cars on the first day (a remarkable performance).
However, the dealership was faced with ten cancellations
the following day! Salesmen do not believe it is possible
to implement the system and resent the image of the non-
thinking salesman. The following transcript gives a
salesman's viewpoint and his description of the system,
with his scepticism being evident.
A Sales Description of the Pendle System
Well, basically, you have an 'up desk' and a
salesman sits at that desk watching the site. No
telephone, no papers, nothing, he is just looking
out of the window waiting for somebody to walk onto
the site. There are then a row of desks with
salesmen making their telephone calls, follow-ups
and what have you. The controller's - this will be
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the Control Office - with this two-way glass, you
can see out but you can't see in, because you don't
want customers walking in here - and as soon as that
salesman goes out to greet a customer, the next
salesman in line - and they take turns - moves over
onto the 'up desk' and the first thing that salesmen
must do is to greet the customer, tell him who he
is, ask the customer's name and then ask him what
he is running and look at his car and do him an
appraisal on the car. Well, the customer thinks he
is doing an appraisal, but this is just part of the
process starting. Get the customer driving - noting
everything on an appraisal pad and when you have got
to a tricky junction - you have got to have a tricky
junction on the demonstration, where, perhaps, he is
turning right, he has got to put it into gear, do
the clutch, the indicator, look in his mirror and
that's when you ask him what he wants for his car.
That's in his car mind you - you let him drive.
The customer's thinking, just as he is thinking
absolutely on his driving, you ask him what he wants
for his car and he will usually come out with a
figure and, as he said, he will probably come out
with a figure which is four, five, six hundred
pounds more than he is expecting for the car - and
he says two thousand pounds and you say "TWO
THOUSAND POUNDS!" but you write two thousand pounds
down. The customer sees you write two thousand
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pounds down on the appraisal pad and he thinks - he
is going to give me two thousand pounds, or there is
a change, so he is going to stay with you. This
process is to take an hour and a half, no less. The
whole system is an hour and a half, so you can't do
it under an hour and a half.
The idea then is to bring him back to the site. You
have got the car is a special position and you get
him into the closing room and you give him a cup of
coffee. You do a qualification sheet - you have
been doing that on the demonstration, but fill in a
qualification sheet. You have got your appraisal
sheet and you have got to find out what he wants to
spend; preferably what he wants to spend per month,
because you want to sell finance and you take those
papers into the Controller. If you haven't got it
all filled in the Controller should 'throw you out'
until you have. Send you back to the customer.
That's one of the disciplines. You see, even losing
one or two customers to start with when bringing the
system in, rather than the salesman thinking he can
get away with coming with half a completed sheet.
The Controller then chooses the car he is going to
show the customer. The customer hasn't looked at
cars, by the way, at this stage - he must not
wonder in the showroom, must not look at cars - he
has got his wife and kids and they say when we go
on the run - always stay behind - and another
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salesman must put them into another office. The
salesman then gets out a car that the Controller
has obviously chosen - it has got to be, if he has
come in for a Metro it is no good showing him a
Jaguar, but you have got to meet his needs as much
as possible, but it is the Controller who says what
car to show him. If he is interested in a Maxi and
you haven't got a Maxi well, obviously, you would
perhaps show him an Ital Estate.
TWK	 The Controller makes that decision?
	
 The Controller makes that decision and then you go
out on a demonstration - the salesman drives - you
are finding out all the features on the car that be
mentioned on his qualification sheet - what he is
looking for; room, comfort, economy, whatever. You
come back - you park the car next to the customer's
car and if, when you get out, he wanders around and
starts looking about it, he is interested in it.
He might turn around and say I wouldn't buy one of
those. You then go back to the Controller and sort
out another car. But, take it he is interested in
the car, take him back into the closing room and
try and 'chip' him. You have really got to 'chip'
him there and then. You then go back to the
Controller and you have 'chipped' him say two
hundred pounds. You say to the customer then, go
back to the closing room and say - "my boss would
like to try your car" - and this is when you do the
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appraisal on his car. This is when you 'chip' him
again. You have really got to 'chip' him three
times. If, at the end of it you can't, the
salesman can't do a deal with the customer, then he
must bring the Controller in. The Controller goes
into the closing room - he might say to him "has my
salesman upset you, you know, what, why has he upset
you" - and he usually says "no, no, no, he has taken
us on a run" - all sorts of objections and questions.
TWK	 Do they suggest a strike rate - what do they think,
you know - is this supposed to succeed every time?
	
 He is talking about 75/80%.
TWK	 So, for every four customers that walk in you are
going to sell three cars.
	  If you are convinced - I would like to see that.
	  They say it should never, never be below 45%.
TWK	 Yes, how does it compare with your current strike
rate 	  roughly. How many do you sell - one in
five?
	  Yes, I was going to say 25/30%.
TWK	 That's pretty average - that's what most people say.
	
 Why a salesman should make a good job with this
customer is because if there are another five or
six chaps waiting to go up to the 'up desk', he may
only speak to one customer per day, or perhaps two
customers a day - he is going to make the best
possible use of talking to that customer. It
doesn't matter what that chap has really come onto
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the site for - that's his customer. Unless he has
come in to ask to see another salesman, or something
about a query, but other than that, that counts as
his turn. So he is not going to get another turn
to speak to a customer until the rest have had a
turn. So, it depends on how many you employ.
APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW WITH THE SALES MANAGER OF BRITCARS IMMEDIATELY
FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE EXPERIMENTAL PERIOD 
APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW WITH THE SALES MANAGER OF BRITCARS IMMEDIATELY
FOLLOWING END OF EXPERIMENTAL PAY PERIOD 
TWK	 Before talking about the new system, can we talk
about the current system that I introduced on 1st
January.
	  Your system?
TWK	 Any problems?
	
 In the administration of it, none. As you will
remember, there were one or two distortions, which
we might have foreseen with a little bit more
thought and I mean we were fairly keen to sort of
not detract from their income levels. It has been
more noticeable here with the new car salesmen,
most particularly there have been distortions with
the new car salesmen.
TWK	 What distortions?
	
 In as much as they have been paid too much - in a
word. I think the inclusion of MCP type business
was a mistake. I feel that the very high percen-
tages, the thirty per cent to above, were too
easily achieved by virtue of the inclusion of MCP.
TWK	 We discussed this before we implemented it.
	
 We did discuss it, yes. OK. We said we would try
it for six months - we have tried it for six months
- you prevailed on the Director to keep it despite,
you know, we have, what, we have had a couple of
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quite horrendous months in terms of payouts - quite
disproportionate, in my opinion, to the amount of
incremental business we have received. You see, I
can't believe, O.K. I have got nothing against a
Matrix system, in fact, this new Britcars thing is
on a matrix, but I feel the very big percentages
were too easily achieved. In other words, you know
we have had four hundred odd pounds plus paid out on
a particular deal and I can't believe that a bloke
worked any harder if he had only earned two hundred
pounds - all I have got to say is if he had earned
two hundred pounds on that deal, he would have
tried just as hard to do it as he would to try and
earn four hundred pounds plus. I don't think the
extra money made him, couldn't make him work, he
tries as hard as he possibly could to get two
hundred pounds, no questions and the fact that he
ended up earning four hundred quid was great. I
mean, a couple of the lads really have, well three
of them particularly, really have had 'a ball',
which is fine, you know, OK you can't begrudge it if
you like - but, I think that, as much our fault as
yours, I mean it was like, no one knew, we were
stepping off the end of a plank into the dark, we
didn't know what we were going to be in for. We
were involved, you know, we had some quite good
placements anyway. So, as I said, we were 'taking
a step off the end of the plank' if you like, we
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didn't quite know what we were in for. With hind-
sight, of course, we now know that some of the
thresholds were perhaps too low. I feel that some
of the upper percentages were, perhaps, too high
anyway - as I say, with hindsight, I think being
able to generate 40% is perhaps a bit top heavy
anyway, as I don't feel, as I have already said,
that the extra commission that generated could make
the bloke work any harder.
TWK	 The 40% was for double the amount of profit on
double the standard performance.
	
 Yes, that's fine. As I say, this is not a
criticism, it is a fact. I think we are as much,
to well, more to blame, because you did ask us. I
think we pitched the averages too low. That's what
it's all about. That's one aspect, the other one
is, as I say, the inclusion of MCP, which is a
gross distortion and it's unfair, because when you
include the 'used' men in the same matrix, that
facility isn't really available to them, so we have
had this imbalance of earnings between the blokes
in the showroom here, opposed to the men on the
site opposite - which has caused a little bit of
unrest, because no matter, OK salaries are supposed
to be private, but they never bloody well are and
words get about, you know, one or two of the lads
have had a real clean up.
TWK	 Did the salesmen make more money?
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	  Oh Christ, yes!
TWK	 Did they sell more cars?
	
 Well, you will tell me that when you have done your
analysis, but as far as I can see, and again this
is not trying to moan, I think we had good months
here when everybody else had good months and we had
average months when everybody else had average
months. That's how it seems to me. I mean we had
a great March, but there again so did everybody
else. I mean, I can only look from a Branch point
of view, I mean, the Director can look from a
regional point of view and you have spoken to him,
I know; and he's of the opinion, OK it may have,
yes we have probably improved over what we would
have improved, but I don't think we have improved
in proportion to the extra money we have paid out.
Since having handled it and touched it I like this
type of payment scheme - I like the structure and,
of course the new Britcars one is on a similar sort
of basis - OK the top end is not as high as your
own one, but I like the idea of it - I think it is
a good idea and if a blokes got any 'gum', like
anything else, this new one will favour the good
man, rather than the average man, which, of course,
is what it's all about anyway. "Give to him that
has" as it were. You know, I've got no argument
with that. I mean if they are going out with two
thousand pounds a month commission, providing I can
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see there has been that much extra business, that's
fine - but as I say, I think due to the threshold
being pitched that much too low, which is as I say
is as much our fault as yours, probably more so,
then the earnings, I think, have been disproportion-
ate - but the Director is of the opinion, as you
know, that we have had good months when everybody
else has and maybe our good months have been just a
little bit better than the other's good months, but
not that much better if you see what I am trying to
get at.
TWK	 Well I will be able to tell you that when I . . .
Yes, as I say you will be the judge of that at the
end of the day when you have done your sums.
TWK	 As from 1st July you are now going onto the Britcars
Group System. This works on a composite retained
gross profit over the month.
	
 Correct - over the period in times in the month -
correct.
TWK	 So the salesman doesn't actually know the amount of
money that he has got in that particular car,
because it is calculated in retrospect.
	
 Well he doesn't to the penny, but, I mean, I don't
know a salesman yet that doesn't really know within
a few quid what's going to be left in a car.
TWK	 Unless he accumulates it.
	
 Unless he accumulates it. Yes, I mean if he sells
that car, I mean he is going to know whether there
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is fifty pound left in it, or three hundred pounds
left in it.
TWK	 For him personally I am talking about, not . .
Well, yes, for him, well yes, left in for the
company. The problem is that, you know, there is,
with (here we were interrupted by a salesman
wanting a chit signed to get a gallon of petrol)
there is no one else that can sign the bloody
petrol, this is my one moment of power, signing off
a gallon of petrol - you know you have really
arrived when you are empowered to sign off thirty
bobs worth of petrol.
TWK	 The other thing with the Britcars system, of course,
is that there is no basic pay, only a four hundred
pound guarantee.
	
 Well, yes - the word 'guarantee', yes it is true,
I suppose, but I mean it is really a withdrawal
account, isn't it, really. I mean, because if they
don't, I mean you know as much about it as I do,
but as I see it and having read it carefully and
listened to the (Personnel Manager) OK in month 'X'
if they only generate three hundred pounds worth of
commission they paid four, but then that hundred
pound is caught back the following month.
TWK	 That's my understanding.
	
 Well that's it. Again, I mean I shall not know,
none of us will know, until we have had it going
for a few months, but I am told that those depots
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that have operated this scheme and apparently some
have as a 'pilot' as we have been doing with your's
here, those depots that have been operating this
scheme which is coming in now, have paid out more
than they would have done previously - which I
really have no doubt - that's the truth. Again, of
course, it favours the good man and not the average
man and some ways, if you have got a bloke drawing
four hundred quid month after month, well it won't
happen month after month, of course, it will high-
light, if the Sales Manager doesn't already know it,
it will highlight any weaknesses in his sales force.
So, as I say, I have got no argument with this type
of system, but how the lads will feel, of course, I
don't know. I mean this is a little .
TWK	 They don't know yet?
	  They know it is going to be changed - I have
discussed it in some detail with a [salesman] sort
of being my 'right-hand man' if you want for a
better word; the problems that I am going to face
here with them, and as far as I am concerned I can
see there is no discussion in.this, there is one or
two of them that enjoy slightly higher basics than
the others and, of course, in this present scheme
there is no provision for that, at all and it
constitutes a change in their Contract of Employment
but there is no provision for the likes of a
salesman, who gets a little bit more, in as much as
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he doubles for me when I am not here and he is sort
of nominee showroom if you like and he is
responsible after me - and like (salesmen), who is
given a little bit extra for his responsibilities
at the site opposite. But, that's the deal and I
can only see what happens tonight.
TWK	 I will be interested to know.
	
 Oh yes, fine.
TWK	 What about Sales Manager's salaries while all this
is going on?
	
 Well, as far as I am concerned there is no change.
I mean I certainly have not been told of any change,
I mean, I am not saying there isn't any, all I am
saying is that I don't know any.
TWK	 I don't know of any either. This must be a bit
irritating, or goring, or anything else.
	
 Well, a little bit yes; particularly this last six
months when I have seen one or two of them sort of
earning substantially higher than me - substan-
tially - I mean, I have never known a showroom yet
where there hasn't been one or two 'high flyers'
earn more than the Sales Manager, you know, that is
a fact of life, which I have long since stopped
worrying about; but as I say over the last six
months and I am not going to 'go over the same
ground' there have been occasions where they have
earned significantly more than me - which is in
some ways a little bit goring - OK it was a six
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month period - experimental period - and that's it.
You know so there's no sort of 'sour grapes' as far
as that's concerned, but sometimes it does get you
a little bit, you know, you think, "bloody hell, is
it worth the aggravation" and, of course, the short
answer is "no", but if it was going to continue
like that - but, as I say the new system starts
next month and tonight I try and tell them all
about it.
TWK	 If, all things being equal, do you think the system
as you see it has been successful, say we took out
the MCP and pitched the matrix at what we know to
be a fair level.
	  Yes, I do. I have got no argument with the prin-
ciple of linking units and profit and varying the
rate of commission 'to reward' the better deal and
the 'high flyer' and certainly, I know from the
'boys' point of view that is the case. Now, none
of them are naive, I mean they know they have had
six months holiday and they all know that at the
end of this month that whatever we do it's going to
be changed - whether we modify the form of yours or
whatever, things are not going to be the same. I
mean, they quite sensibly looked upon it as 'a
little oasis' and said "thank you very much". I
say it isn't all of them that benefitted.to  a
large extent. I mean, I think with the 'used'
lads it was just about right, we got it right, but
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as far as they were concerned, as I said the gross
distorter was the MCP really, because you can never
regulate them you have got no control them , when
they come in - the factory manipulate MCP to suit
their penetration figures anyway. So, quite out of
the blue you can get a mass throughput of MCP which
we had on a couple of occasions in the early part
of your campaign. Now, currently the level of MCP
is very low. The factory seem to have a lot of .
Category B cars around them suddenly, which they
are putting out to MCP participants at a special
reduced rate and handling them themselves - so they
are not coming through the trade in any numbers,
plus the fact they have reduced the amount of models
open to MCP people - we only have Itals, Ambassadors
and Acclaim automatics now. So, quite obviously
those people that are up for change are doing all
the 'ducking and diving' techniques so they don't
have to change their car, as they might not want
what's on offer. So for those two reasons the
level of MCP business is very low, but you can't
really control, you can't really prospect it - I
mean you can't really 'phone a bloke up and say,
you know, "it's time you changed your car" - if he
changed his car, I mean, he is given a form - we
have no control - OK we can decide and try and make
them come here as opposed to another dealer, but
the actual time which they deal, we have got no
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control whatsoever. It is just when the bloke is
given a new form and told to do it and as I say at
the moment there is a lot of Category B stuff about.
TWK	 They do have a choice of where they buy a car?
	
 Oh, very much so, yes. They do have a choice of
where. I mean don't get me wrong we welcome the
business from an overall, not so much, yes, from a
•sales point of view it's good, but from the service
point of view it is very good, because they get
just as much for a PDI and MCP car as they do an
ordinary retail one and, of course, the subsequent
servicing as well. So, you know, from the Depot
point of view, from the branch point of view, there
is business that we want.
APPENDIX C
INTERVIEWS WITH SALESMEN AT END OF EXPERIMENTAL PERIOD
Salesman No 2
Salesman No 4
Salesman No 5
Salesman No 6
INTERVIEW WITH SALESMAN (NO 2) AT END OF EXPERIMENTAL
PERIOD
TWK	 We spoke about six months ago and we had a
conversation then, when we implemented the new
payment system.
	  That's correct.
TWK	 Any problems - what do you think of the system?
	
 Well, I thought the system was very good - possibly
gave us incentive to try and sell more units, but I
suppose it is the sort of thing that we have anyway.
Financially, it worked out very well. I think,
possibly, it gave us a bit more consciousness of
what sort of profit we were needing in deals. We
are in a position to work out earnings per unit,
per deal - not just a percentage across the board.
So, having said that, I think we did benefit over-
heads - the company benefitted as well.
TWK	 You made more money over the last six months?
	
 I think we have, I think so, yes.
TWK	 I mean, you personally have made more money than
might otherwise have done?
	
 Well, it is very difficult for me to say, because
I have only been with Britcars eight months, and I
wasn't here this time last year, so I don't know
what sort of market trend they had in the showroom
last year, you see. So, it is a bit difficult for
me to say, Unless I compare the company I was
- 327 -
working before Britcars - if I do that I could say
that I made much more money this year with Britcars,
than I did last year at the same time.
TWK	 But, have you sold more cars?
	
 Compared to last year - I have, indeed, I was
surprised the number of cars we sold in the last
six months, compared to what we did with
the year before, really.
TWK	 Do you think that this is due to the consciousness
of the pay system, or what?
	  Well, as I said before, I think the commission
structure did give us a little bit extra go to sell
more units - to rush a few more units in. But,
again, it is the sort of thing that I think we have
in our blood all the time anyway.
TWK	 Do you think your attitude or behaviour changed
during the month because of the system?
	  Changed - I don't think my attitude changed, no. I
don't think so, because I think my attitude and
possibly my colleagues' attitude as well changes
pending on the turning of the market. If we get
very busy, we all act in a different way and as we
get quieter, we change with the trend. I mean, just
to give you an example, if we are very very busy and
we have to say 'hello' to each other and that's it
from the morning until the end of the day, although
we respect each other all the way. As things get a
bit quieter not only do we greet each other, but we
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have got time to sit down and have a cup of coffee
together and chat. So, my feeling is that attitude
changes depending on how busy we are.
TWK	 Under the commission system at the end of the
month, you were earning a lot of money for an
individual deal, as compared with the beginning of
the month.
	
 Well, that is correct.
TWK	 Did it make any difference?
	
 I think possibly it did - with some deals which
were effected at the end of the month the earning
was pretty high really, you know, for a salesman.
But then again, at the beginning of the month, the
same deal did bring very little money as commission
to the salesman.
TWK	 OK Tell me - when you first talk to a customer,
what do you think the chances are of you selling
him a car - do you try and estimate what the
chances are?
	
 I do. Yes. I do, although I don't assess the
outcome just by thinking, but by fully qualifying
the customer to see what sort of state of mind he
is in, so not at the very beginning stage by just
looking, so I try and cultivate my customer to
selling a car - quite often I realise that it might
not take place until a few weeks from that date.
With some others you can tell he is already to a
different stage and, therefore, that you are nearer
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to a sale. But, whenever I greet a customer in my
mind, the objective is, I want to sell him a car.
TWK	 What stage do you know whether you are going to
sell him a car? - or not.
	  Well, it varies and I think that the policy I adopt
for myself is try and close whenever you can. So
really, I don't put a time in . . .
TWK	 Of the number of people you actually talk to - how
many do you actually sell a car to?
	  That is a very interesting question, because some
companies do actually monitor this sort of business
and I think possibly I close a sale out of six or
seven enquiries, I think.
TWK	 One in six or seven.
	
 Yes, something like that. That is very interesting,
because as I said some garages do monitor the
number of calls taken per salesman and then the
number of sales compared to that number.
TWK	 Over the last six months you have, under the scheme,
earned a fair bit of money, have you tried to buy
anything in particular or have you bought anything
or have you needed money for any particular project
or anything in any way?
	  Yes, I am married and have two kids. Last year I
decided to change house and it just happened that
the final arrangements came in the last few months
so I am in the process of changing house now, which
is a very expensive business.
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TWK	 This has enabled you to do this?
	
 I think this has helped - it certainly has helped.
TWK	 Can I talk to you next about the job of a salesman?
I am interested in what the job of salesman is.
Can you tell me what you do?
	
 The job is obviously to satisfy the customer's
requirement we have got a showroom and we have got
a telephone - potential customers either ring or
come into a showroom and with a particular reason
and that is to buy from us, or at least with
intention to buy from us - or to buy, not
particularly from us - and, as a salesman, my job
is to try and sell to that particular individual.
So there is a lot of psychology to come into it.
To understand this individual who rings, who comes
into our showroom - to get involved, to get as much
information as I can from this individual, so that
I know what his requirements are. Because, once I
know what his requirements are, then I am half way
there, really, to selling the car.
TWK	 How much time in a day do you spend actually
talking to customers?
	
 Again, it depends, sometimes I start talking early
in the morning and talk right through the day, you
know, right to six o'clock, so we could say in one
day I could talk for about eight hours, you know,
non-stop. Another day it could be just two or
three hours, in which case, I try and do other
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things. I think the average is I would say, a good
four to five hours per day.
TWK	 What do you do the rest of the time?
	  The rest of the time, there are estimates to be
prepared; invoices to be completed, in other words
paperwork. A little bit of running around - to go
and see how my cars are getting on down where they
inspect them. Or a few calls down Services section
to see, I mean if a customer has come back to
service their car and so on. I like to follow that
up to see when they come back whether they come
back with straight forward service requirement or
whether they have found something wrong with the
car and what they found wrong. I think all this
sort of information helps.
TWK	 You like being a salesman, Joe, do you?
	
 Oh yes, very much.
TWK	 When you go out to a party or something else like
that, what do you tell people you do?
	  Well, I, whatever I do I am not ashamed you know.
When I socialize I talk about my job, I have always
done it, you see. So whenever I socialize with
friends or with friends of friends I always say, oh
Joe, is the motor trade, Joe is a car salesman. I
sell new cars, I sell second hand cars and I am
proud of it. I think I have got reasons to be
proud of it.
TWK	 Do you enjoy the challenge of selling a car - do
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you feel that you have achieved something when you
have sold a car?
	  Oh yes. What I enjoy more is when in one day I
manage to sell more than one car - something like
3, 4 or 5 cars in one day - that's when I get the
kicks. One car doesn't excite me that much, any
more. I think the very excitement I get is when I
sell a few cars in one day - then I really feel
really pleased.
TWK	 Are you competitive, do you think Joe?
	  In what sense?
TWK	 Well, in order to sell a car, will you compete with
others to sell a car, or . . .
	  Do you mean within the showroom itself?
TWK	 Yes, whatever, either in the showroom, or . . .
	 You mean with my colleagues. Well, at present I
don't much because I am the newest salesman here,
at Britcars, and the other three colleagues of mine
are very good colleagues who have been here 7 years,
10, 15, so I respect their long service, but I do
like my share of the business and I do get it.
TWK	 And what about competing with other garages?
	  Oh, yes, I do that with great pleasure. I mean,
when I talk to a customer, some of the information
I like to get is what sort of conversation they had
with other garages, whether they are BL dealers or
foreign dealers and I try and study whatever offers
were put to them and try and organise something
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which - try and organise a pack which would
possibly look better.
TWK	 How much of your sales or success is due to luck?
	  Due to luck! Ah, L.U.C.K. yes. I think very
little, I mean nowadays, I don't think nowadays
you get a customer walking through the door,
sitting down and putting a fiver in your pocket and
saying please sell me a car. I think very little
luck. I think, to be honest, the majority of my
success is knowledge of psychology.
TWK	 OK. Can I talk about customers now. Are there
sort of types of customers do you think, or what?
	
 Yes, many types of customers. Many different types
- you get the guy who comes in and looks like a
tramp and, of course, you try and use a tone which
suits the particular individual and treat him as a
customer. You get the odd customer who comes in in
jeans and teeshirt and, you know, the sporty type
and I use a different language with him. And you
get the conservative potential customer with a suit
and tie and handkerchief in the pocket and you use
a different language with him. But, you do get
different types of people. Of course, people come
from different classes. You know, you have got the
lower class, middle, the upper middle and the
aristocrats and lucky enough in this showroom we
get all of them really. So, we have got to adapt
ourselves to fit in with all these different types
- 334 -
TWK	 Do you have any special techniques for closing a
sale. .I mean, do you try and control what's
happening?
	
 Well yes. To close a sale, I mean, I suppose the
procedure is always the same. Find what he wants
- find what he can afford, that includes what he
can afford to borrow and find what he requires and
to communicate to him so that he understands
that's what he needs, although that's not what he
wanted, that's what he can afford, and then
convince him to buy.
TWK	 Do you feel that you control what is going on, or
that you do more or less what the customer wants?
	
 Well, when the conversation starts with the
customer - I like the customer to say what he likes
and do what he likes, because that makes him 'free
and easy' - it breaks the ice you see. But, as we
go along I like to control the conversation - I
like to possibly lead the conversation, because you
have got to do this, otherwise if you don't control
the conversation you will never know what he needs
and he might like a Metro and he has got a family
with seven kids and unless you are given the
chance to actually control the conversation, you
know, lead the conversation, you never know that.
TWK No, that's true. How devious would you be in order
to achieve a sale. People tend to bend the truth a
bit, or what. Well, tell something about a car
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that's not true, or not tell him something which he
ought to know.
	
 Well, I think 'white lies' are acceptable in the
selling business.
TWK	 What is a 'white' lie?
	
 I would say a 'white' lie is a small lie - if a
customer, let's say he likes white and we only got
black and we want to sell that car say that white
is a colour that perhaps doesn't suit you, while
black is the colour for you, you know - and I
notice you are wearing a black suit. Now, that is
a 'white' lie, that is nothing which would affect
the customer. But, I think all the same we should
always be overall frank, honest and give true
information. I think that is very important. I
mean the customer is spending a lot of money and as
I said I always try to help him make a decision by
choosing the right car, at the right amount of
money he can afford and the right time. I mean if
a customer came to me in December and wanted to buy
a new car - I would try and sell him a car in
December, because obviously it is money in the bank
for the company and commission for me in my pocket
- I won't volunteer information, but if he does ask
me whether it would be more beneficial to buy then
or buy in January, unless there is a special offer
in that month, then I would tell the customer that
it is more beneficial to buy in January - you have
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got to be frank with the customer. That's it,
'white' lies help selling, but little things which
would not damage the relationship or the customer
because the customer before later finds out and
then you lose not only one customer but you lose
his friends as well and their relations.
TWK	 OK Fine. Thanks very much Joe.
INTERVIEW WITH SALESMAN NO 4 
TWK	 You have been on the pay system now for about six
months - any problems - how did it go?
	
 Very good, very good. It gave me a much better
standard of living and it encouraged me to come in
more at weekends. When I was on the higher band,
sort of thing, of up to 20 or 30 units and it would
be my weekend off, I would come in and work the
Saturday, which I wouldn't normally do, because
obviously, there was a great incentive there.
TWK	 You have made more money?
	  Oh yes.
TWK	 Have you sold more cars because of it?
	
 Truthfully, I wouldn't think so, I wouldn't think
so, because if somebody is a salesman, they are
going to sell the motor car anyway. I might have
done the odd one or two more from where I came in
at the weekend, when I wouldn't normally have been
working, but, it doesn't make you sell harder.
TWK	 What does it do?
	
 It just makes the reward at the end of it a little
bit better.
TWK	 Do you not put more effort into the sale?
	
 I suppose you might do, but you don't do it
consciously. I mean if something has got £20
commission on it, I am going to work as hard on
that as something that has got £200 commission on
- 338 -
it.
TWK	 Are you?
	
 Oh yes. Because they all add up at the end of the
month, don't they.
TWK	 Yes, yes, I suppose they do. You are quite happy
with the system and there are no admin problems or
anything else like that. You do know it is going
to finish at the end of the month. Were you aware
that it was a temporary system and you realised
that it was just going to last for six months and
did you feel that you had the opportunity during
that time to earn as much as you wanted?
	  Well, I was a little bit dubious about it to start
with. You always are, I think, when you go onto a
new pay structure. You are not sure if it is going
to be as good as the old one, but within the first
month of being on it, I realised that there was
good potential there to earn good money and I think
it is a great shame we are not staying on it.
TWK	 Can I talk about car selling now. When you see a
customer, what do you think the chances are of you
selling him a car?
	  Well certainly, as much chance as anybody else.
TWK	 Can you put a figure on it - 50/50 or
	  Oh, I would hope higher than that. I mean if the
man genuinely wants to buy a motor car there is no
reason why he shouldn't buy one from me.
TWK	 How do you know that?
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	  I would hope that people that walk in that show-
room to get 60/70% conversion rate.
TWK	 Of the people you talk to you convert 60.70. That
is higher than most salesmen.
	  Well, a lot of the ones I get come in are repeat
customers as well purely because I have been here
so long.
TKW	 Yes, yes, which has got to be a good thing. Does
it vary from the time in the month or is it fairly
constant.
	  I always find it tends to go quiet in the middle
of the month and the, say the end of this month
you start to build up for July, although it is a
little bit different this month, because, probably
a lot that we will do now and of course during July
people hold back for August, which makes August a
little bit of a false month really, doesn't it,
because you are just robbing the other months.
TWK	 That's right. When you sell a car are you conscious
of the amount of money that you are going to earn
from it at all - do you know how much you are going
to be paid tomorrow?
	  Oh yes.
TWK	 At the time you are selling it?
	  Well, when you are negotiating the deal, yes;
because we are paid on a profit basis. If we were
paid on a unit basis then all you would be
concerned about really is just 'turning the motor
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car over' regardless of how much money there is in
it.
TWK	 Over the last six months or so, you have earned a
fair bit of money - did you have any particular
_
need for money over that time - I mean you are
married and you have a wife and mortgage.
	
 I have always got a need for money.
TWK	 Was there anything in particular that you were
aiming to achieve.
	
 Yes, I got a few things for the home, like a new
dining room suite and I have just fixed up a
holiday for September, which I will be honest, at
the beginning of the year I wasn't sure if I was
going to be able to afford a holiday this year.
TWK	 But you decided - when did you decide to go on
holiday?
	
 It would have been about April.
TWK	 Before you earned the money - you realised you
could earn the money to go on holiday - that's
interesting. OK can I talk about - I am
interested in the job of a salesman. Can you tell
me what the job is, Nick?
	
 Satisfying people's needs and requirements. I
suppose being as helpful and as pleasant as you can
to people, even when you feel that you don't want
to at times. But you get a certain amount of
freedom and flexibility with the job, although you
have to put in a lot of hours and I think you get
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a great deal of satisfaction from it, when you sell
a motor car regardless of whether it is a Mini or a
Jaguar.
TWK	 How much of the time do you actually spend face to
face talking with the customers?
	
 Well talking to customers - I would think 60%,
60/70% of the day - that's including on the
telephone.
TWK	 Oh. What do you do with the rest of the day?
	
 Paperwork, chase cars around in service or if
somebody has got a service complaint looking into
it for them and that sort of thing.
TWK	 When you go out to a party or you meet someone, or
something else like that, what do you tell them you
do for a living?
	
 I tell them I am a Senior Sales Executive at
Britcars.
TWK	 Salesmen have not got the best reputation in the
world and I wondered whether, you don't feel
defensive about that.
	
 Oh no, not at all, not at all.
TWK	 You are quite proud of being a salesman.
	
 Oh yes, I think when you get a customer come in the
showroom - I mean salesmen, car salesmen I think
have had reputations of being a bit sharp and this
sort of thing - I think the sharpest one is the
customer when he comes in.
TWK	 You would be surprised how often I hear that. Do
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you compete with other salesmen for business.
	  Yes, yes.
TWK	 Is it important to you to achieve sales?
	
 Oh yes. I mean, I like to sell the most units and
earn the most profit.
TWK	 And you normally do, do you?
	
 I think so, yes.
TWK	 Salesman No 6's coming in now - he is challenging
you a bit isn't he?
	
 Oh yes. Well he's hung on now, he has been here
now 6/7 years I suppose and he's keen, but I think
it's good that there is competition.
TWK	 And you enjoy competition?
	  Yes.
TWK	 What percentage of your sales do you think could be
put down to luck?
	  None.
TWK	 Is there any luck in it?
	
 Well, I suppose it depends how you determine luck.
I mean you could have a customer walk in the show-
room that's 'hands in the air job giving themselves
up', which I suppose you could say that's luck, but
at the same time, it depends if you have kept your
eyes open and you are watching people on the front
and you are the first one there to serve him when
he comes in.
TWK	 OK. Can we talk about customers now. Are there
various types of customers, or what?
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	  Oh yes. You get some that are extremely impatient
and they will come in the showroom and if you are
tied up with somebody and you say to them, "I will
be with you in a minute" sort of thing "as soon as
I can" and within two or three minutes they are
hopping up and down and giving a little sigh and
this sort of thing. Where you get others, I mean
they will turn around to you and say, "I can see
you are busy, take your time, I have got plenty of
time, I will wait for you."
TWK	 Do you alter your approach to a customer, or what?
	
 No, I don't think so. The only time I might do is
if I tend to get more of a 'down to earth' person
come in the showroom I try to get onto christian
name terms with them because I think it makes them
feel a lot more relaxed as well. Whereas, the
other extreme would be if I get the Managing
Director of a local company around here or some-
thing like that, I mean, he is 'Mr' all the time
until he tells me to call him differently.
TWK	 You treat most people the same, do you? You don't
try and .
	  I think I give them all the same attention and do
the same for them.
TWK	 You don't alter your personality or attitude?
	  No, no.
TWK	 Do you have any special techniques for trying to
sell cars - I mean do you try and control the sale?
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	  No, I just try and talk. to them as if I was talking
to them in the pub and get on a friendly basis with
them, so that they feel that they can trust me and
I will do the best deal that I can for them and I
have got their interests at heart.
TWK	 You try and establish that sort of confidence. How
devious would you be to sell a car?
	  It depends if it is one the Company really wants
to get rid of. But, I wouldn't tell an outright
lie to the customer. I might, if he asked me a
question that I didn't want to answer, I might well
answer him with another question and try and avoid
saying anything. But if he asked me point blank
something then I would tell him the truth.
TWK	 Do you think it is worthwhile being dishonest to
sell a car?
	
 Oh no - I think it bounces back on you at a later
date, plus if he finds that you have lied to him I
don't think there is any chance you would get him
back again as a customer, plus he would spread it
around to all his friends and all the rest of it.
It is not worth it.
TWK	 OK. Fine - Thanks very much.
INTERVIEW WITH SALESMAN (NO 5) 
TWK	 The last time we talked you had just gone onto my
pay scheme. Any problems with the system - what do
you think of it?
	
 No, not at all. I did ... very much in principle -
in practice I suppose we earned a lot more than any
one envisaged. I think at the start of it, the
term, I know I came out with close on three thou-
sand pounds a couple of months, which I suppose
from, you know, a Manager's point of view, I had
quite a few cars at the end of those months where I
was looking to earn five or six hundred pounds per
deal.
TWK	 Did you do that deliberately?
	  It is hard to say. I mean, obviously I was
conscious if I had someone on the go the last
couple of days of a month, especially if it was a
big car, yes, I would try and 'button them up' then,
rather than let it slide for a couple of days, as
anyone would.
TWK	 Do you think you sold more cars?
	
 I think so, yes, I didn't take any of my, well, I
don't take my time off anyway, but I didn't take
any time off apart from my Sundays and tended to
stay a bit later and perhaps half an hour for lunch
- things like that. But the only thing I think, I
mean, I couldn't on those cars have worked harder
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for four, or five, or six hundred that I would have
done for one, or two hundred; and you ask when you
get to the point where, you know, two hundred
motivates as much as you possibly can be motivated,
the bigger reward perhaps doesn't add any extra.
TWK	 You were aware the system was a short term system;
so you realised it was just for six months.
	  Yes, that's right.
TWK	 Yes, and of course you don't know anything about
the new system that you are going onto yet, do you?
	
 The only thing I know about it is it's geared
differently, obviously so I won't have to earn as
much and I don't really expect to. I have heard
that there is no basic, which is slightly worrying
on the face of it.
TWK	 In the current system did you feel that you had
your opportunity to earn as much as you could?
	
 Yes, yes certainly. I think in the old way there
wasn't very much difference in earnings between
salesmen like
	 and myself and the less
capable, if you like, members of staff; whereas
there is a huge earning differential between, if
you like, the longer standing members and the ones
who work a bit harder.
TWK	 OK Now can I ask you a few more questions. When
you see a customer for the first time, can you
estimate the probability of selling him a car?
	
 Not really, no. I think we all think we can, but I
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have been selling here for eight years now and I
can't.
TWK	 But you say you think you can - if you had to - a
guy's going to walk in what are the chances of you
selling him a car?
	
 Are you talking statistically?
TWK	 No, your perception, your idea.
	
 Well, I need to qualify the fellow and that's the
first thing I do. You know what price range you
are looking for? If it is an expensive car I then
look at what he has got to make sure he is really
in that range. I ask when he is due to change -
you know if he says four, five or six months I
don't waste a lot of time on him - I will perhaps
cultivate him, but generally that's a person's
escape route. A lot of people come into a show-
room to look around and to avoid any pressure they
will say, I am looking around for four or five
months time. So I always ask a lot of qualified
questions, you know, "Are you changing now? At the
right sort of price?" things like that, to try and
at least make sure that he is an able purchaser and
then take it from there.
TWK	 Do you assess the probability of you selling him a
car at that stage and decide whether he is on or
off, or what?
	
 I try to treat everybody as if, I always remember a
lesson from an, you know, early mystery shoppers -
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try and treat everybody as if he is a mystery
shopper, even if he looks like a 'messer'. Then at
least try and get him to buy a car, because that's
the only way you will find out. So many times we
do deals with people we never thought we would and
the 'certs' don't materialize.
TWK	 Of the people you see, how many do you convert to a
sale?
	
 Are you thinking of a ratio of enquiries for sales?
I think, if you count everybody that I talk to
perhaps it's 1 in 5, 1 in 6. The actual conversion
ratio I would like to think is slightly higher,
because a lot of people aren't able purchasers, so
I think I get most people. I mean people that are
actually genuine buyers I think I would get 1 in 3
and I would like to think I do more, but new cars
are bought very much on price - I mean there are so
many times I have done two or three demonstrations
to a fellow, run cars round'to his house at night
and I have lost it for £25 to somewhere else - and
vice versa, I have people here walking in saying
'Can you beat this price?" and I know there's a
salesman somewhere who has done a lot of work on
them and I just get in at the end and do the
business.
TWK	 Do you have an idea in your mind as to how much
money you are going to make on that?
	
 Yes I do. Mainly because we are always told to have
- 349 -
in mind the sort of profit we are making out of the
deal. So I generally know what percentage of the
profit I am going to get, but it is profit that is
upper most in my mind.
TWK	 And you always receive that amount of money?
	  I always check - you know, I never just leave it to
chance or trust or whatever, I always have an idea,
I always keep a record of cars going out with any
extras that I have supplied and my estimation of
the profit and I make sure that they tie-up.
TWK	 And, as far as pay is concerned, you have earned
substantial sums of money over the last six months,
have you any need for that money - I mean what do
you want the money for?
	  Well, I have got a very big mortgage - higher than
average mortgage, so I like that standard of living
and I think that whenever you earn a certain amount
of money you tend to live up to it.
TWK	 Yes. I can't remember - you are married?
	  I am not - no - single.
TWK	 You are single, but you own your own home.
	  That's right - yes.
TWK	 Do you have any expensive hobbies or . • •
I don't think a car salesman has got time for
hobbies really. When I get the odd Sunday off and
very occasionally a Saturday, there isn't really
time. I am very competitive anyway. I used to
play squash and tennis and football when I had an
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office job, but I found I was able to devote so
little time to those sports that I was getting
beaten by people who, you know, I would have walked
over at one time and I can't really take that. I
am very competitive in any sport I do.
TWK Yes, yes - fine. What I would like to do now is to
talk about the actual job that a car salesman does.
Can you give me an idea - what do you do?
	
 Well, there are lots of ways of looking at the job.
I mean, you can summarise it in four words, I
suppose, from the company's point of view, it's
'cars out, money in' and that principally is what I
think I am here to do - to sell cars profitably.
TWK	 How much of your time do you spend in face to face
interaction with the customer?
	  I suppose it works out quite small, perhaps an hour
and a half a day out of a nine hour day.
TWK	 What do you do the rest of the time?
	  Well, there are all the things that, for instance,
when I take an order, there are always things like
checking the stock; I have to cost out the deal I
do; work out the cost of the car extras - profit
retained; there is the workshop instructions to
write out; the file generally to look after -
things like appraising the part-exchange, making
sure all the details are correct, making sure the
fellow brings in his cover note, making sure any
finance documents get done, chasing the car in the
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workshop, making sure it is ready on time, cleaned.
I tend to 'run them around the block myself' to
check them - there are so many things that I have
to do that I couldn't really leave to anyone else.
If I have got a car going out I have to check it
myself, although we have got a Progress Chaser.
TWK	 Do you like being a salesman?
	
 Yes, I enjoy it very much - after my last sort of
office job, I spent the first five years of my life
in a solicitor's office and I couldn't go back to
that again - I was bored silly.
TWK	 What do you think the public think of salesmen,
particularly car salesmen?
	
 I suppose they - anyone tends to remember the bad
experiences they have had - I suppose they think
we are a 'bit sharp' - interested in our own
interests rather than their's. Whereas, perhaps,
most salesmen perhaps sell to shops or industry and
the general public don't come across them so much.
I like to think that we have got a slightly
different image than most.
TWK	 When you say "we"!
	
 I mean Britcars - I think, I like to think it's got
a reasonably good reputation; certainly, if I'm out
in a pub at night I almost always meet customers
around and I can always hold my head up and talk to
them.
TWK	 If you meet someone new at a party or something
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like that - what do you tell them you do?
	
 Sell cars.
TWK	 Do you feel defensive about that at all?
	  No, not the slightest - it is probably different
with myself, because I earn a good standard of
living, so, you know, friends and neighbours always
see me in a new car - I have got a bigger house
than they have - far younger, so at least they see
it as a, I would think, a very good occupation, in
my case. You know, I mean sometimes people say the
usual things I suppose they say about salesmen, you
know 'a bit sharp' and 'all patter' but most people
aren't like us. They are not used to talking to
people afresh, and they tend to say the first
things that come into their head, or that they are
expected to say; so I think that the first few
words of a conversation with a person socially are
virtually meaningless, you know, they are just
feeling the ground. I think as soon as they talk
to you for a few minutes they see that you are an
individual and judge you accordingly.
TWK	 You like the challenge of selling, you like . .
Yes I do, because every day at least I am likely to
be doing something different - speaking to
different people - perhaps going out somewhere at
the drop of a hat, so there is not so much routine.
TWK	 How do you think it's going to go in the future?
	  It is always 'hard to make predictions - I think
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that sales is certainly the most secure of jobs, I
can't see any micro-chip technology taking the
place of salesmen, which I think it will do with
accountants and secretaries, as well as shop floor
workers. I think a lot of clerical staff will be
out of jobs in the next twenty/thirty years. The
only change that I think perhaps could be - there
are a lot of auctions now open to the public where
I would think perhaps your retail man could go and
see cars and buy one where perhaps on the same site
there is someone who would appraise the car
mechanically. There might be a finance counter
there and he might be able to do all the things he
does in a showroom without showroom overheads -
perhaps that might be a . . .
TWK	 What about your personal future - how do you see
that going?
	
 I think I will stay in car sales - I like it very
much.
TWK	 Do you want to be a Manager, or?
	  Yes, I would like to have a go.
TWK	 Would you like to be a General Manager - would you
like the Chief Executive's job?
	
 It always sounds pretentious if you say you would
like the Chief Executive's job, but, yes, one day
I would like to have a go at something like that.
Yes, certainly 1 am looking at Managers. I think
we have got a far higher standard of Managers than
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most. I know a lot of Managers around town and I
don't see anything there that frightens me.
Obviously, if they can do the job - I can do it at
least as well, although, if you get someone like a
Sales Manager at a showroom like this where we put
out two thousand cars a year, that's a very big job.
It's obviously someone like the Sales Manager. I
suppose he's being a Sales Manager before he came
here and obviously it does take a very high
standard of Sales Manager to run an operation like
this. Certainly I don't see this as a 'first climb
up' in any way - more a sort of Manager, if you
like, of a smaller place.
TWK	 And then working up .
	  That's right.
TWK	 What percentage of your sales do you think are due
to luck?
	
 It's very difficult - I think one could be an
average salesman - I have seen quite a bit - simply
be the last firm on a shopper's list. You know, as
I said before often I feel whereas I do all the
work and somebody else gets the deal, sometimes it
works in reverse. So, I think one could get on the
end of some of those deals and that's it, if you
call it luck, but many times when you see a sales-
man conclude a sale very very quickly, it's not
because a customer has surrendered, it's because
the salesman is good. If he knows he can get the
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deal without doing the demonstration drive and all
the rigmarole and he sits the customer down, signs
him up, takes his money, then that's I would think
good salesman. He has done the job very very
efficiently.
TWK	 How do you get on with other salesmen?
	
 Very well. I like other salesmen, they are always
lively, so the company is good - we have the odd
commission dispute, but because salesmen are used
to looking after themselves, you tend to have a
row and then it's pretty well forgotten; whereas
I would think a lot of occupations where and I used
to be the same, they say nothing and hold a grudge,
which is no good at all.
TWK	 Can I talk to you about customers - how you see
customers now. Do you find there are any types of
customers?
	
 Well, as many types of customers as there are
people generally, which I think is pretty well
innumerable. It's, I think, possible to weigh up
in the first few minutes of a conversation or even
the way somebody approaches the showroom. I think
big showrooms like this are quite intimidating,
but you get some people who walk confidently
through the front door and that sort of person you
can approach, shake his hand, get his name and get
straight down to business. Whereas, you see a lot
of people they park their car around the side and
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come in through a side door and hope to arrive
unnoticed and people, like that you let them settle
a bit and just try and make a few comments and
hang around in the background - ready when you are
needed.
TWK	 Do you think that you adapt yourself to each
customer?
	
 Yes, all the time. Some customers - again you can
be talking to a Jaguar customer one moment and a
small used car customer the next. Some like to
meet quite an educated salesman, if you like, who
can talk to them on their own terms, but a lot of
the say unemployed, shop floor workers, or a used
car man, they would be put off by that, so you try
and be more 'matey' with them. Generally try to
get in - try and be the sort of salesman the
customer feels comfortable with.
TWK	 Do you try and control what's going on, in a sale?
	
 Oh yes, I control all of it, I would think. You
tend to find it's reasonably easy to control
people. For instance, if I want a person to take
a 'test drive' I wouldn't ask him - you find that
if you bring a car around to the front and you
open the passenger door and talk to the fellow, he
has got to get in. He really hasn't got any
choice. The same as if you are talking to someone
and you start walking slowly they will follow you
- if you pull a chair up, they will sit down.
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TWK	 How devious would you be in order to make a sale?
	
 I wouldn't be devious at all. I mean that is
fatal - I think all that would happen is that you
would get a cancellation next morning. Most
salesmen go through that 'hard sale' phases, or
devious phases and it never works, even if you
sign the fellow up, because he gets back to the
comfort and security of his own home, he will
either write or 'phone and cancel. I mean it puts
my back up a little bit when sometimes you get
double glazing salesmen around - they will say
they are doing a property survey and something
like that to start with, whereas again, if I am
caught canvassing, speaking to a company on the
'phone, I say who I am, who I work for and I am
ringing as we are in the business of selling cars
and I would like to see if I can come and talk to
them and see if I can do some business with them -
it's just as simple as that - getting right down
to it - say what I am 'phoning for. Saves my time
and their's - my time's as valuable as their's and
if they are not in the market, I would rather know
straight away.
TWK	 Fine, that's everything - you have been looking at
the commission system, you think it is a good
system and that it - looking at other salesmen, do
you think it has worked for them as well as for
you?
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 Oh yes, I think everybody has worked very hard the
last six months.
TWK	 As hard as they did during the previous six months?
	
 Yes - I mean we were conscious of the financial
rewards and I wouldn't pretend otherwise. I think
if the system had been geared slightly differently
- you know, perhaps from 6% through to, well I
don't know, 25% say. We are earning huge sums per
car at the end and I still think it would have
worked as well - as I say, I think you get beyond
a certain sum of money when you can't motivate any
more. But certainly I like the idea of progressive
scale.
TWK	 And the other salesmen did as well?
	
 That's right, because I mean you hear lots of
salesmen if they are in particularly high risk
activities like insurance and so forth, if they
hear of the 'high flyers' who perhaps earn thou-
sands it does give them something to aim at and
even if they are not doing very well, they can say
well, if Harry earns this I can. So it is always
an example - I think you have got to have a few,
at least one successful salesman in an organization,
particularly when newcomers are coming into the
business to say 'Look, when he joined us, he's as
green as you are, now look at him." It's got to
motivate, I know it did me when I first started.
TWK	 Is that why you took the job in the first place, or
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one of the reasons - for money.
	
 Not really, no. It was just that I was bored silly
with an office job ' - I was always interested in
cars and selling, so it seemed a logical move.
TWK	 Thanks ever so much.
INTERVIEW WITH SALESMAN (NO 6)
TWK	 You have been on the commission system now for
just gone six months, any problems - what do you
think of it?
	  Oh, it's a big improvement from what we were on
before. I got the impression that it was too
complicated as you probably know, all the salesmen
were delighted with it - I don't know what the
company thought of it, but certainly it gave you
more enthusiasm, you know, as you could see the
commission building up it gave you the momentum to
'push on' the deals, especially towards the end of
the month. I think it was a very good system - I
was very pleased to work within it and would be
pleased to continue it.
TWK	 You were conscious were you - well, you knew it was
a 'short term' system, did you?
	
 Oh yes, it was explained originally to us that it
would run for six months 'come what may'.
TWK	 Yes, and you were quite happy with that and you
felt that you had the opportunity to earn as much
as you could?
	
 Oh yes, I think it really 'opened the door' from
the commission side. I think it really gave you
the momentum especially towards the end of the
month - I know a number of the lads where they
would normally have the Sunday off or a Saturday
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afternoon off - when you are half way through the
month and you saw your sales building up, people
were more inclined to, you know, stay the extra
hour here and work an extra half a day to 'push'
the deals in towards the end of the month.
TWK	 And you made more money?
	
 Oh yes, no doubt about it.
TWK	 Did you sell more cars?
	
 Yes, I think overall, yes, I think I can say that
I did sell more motor cars, yes.
TWK	 And you think it was because of the . . .
	
 It certainly helped. When you say 'sell more
motor cars', it really is difficult is pinpoint
this, because months can change so much; we had
a very good run from January and it really only is
during the last couple of months that things have
really slackened down, but, yes, I think overall
it certainly did improve the sales and certainly
from my side more time was put in, so, obviously,
the more time you spend on it, the more motor cars
you are going to sell.
TWK	 Can I talk about selling now - when you first see
a customer or when you talk to a customer, what do
you think the probability is of you selling them a
car at that stage?
	
 Well I always remember when I first joined Britcars,
quite a few years ago, where we had a chappie come
in and looked at an AC Cobra, and he was, all his
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shirt was open in the front and he had a bottle
hat on and he was about 25 years old and my Sales
Manager said "I wouldn't waste your time with him,
he is a drain cleaner from Parkway." Anyway, he
came in and I had only joined Britcars a little
while then, and I plugged away and plugged away,
anyway the deal came up and when I started filling
in the order form I asked him for his name and he
said his name was Dundas, I said "I need your full
name," he said, "Lord David Dundas."
	 So ever
since that day, I work on the assumption that
everyone is going to buy a motor car.
TWK	 But you don't actually sell to everyone.
	
 Yes, because I don't think - it is very difficult
to say, this is a genuine buyer, that's not a
genuine buyer. As I say, that's the best example
I can give you about trying to estimate a buyer
from a non-buyer. I think the only time that I
would probably say to myself "He's not going to
buy" is when you get a couple of young blokes in -
eighteen year olds, or something like this. Apart
from that I wouldn't on appearance try to say this
is a buyer or it's not a buyer.
TWK	 After you have asked them a few questions do you
try and assess whether you are likely to sell them
a car or not?
	
 Oh yes, I think you tend to get an idea then.
think most of the people basically want a motor
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car, but you get a fair idea of whether it is a
sort of 'pipe dream' or whether, you know, they
are in the market in too much time or whether they
are sort of desperate and they have been round to
several other garages and they look quite genuine.
I think there is a way of sorting out how good a
punter they are - you get the odd one who really
is a time waster, but you just put that down as
bad luck and you look on it afterwards as wasting
your time. But to try and estimate beforehand, I
don't think is a good idea.
TWK	 Of the people you talk to, how many do you actually
sell cars to - how many sign the order form?
	  Well it doesn't sound very many, but I would think,
thinking about it, probably, when you say "sign
the order form" you mean eventually or then and
there?
TWK	 Or whichever. How many do you actually sell a
car to?
	  I would think about 2 in 10. It is tempting to
say more than that, but I think 2 in 10 would
probably be a fair idea.
TWK	 And once you have sold them a car, do you have
any idea of how much money is in that car - how
much you are going to earn from it?
	  No, I don't tend to look at it as to how much I
am going to earn from it. I look more at how
much the Company is going to retain profit-wise.
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Obviously, if the Company's profit is good, then
obviously, it is reflected back into my commission.
I don't actually work out my commission as I am
talking to the customer it just goes through your
head that the more profit you can retain, the more
you are going to earn out of it, so it is a little
bit hypothetical to look at how much I am going to
earn. It is easier to look at what we retain in
the deal.
TWK	 But you are conscious that your pay is directly .
	  Oh yes.
TWK	 And over the last six months you have earned more
money than you would normally.
	
 Yes, most certainly.
TWK	 Do you have any particular, well, I was going to
say 'need' for money, everybody has a 'need' for
money, but is there anything special that you are
saving for, or - you are married aren't you?
	
 I am, yes, but, no, I am not heavily committed, but
I must admit that when I first joined Britcars
about 17 years ago and I first took out a mortgage
and had bigger overheads, I must admit this gave
you the more momentum to sell and look for business
- now my commitments are a lot smaller then the
pressure is obviously not on to earn as much as you
used to.
TWK	 But you still took advantage of this opportunity to
earn.
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 Yes, you can always do with more. I think when you
see the money there and you have got a better goal
to aim for, you see on our old commission system
there wasn't the goal at the end of it. Whereas
with the scheme we have been working on for the
last six months you can see the build-up of it and,
you know, whether your commitments are high or low
everybody can use more money so.
TWK Yes. Could I talk about the job of a salesman, or
a car salesman. Can you just tell me what the job
is, what you do?
	
 Yes, basically, I think I am representing Britcars
and I am putting over my thoughts and my manners,
my courtesy, if I can use that word, and care to
induce a customer to purchase a vehicle from
Britcars.
TWK	 How much time do you spend face to face with the
customer?
	
 What, how many hours per day?
TWK	 Yes,
	
 I would think somewhere in the region of about four
hours a day I would think, that's taking into
account, when you say face to face, telephone - I
would think somewhere in the region of 4/4 1/2
hours a day.
TWK	 What do you do the rest of the time?
	
 The rest of the time you are normally sorting out
deals that you have already done. It is very time
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absorbing to see motor cars through and you have
people coming back on a service query and finance;
there is a fair bit of paper work when somebody
says yes I will buy a car - you have to sort out the
insurance for them, of course, and there is always
something to do. I will give you an example. I
spent, what, 3/4 hour this morning with a man that
bought a year ago a Jaguar from us, which has just
gone out of warranty and we are trying to get a
claim through for him from the factory - well it
involves writing letters and so on, so, although it
only seems like one small query, it can easily
absorb an hour of your time.
TWK	 Do you like being a salesman?
	  Never known any difference to be honest with you.
I have always been in selling, so yes, I do like it
- I do like meeting the people.
TWK	 What do you think other people who you meet think
of car salesmen - think of you as a car salesman?
	
 Oh, I think everybody, it's a standing joke, you
know, a second hand car salesman is a bit dodgey
with the small moustache and so on. I don't know,
I think people are coming round more now; I think
this is a nice thing about working for a large
group, because I think you have got the respect-
ability for being a car salesman when you say I am
a car salesman for Britcars, rather than say I am
a car salesman. I think, you know, if you have got
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the not necessarily Britcars, but if you have got
Kennings, the name Kennings, or Lex, or something
that has got a little bit of concrete behind it,
then it's like saying you have got, you work for a
grocer or you work for Sainsburys - it's got the
impact behind it.
TWK	 When you are at a party or something like that, do
you tell people what you do?
	  It depends, sometimes I say I sell motor cars for a
living, rather than use the words 'car salesman', I
think the word car salesman, as you were saying, is,
has got a bit of stigma about it, but I usually say
that I work in the motor car trade, or I work for
Britcars or something like this - I try not to use
the word 'car salesman'.
TWK	 How can I put this - are you competitive in car
selling - I mean competing with other salesmen?
	
 I am not too sure what you mean. When you say
competitive, do you mean, do I look at it on a, you
know, am I doing better than him this month or am I
doing worse, do you mean from that angle?
TWK	 Yes?
	  Yes, I suppose I do. I like to see the commission
sheets at the end of the month, when we get a break
down of the figures and who sold what and how much
money you have earned for the company and yes,
there is that competitiveness there - I like to
think yes, I am here, or there, or I have got to
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beat him, or I have got a little bit more than him
- yes, I do look at it from that angle.
TWK	 How much of car selling or the sales you make are
due to luck?
	  Due to luck! I think the only luck that comes into
it, to be honest with you, is being there to see
the person first. You know, somebody walks into
the showrooms, it would be unlucky if you were just
dictating a letter compared with if you were, you
know, get in five minutes earlier and I am lucky
enough to see the chappie that walks in through the
door. That's the only sort of luck that I would
say is involved in it.
TWK	 But, once you are talking to the guy?
	  No, I don't think luck comes into it. I think it
is just a matter of doing a better job than the
other people he has seen. 1 find it is a lot
easier, in most cases, especially when you are
dealing with someone like a Managing Director and
executive cars is to talk about other things and
lastly you talk about his cars and if you find his
interest, you have usually got him because he thinks
you are a nice chap, rather than give him all the
technical 'bull' on a Jaguar and this sort of
thing. If you can pinpoint the man's interest very
quickly - if he has got a set of golf clubs in the
back of his car you can usually get him talking
about golf for half an hour and the last thing he
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says is, well, we will have the car if you can
meet this quote. So, 1 find it is easier not to
talk about cars unless they specifically ask you
out and out questions.
TWK	 Can I ask you about customers now? Are there sort
of certain types of customers do you think?
	
 Oh yes. I don't think any two are the same. I
think they are all different. You obviously get
your Managing Directors on one scale and your sort
of family man. And the 'wizz-kid', if you like,
the ones that want to buy a sports car. You can
put them in those sort of categories, I suppose.
The odd woman, single woman, that's probably in a
good job and wants to buy a motor car. You know,
a nurse, or recently we sold a car to a woman
Customs Officer. You can put them into those sort
of categories - but I think, you know, one
Managing Director, I find, is very much like
another Managing Director - a family man, one
family man is very much like another family man.
TWK	 Do you approach them differently - do you have
different techniques for them?
	  Yes, I was saying that I don't talk about the motor
car, I talk about his interests - I don't think
that's true when you are dealing with the executive
type of motor cars or where a company is probably
paying for the car. I think when you are dealing
with a family man, he is more conscious, he has
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come out to buy a motor car and he goes into the
'nitty gritty' of fuel comsumptions, boot spaces
and this sort of thing, so I think you spend a lot
more time talking about the actual product with
the family man than you do with an executive.
TWK	 Do you have any special 'technique for making a
sale? Do you try and control what's going on
during the sale?
	  Yes, I do. I think I prefer to deal with the
Managing Director of a company - I prefer to deal
with the Jaguar market than the lower market. I
find these people a lot easier to get on with and
they are a lot more straight forward and you can
normally get a straight "yes" immediately, rather
than dragging on when, you know 'Aunt Mary dies'
and they are going to get a few bob and this sort
of thing with the family man. So, yes, as far as
technique goes, I can only say, you know, what I
referred to before by finding the man's interest
and playing on that. Obviously, things, general
courtesy comes into it. I have never called a man
by his first name, unless he particularly asked me
to. I think if people like to be called - I
usually put in a lot of 'Sirs' and this sort of
thing. But, after you have met them a couple of
times, you tend to be fairly matey with them and
and it becomes fairly natural. I don't think you
get a feeling when you can call them by their
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first name - a chappie when he always comes on the
'phone, says, "I am Bernie Newmarch." But if he
came on and said, "I am Mr Newmarch," I would
probably, accept this for this morning. After
about 12 years, I referred to him as "Bernie." But
I don't think you can feel your way through on that
sort of thing.
TWK	 How devious would you be to sell a car? I mean,
you must be tempted from time to time.
	
 I would be as devious as I possibly could be. I
don't think there is anything wrong with that. I
wouldn't tell an out and out lie and, of course,
the law is so tight now on motor car salesmen, on
what you can do and what you can't do. But, when
you say devious - it wouldn't worry me if I saw a
finance wreck in here and picked up some information
that somebody else was interested in a car from
another garage - it wouldn't worry me at all to go
out and chase that up. But I wouldn't tell a man a
car has never been in an accident if I know it had
been.
TWK	 Would you not disclose information to the customer?
	
 Oh yes, I wouldn't, I am just trying to think.
Obviously, when you are talking about cars that have
been in a bad accident, Britcars wouldn't sell one
in the first place anyway. If I knew there was a
fault on a motor car, sometimes, it is better, I
find it easier if it's a small thing, which we have
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got to do anyway under our warranty, it is better
to point it out to the man there and then and he
thinks more of you than letting him find it out
himself. If it is something he probably wouldn't
notice, I probably wouldn't mention it - or
something I thought we could get away with, I
probably wouldn't mention it. I don't know, that's
a difficult one that one.
TWK	 OK How do you think the other salesmen responded .
to the commission scheme. Do you think it has
worked well for them?
	  They have all been delighted with the one we have
been using over the last six months and they
would certainly like to keep it - no doubt about
that, but I think what it has done I don't know
if we have got a meeting tonight on the new
commission structure, but I think it's leaning
more to your scheme than to the old ones, so I
think it is certainly going to be a lot better, on
the little I know about it at the moment, I can
only think that your scheme has highlighted the
idea a bit. But, it was unfortunate, I think,
when your scheme came in, when I say unfortunate
from the company looking at it, because at that
particular time we had a big influx of MCP cars -
this had now drastically dropped off. We were
working on something like about 12 or 15 each MCP
cars in January/February and now we are down to
- 373 -
about the odd two or three. So, where originally
it might have given a false impression of your
commission structure by this big influx of MCP
cars coming on. I think if you looked at it now,
from the company's point of view, it would be more
realistic.
TWK	 OK. Thanks very much indeed.
APPENDIX D
DETAILS OF PERFORMANCE OF EXPERIMENTAL SALESMEN
Dl - Units Sold
D2 - Profit Per Unit
D3 - Income
0X
0
0
X
0
0
H4	 La
11 11
a) al
7
,-4
re
7
0
3
4-I +4
N
0 0
0 0
0.4	 0.4
4-1
	4-)
a
rtS
C)
HI HI
4-1	 4-1
• n••1
a a
CT•
HI +4
U)
ic	 *
4.3
a
4-/
0
a
0
4-)
.0
,
-.....
al	 a)
0 U)
a 0
0.4	 CD
PP
00
a(1.)
4-40
r
.444. 111 M 0
•	 •	 •	 •ND c-N (N in
H + + +
+
*
0
•
%.0
+
4-N 4-- t.0 Ln co o in CO
•	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
rn •cf• H 0 r-I in o ..o.
+I++++1+
.414
•
+4
+
1.11 M (V
•	 •	 •
0 0 N
+11
r-
•
0
1
•rl• al 0 rn ON 04 rn LA .--1 0 CO
•	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
Tr N %.0 01 413 0 0 04 Ca rn en
+ + + -I- + 1 + + + + +
*
4,
Lf1
•
rr1
+
rn
Z	 co
r .1 IX 01
...,-1	 H2.
zN
4 IX CO4.1	 al
Zr-I
NI--00
•	 •	 •	 •
.;l• .-4 in N.
rn rn N ,--1
01
•
43
01
C3LarriNniNNCO
•	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
V 03 HI 01 04 C) r- cr
H H H H r-I r-I	 0-1
143
•
N
.--1
Ornrn
•	 •	 •
r•-• (.4 r..
r-I r-I r-I
1.11
•
4.(1
r-I
NNNCOHICOON1/3L(1 W
•	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
al Lr% 4...- 01 O. -V M 01 MI 04 01
r-r ,--, ,-.4 ,--1 ,--1	 ,--1	 ,--1	 ,-.4 ,-, ,-4
rr,
I",
•
01
,--,
CO 01 0- o
•	 •	 •	 •
1-- ON N r-I
r-1 N N r-I
rN
•
0
N
co 4-4 r.- C"... LC1 CN l'••• 0
•	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
cl rn cr )-1 o in N .-1
r-I N	 r-I r-I	 r-I
N
•
r-I
r-I
fr) 43 Cr1
•	 •	 •
4O01 01
I-I r-I r-I
N
•
10
r--1
CO rn N L/1 N 0 I-- 0- in 1/1 CO
•	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
cl• 01 r-I 0 N1 Lt1 C,1 kr0 M ON Ill
r-I r-I r-I r-I r-I r-I r-I 	 r-I	 r-I
N
•
N
r-I
M
co
01
r-I
N
CO
131
r-I
U) CC0 •Ir
o a. 4n co
N r-I r-I
srr Hi 03 rn +I. H rn aN
co +I ..o r. r..4 kID Cr CO
r-I
01 V •rt.
40 4.--. 0
r-I
	 r-I
in 4-1 m cr, cri cr% CO LI1 N I.(1 CO
r-I ON 0 .--1 r-I CO I-- Ln co r.... .--1
e-I	 I-I r-I I-I	 r-I
N rr, V) 1.0
0 N 01 40
.--I 1-1	 .--I
Ifl 01 CO 0 rn HI 4.0 l0
4D rn Or- 10 en •rl• ID
/-I
N 0 11:3
Ca CO C3
r-I	 r-I
Cll .o. r- rr) rn 0 t.0 Ca HI r- La
CO I-- l0 l0 1-- CII1 r-- cr CO ill 0'1
In
CO
ON
1-1
N
o3
01
r-I
•
cr 01 r- 0-
N N Hi
1/40 ON IN 0 +r ..11• CO al
H Hi Hi Hi	 N
+14 r- (71
.-1 Hi H
HI rn H ON I.'. CT r-I 0 ON	 CO
N HI Hi r-I r-I	 r-I r-I	 r-I
01 CO LI1 0
H N N HI
H 10 01 Crl rn 111 CO CO
,--1 H	 H	 H
N rn CO
Hi	 r-I
CU) 0 113 01 kJ:, .--1 r•-• cr CO CO
1-1 .-I r-I	 r-I
PI
CO
01
r-I
N
CO
01
.--1
(71 In ‘11.
 1/0
rn rn 01 HI
IN r- •:). CD W V) l0 CO
H Hi	 r-I
••rr CO 0
e-I	 N
NI VI ul lf) N tfl 04 1-- 0 cr 01
r-I r-I •-1 r-I N r--I r-I
	 r-I r-I r-I
0 N 01 CNI
N N Hi H
r- ch HirrICOOtOON
H H H	 I-I
NS H
,-.1 1-1 N
ON CO 0 1/40 r.13 VD 01 VD V' I"- 40
H	 H	 H N	 H	 H
C•1
CO
01
.-I
N
03
cr,
H
h U1 Lf1 HI
01 01 04 HI
40 CO I-- rn VD PI HI 1/40
Hi HI r-I r--1	 r-I r-I ,-,
cr 01 H
N Hi H
NOD0 H HI N r- CO CD 01 Ul
1	 H H e-I CS) CI r1) r-I
	 N I-1 N
r... rn 43. 4r1
H 01 Hi Hi
(11 ON N 111 CO LI1 lfl PI
H N H H	 N
KC < KC1.........„ `,.....
Z Z Z
1".... 0 I-I 0 1"..• N CO 0 r-I I-- in
H H H H	 rn H Hi H	 H
rn
CO
crl
r-I
N
CO
43.
H
N N C) til
41. V cr N
..4. rsun in o -I C•1 tr)
N rrl HI HI N r-1	 Hi
01 r- in
H	 N
rn r-I r- rn Ht Lfl N 0 01 cr CO
IN N N 01 H r-I ,-I r-I 1-1 r-I N
LI1 CO r- rn
H01NH
ill CD L11 0 Lr) N 03 i•-•
H N H H H
+I c0 ON
N HI .--1
o) in •rr .0 rn cr rn szr 4-... 1/40 1-.-
N ,--1 H H H	 Hi	 H
rn
co
ON
r-I
N
CO
01
,-,
r•-1 WI Lel N
N N N r-I
10 Hi r-- r-I N r-I Cr1 .-I
.-, N	 r-I 1--1 r-I	 N
CIN 0 N
r-I r-I r-I
ON .0. lD tfl l0 r-I M r••• M 'Cr N
6-1 	 r-/ r-I	 r-I 1-1 N
Ill .1'. •-1 •-1
N rn N H
ON In 0 r-I M 'Cr Kr Kr
N H Hi HI	 HI
<
N-1 '',.. 0
N Z 01
43 H 01 Lf) 0 43 rn L.11 1-- N 1/40
H	 r-1 r-1	 1-1 e-1 e-I
In
c0
ON
r-I
N
CO
Crl
H
0 01 Cr, rn
'Cr V' t-I r-I
0 'Kr r'l .K1' 10 10 r-- o.
r-I r-I .-I r-I r-I
N ON 1"`•
.-I H.--4r-I
M CO er V, CO
 N " (11 CO ON N
M r-I N N N r-I N 1-1 r-I r-I N
r-I 0 V/ In
.-INN
0 N 1-1 N lt:r Ln tr) in
r-I el C) r-I
< 4 4
....„.............
ZZZ
1.... LC1 01 43 ..4. ‘.0 N CO CO r- 111
r-I r-I r-I r-I HI HI N
	 Hi H N
Z
CD
Ca
4
KC
(1)
C'NI V' Ul ‘.0 4.... co cr, o ,H c-N m +4.
+1 4-1 r-I r-I r-I
U) '.O N0-
r-I 1--1 rl
co cl, C3 ri Cs3 In V ill 10 0- CO
r-lr-INNNNININNNN
,--n
MI
4-1
'0
a)
a
-ri
PO413)	 a
040X	 s-i(U(
>,,-1
00(04404sa,044->0a
0000 0 i-.0 0 0
Pm0
-.-10
HI
ra
s-i
E
4J00 P 0,
X 4-1 a44000
s-1(0 044
Z C.) 0
0LI
C.
0
(NJ
co
a,
1'3
LI
0
LI
1-4
IA
0.1
C	 a)
o .-.
1..	 •	 .o
tr.	 4-I 	ro
C	 ,-I
C	 al	 CD	 --I
CD	 U	 ,-.	 MI
CD	 -.-4	 -fa	 >4.4	 rEl	 rEI
4.4	 . .4	 .-..
CD	 C	 - .-I 	 4-'XI	 ty,	 co	 o
..4	 >	 C
En	 U)	 rti
CD	 I
U .1-1	 4-I
C	 o	 0 .-1
0 0 C 0
14	 /4
cll	 I	 I	 4-)4-1	 C
4-1	 U) N	 0
-,I	 0	 0
Cl
	
al 0	 I
a)	 z	 4-I
a	 a)
C	 ..+4
C	 10	 I+
CD	 a	 c0
CD	 (I)
	 Z
3	 a)4.1	 •-n 	 (4
cl)	 rcl	 0
,C1	 CO	 4-1
........
00
Z CO
.-I 0
N.
In
I
in
1--1
I
In/-4
I
.cr
N
I
0 N
PI	 1/40
I	 I
N
In
+
0
N
.-I
+
L.D
N
+
'crin
+
N
I
kij
M
+
Cr
,.--.
I
4,
n0
•.-I
+
2:
<
r4
Z
N
N
r-.1
OD
v.
IN
.1.
al
•-1
In
0
C \ I
N	 I's
MI	 IN
PI	 IN
VD
NCNI
0
an
PI
.0"
10
PI
l0
1/40
PI
In
VDC \ I
•:r
01
CV
.-I
0
01
N
0
P-1
a,
N
N
r•-n
VD
CV
In
•cl.
el
01
h
N
IN	 CPIn co
el N
r-1
1/40
N
0
el
NI
CO
rl
en
P.1
.--I
el
N
1/4.0
CNI
co
in
N
In
,-i
el
r-1
0 \
C•1
P-I
03
r11
CO
CO
01
.--I
0
,-.4
eV
P-1ON
r-1
0
N
•-1
N cr
el	 t0
IN	 Pl
rn
o
PI
a)
in
P-1
0
CO
PI
0
In
PI
'V
ai
N
CO
N.
..-.
N
,-1
el
CP
N.
0
el
a)
er
N
.rr
TI.
N4
V.
N
NI
in
111
NJ
10 In
0 0C , 1	 N
N
.1.CNI
el
1/40
PI
r -
el
PI
InI 1
.-I
PI
r-
el
CNI
el
N.
N
01
rn
fq
In
03
l0
N
F.)
co
CNI
OD
V
1/40
•-n
as
03
N
In
0
N
a,
r-I
N
co m
CO	 Cr
N N
o
In
el
Tr
en
en
IN(V
cr
N
V'
el
IN
1/40
N
V
cr
V'
N
el
IN
N.
cr
N
el
001
N
.-I
in
N
el
el
N
CO
in
IN
In el
v el
•cy	 en
CIN
10
N
0
V
N
CO
0
el
el
0
V
.-I
01(V
h
I.0(N1
01
,--I
rn
F..'
(01
,--1
rn
m
a3
N
03
C'
•-n
CN
N
.4.
NI
N.
as
.-+
0,
,-.I
N
I--	 ,-1
er	 cr
el N
es
In
N
.-n
cr
N
N
N
el
rn
1/40
LA
co
IN
en
co
0,
el
r-
0
en
F.)
cr
el
el
0
OD
es.]
0
0
el
elN.
N
OD
CNI
1/49	 0,M es
el	 rn
ST.
0
iNi
,4
n+
CV
0,
OD
CV
tO.
CO
N
el
m
NI
\Sl
CO
el
W).(N)
NI
1/4D
.	 Z
03
N
F..'
03
N
CO
In
LC)
N
N
N.
N
(U.
01
.-I
0
V
IN
I's	 0
.	 in	 CIL
N	 .--n
0
i•-•(V
.-1
0
V
NJ
r-
el
CN
In
el
01
el
el
0
0
,--I
0
0
en
In
r-•03
N
.-I
CO
.-I
el
N
N
V
In
N
1/40
el
N
1/40	 01
n.C.	 rn
el	 CV
0
47,
N
OD
V
NI
VD
rn
en
cr
In
rn
el01 Nel
CV
el
in
el
In
al
r-
N
F..'
03
N1
a,
C'
el
•-n
V.
0
N
CO
el
.-I
0
1/40
r-i
0	 .--I
el	 ,-I
N (V
V
at
,-+
rn
N
el
(V
CO(V
..-1
el
NI
01
•--I
N
.--n
In
‘1.
CO
r-I
en
CO
CO
Is-
N
n-o
ro
N
cr
cr
N
1/40
Tr
el
In
1/413C1/41
%CICT
el
01
CO
N
1/40
In
N
01
a)
el
co
,71.
N
In
0,
,-i
el
1/40
N
0
0
en
In
an
rsN
F..'
03
N
CO
rs.
V
.-t
en
r-
(N)
es
el
CNI
IT
..-1
IN
.--4	 1/40CO	 .-4
in	 .-I
InCO
N
cl.
C11
el
0
0
V.
N
V
P'1
N
V
,-I
N
al
4-4
in
en
el
N.
0
,.-..
M
in
Iss
,-.
CO
nD
N
in
CA
1/40
al
r-
en
1/40
1/40
•cl•
N
n 0
N
0
k 0
0
r,
el
h
1/40
N
.1.
N
In
.-I
N
.-4
N
In
•er
el
N
el
Z
(J)
CL1
n-4
4
c)
*O. ul VD N in
•-i
a) CT 0
r-1
4-4
p-1
N
r4
rn
.-1
V
r-1
.--1
ra
4-1
C
a,
a
-,1
I-I
CD
CL
X
al
CL
C
0
14
0
C	 0
MI	 /-I
CL	 4-I
E	 Z
00
00
CO
Cr1
El
rn
0
El
co
cr,
1-3
El
0
(N1
CO
Co
Ces
S./
cr)
^
•-•••
co
en
14
•-)(1)
0
c0
• 4
cc1
U	 7
4.3 -1-) rts
0
O	 >
rt1
7 3 04
0 e	 r0
--- 0
o
4-)
ra
(1) a) 0	 34
U
1+1
r0
El >
0,
0Lr;
0	 N
r0
r-4
n3
H	 11
0
•r1
4.4
s.r
4-, rd	 a)
4-$
V U in
>
a)	 a)
II ii 0	 >
3-1
El El pa 	 a)
01 X)
a)	 0
r0 (13 3
El > -(J ul
a)	 o
a) '0a)
> (1)
a)
ul
1,
in
U
,Cl .Cl al	 4.1
0 0 )4
r0
L4-4
111 4-1	 ••-1
co 0 44
•.-1
0 0
Ni 4.4
aL
(I)(1) C.0
F • •
4.)
0
rO
0
0
co
0
1-1
+1 +I el
4-1 0 0
+1 +I U
C
cf (0
4, 4, 0
(13
E
0
U
•
cIP
N	 0	 ,i4
(.0	 01	 1".•
UD	 N
4
4-1
C
00) 0)
in En E
its	 rizI
01	 a)	 3-1
14140)(1/
C./	 Cl	 04
00)
1-.1 01 X
0 rr., .4.
CO 0 r.-
'0' 1/40 +
+ +
*
1.--
CO
In
+
•
rn .7. OD CO 4cr I11 en V' .-I
CO cr r-i I-4 + N kr) pi rn
c-i + .--1 +	 + c-1	 I	 +
+1	 +
l0
en
+
N ,-I VD r-, N 0 1 C 0 N ,-4 rn rn
+NC04,11.01,11 1".. 01 en COln
+ .--5 CNJ r-i .-1 + +	 I	 ++
++++ 
*
*
N
01
+
1-1 .0
a) 4-)
CL 0
0
I X 0
r... .4	 cr,
N 1--I 01
I-- r- N
o
CO
Ln
.4. nD 01 0 00,01010
CO 1--. 01-10001110000
N rn r- .7. cr •cr ,-1 N .7
Crl
01
rn
rn OD co N cr, a, rn *V N L.0 .7.
0 e") tr, I.-- CV OD 1-, OD tfl N rn
Ln cr C.4 (V en 04 en I-4 Cet N 44,
L13
rn
en
0
7
1-D
N 4er N
u.) in in
VI P..- N
01
,-I
Ill
4:e ,I-1 CD N N OD V r-I N
r.. I-- CO rn ct. rn ,-I cr. N
e-I ,-I ce 4er en cr ,--1 r9 in
cn
N
rn
in 01 CC 1 0 1 N mu-loot-N-4.
,-100N‘0t.00.-1.-1000 rn
tO in rn .-1 rn N cl• N cr /V N
oo
cr
rn
>./
Ca
Z
..4. 0 CO
C) C)'0V'
1/417 4:1. N
.rt.
e•-•
cr.
..I. ,-iNcnoornmoo
v• lD CO CN r•1 CV .7. .7 Lft
.-4 en N en '0'P1 en N 41'
nc
N
en
NN nDlOV.0,--103.-1 1---01
0 k0 r- co CNI Ln o o cr, cs, ,-1
l0 CU •-1 r-I V' C -4 en N en ,-I 41'
0
.-I
01
it
04
<
N 010
ao oo rn
r-I N in
r-I
'Cr
rn
co
CO til 0 lID e-- CO CO ,-4 tO
r-i rn r- r in c-1 %JD 1-4 CO
rn vo c7 (NJ in r‘c .-I N l•-n
,-I
.-I
1--.
40'
C4 0 en 0 en 01 tO 1-- P1'0' 1--I
lll cr ,-I .-. Lo %.o a, .4. o .4. tra
tll 04 et] m .--I rn .7. N en ,-1 rn
OD
o
rn
14
rcl
£
CO N CNI
01 CO rs
s s (NJ
n174
.-1
uo
en .-I .-I ce VD scr CD N e--
0 l0 0 rn N 0 rn rn k0
in N r-- Ln .7 1/40	 CnI N
.--1
in
Cr
CNI ,-1 crlf10301PINCSIODCI.
.--i Ln rn ,-1 .7 r-i CIN rn Ln ty kr)
CO N rn rn .7. c‘i LO ,-i .-1 rn Ln
en
N
.7.
.0
a.)[L,
C) ,-.1 en
I-- kr) Ln
%SD ul rn
.-.
rn
/II
rn in I-- k.0 0 Ln 1/40 Cs1 0
r- cs) in .-i 1/40 N. 01 CO N
,-I rn r-- rn in Ln	 k0 .-I
0
0
4er
N k0NC0.-103,-10r-rnal
N rn tn cr cr. in r... r•-) CSI cl• .-I
N '0'N cn rn csi	 Ncrrntfl
03
rn
rn
7
113
rD
0 en .7.
VI .-I rn
4:1' 01 ,-I
a,
Ch
4T
N •-n CNI I-- 0 .7. rn 0 rn
Cr, 0 1/40 N N C 1 1 0 rn rn
en u i c n tn tr) rnI cs.i .--1 N
Cr,
N
4er
0rn n0Nrnl0 Lrl N 01 crOD
.-1 cn 00 .4• 01CTI1/40C0s1. 0
CNI N rn .-1 N cr. Ln	 N •-n LC/
VD
CO
N
14 ,0
Ill 4-/
0 0
0
I >4	 E
s s ni
o 1-I I"-
N rn rn
s
tD
al
s 0 ,-I CO •cr '0' Nsi i n ,-1
t.D es1 01 N OD en N LI) .-1
.7. .7. LI1 	 rn N Lf1
in
en
cl.
c D i 3, ..:r 0 1/40 C 0 n-1 ,-i .-I Cr, r.-
c-i in in NN,PC310DNOCO
Ln .7. .7. in Ln .7. rn N rn rn .7.
CO
CV
•V
0
7
I-)
0 V. CO
N rn a,
OD lel •-n
I--
,-1
in
Lfl cr 0 .-I rn lD III rn CO
.7 N .-1 kr) 0 .-1 c0 I-- 0
,-1 .7 rn rn cr. cr .7 .-1 r-
,-I
CO
tn
c-irninrnr-	 N ,4 N .o. ,-4
rn CO Ch f-I tip kr/ V. Cr, N ..-1 VD
k0 Ln rn Ln tr) rn .7. N cNi ,-I N
cr,
Crl
rn
›,
ClI
Z
cy rn a,
rn r-o .7
al 41- Let
.-1
in
CO
Cel
c0 .7. I-- 0 1---,1-/l0Cese4
crNinc-slaDaNss ,-I
en et1 I". I-1 en I-1 I-I N 04
CD
0
rn
PI Cl. en k0 cOr-0Dr1.--4alk0
ceen,D,D 1-1 la ce 4 :elliNN
rn '0 . cr rn %SD cr in ric N P1 CY
al
al
en
1-1
0.
<
1/40 .-1 tfl
0 I-- CO
in rn in
.-n .-1
.--1
cs1
.-L
.--1
ODVDNCOODI--01,-1 e--
r- a, Ln N CNI ...A N Ln 0
r-LnkaLn.:r en 4er cr 111
1-I
N
lfl
enuirna,Lnr-NLn.7.COtn
,-4,-1.7.c0cOrnalc0.70C0
in .rr ric cn ito cr. in rn in rn ico
0
a,
cr
S-I
ra
.2.
rsc 00
C) N(.0te,
,--, 0, .:r
NN
,-4
N
cr,
,-I
in •-4 Ill LSI V' 1-4 VD CI N
0 Lel VD N 00 CO CO V' csi
tri .4. r-- r-- 1/40 1"-- PI	 in
0
.7.
LO
lID in ,-I vr ,-1 r /NI r- rn oo (NI
.-1 co 0 CO .-i r-- cr Ln rn r-- co
COMOD1/40.O.I.11 crrnen .7c0
at
r-
Ln
.00./
Ea
C) L.C. en
n-n cr C.-
r- as .-1
cy
r,
kL.
a, tn 1/41)010-11/4D .CP Tr nD
N N rn Ln 1/40 kr. 0 -40
.7. rn co rsi cr rn rn in c0
N
r-
.7.
cr. r... rn CO 0,-4 ..-I rn r- Ln en
r-- rn 1/40 in In 0 OD 0 CNI rsi .7.
encrrnencren	 N N en tin
rn
rn
en
0
RI
1-3
in LID en
CO Lri r--
CO 1/40 rn
CO
rn
1/40
0, .--1 ul I-- 01 c) cs1 en N
.7 c, rn r-- en en ln h rA
tn In N Ln Ln Ln ..-I .-1 rn
k0
al
rn
CNI N N N in rn .-1 c0 in Cr, 0
OD 0 V7,-104 .7 .70 .* Ol N
rn rn in ka .1. Lrl r 1 C \I rn N ,--I
r-
1/40
rn
Z
OD
El
1-4
<
C/3
cr. VI k.0
	
1-.... Lf) OD al 0 ,--I N rn cr	 UllOr....030%/0,--1Nrnc1.. L11
I-I	 ,-I .-. .-. .-i I-I	 .-i .-.1 ,-1,-1.-INNNNN N
.-1	
.
CCI	 -
4J
0
a/	 I X>,r-I	 I X	 riE
+	 00	 4101
/-I	 CL	 .0	 al	 >4	 0,	 .0	 a)	 )4	 o.,4-1	 ci. 4-)	 4"	 ,x 4-)a) 0	 0	 0 0 	 C	 1400CL 0	 0	 014 	 0	 (0014X	 I-I
DI 0	 Z	 000	 k:	 Z U 0
APPENDIX E 
PSYCHOMETRIC MEASURES
1. Demographic Data Form 1
2. Demographic Data Form 2
3. Rosenberg Measure of Self-Esteem
4. Rotters - Locus of Control
5. Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale
6. Manifest Need Questionnaire
7. Machievellianism Scale
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